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ART. I. — *Remarks on the Past, and its Legacies to American Society.* By J. D. NOURSE. Louisville (Ky.) : Morton & Griswold. 1847. 16mo. pp. 223.

A CRITIC in this city expresses surprise that this book could have been written by a young man born and brought up in Kentucky ; but we see no reason why it could not have been written by a young man as well as by an old man, and in Kentucky as well as in any other part of the Union. We suppose they read in Kentucky as well as in Massachusetts ; and it is not more strange that a young Kentuckian than that a young Bostonian should expend a good deal of thought in elaborating a system compounded of sense and nonsense, truth and falsehood, common-place and crude speculation. The book certainly indicates some natural and acquired ability, but no ability peculiar to either side of the Alleghanies. The substance of it may be read any day in Schlegel, Carlyle, Macaulay, Guizot, Bancroft, and *The Boston Quarterly Review*. We have discovered nothing new or striking in the views it sets forth, or if now and then something we never met with before, it is usually something we have no desire to meet with again.

The author tells us, in his brief *advertisement*, “ that it may seem presumptuous for a young backwoodsman to enter the lists with Schlegel, Guizot, and Macaulay.” We think it not only may *seem* so, but that it actually *is* so ; for Schlegel and Guizot — to say nothing of Macaulay — are at least men of varied and profound erudition. They are scholars, and have not derived their learning at second or third hand. Mr. Nourse may rival, nay, surpass them, in his ambition and self-confi-

dence ; but he must live long, and enjoy advantages of study which neither Kentucky nor Massachusetts affords, before he rivals them in any thing else, or can do much else than travesty them. Not that we regard either of them as a safe guide. Guizot is eclectic and humanitarian ; and Schlegel is too mystical, and too ambitious, to reduce within a theory matters which by their very nature transcend any theory the human mind can form or comprehend. Mr. Nourse has, if you will, extraordinary natural abilities, an honest and ingenuous disposition ; but he has not yet begun to master the present, far less the whole past. He has a vague recognition of religion, concedes some influence to Christianity in civilizing the world ; but he is without faith, and has yet to learn the very rudiments of the Christian creed. We doubt, also, whether he is able to give even the outlines of a single historical period, or of a single people or institution, with sufficient accuracy to enable them to serve as the basis of a single sound induction. One should know the *facts* of history before proceeding to construct its *philosophy*. He will forgive us, therefore, if we tell him that we do regard him as not a little presumptuous in attempting a work for which he has in reality not a single qualification. He writes, indeed, with earnestness ; his style, though somewhat cramped, and deficient in freedom and ease, is dignified, simple, clear, and terse, occasionally rich and beautiful ; but this cannot atone for the general incorrectness of his statements, or the crudeness and unsoundness of his speculations.

With sound premises and freed from the prejudices of his education, we doubt not, Mr. Nourse might arrive at passable conclusions ; but he is ruined by his love of theorizing, his false philosophy, and his unsound theology. He may have philanthropic impulses and generous sentiments ; he may mean to be a Christian, and actually believe that he is a Christian believer ; but, whether he knows it or not, the order of thought which he seeks to develop and propagate is neither more nor less than the old Alexandrian Syncretism, as obtained through German Mysticism, French Eclecticism, and Boston Transcendentalism. Radically considered, his system, if system it can be called, is the old Alexandrian system, which sprang up in the third century of our era, as the rival of the Christian Church, ascended the throne of the Cæsars with Julian the Apostate, and fled to Persia in the sixth century, when Justinian closed the last schools of philosophy at Athens. This system was an attempted fusion of all the particular forms of

Gentilism, moulded into a shape as nearly like Christianity as it might be, and intended to dispute with it the empire of the world. It borrowed largely from Christianity, — copied the forms of its hierarchy, and many of its dogmas ; which has led some in more recent times, who never consult chronology, to charge the Church with having herself copied her hierarchy, her ritual, and her principal doctrines from it. It made no direct war on the Christian Symbol ; it simply denied or derided the sources whence it was obtained, and the authority which Christian faith always presupposes. It called itself *Philosophy*, and its pretension was to raise philosophy to the dignity of religion, and to do by it what Christianity professes to do by faith and an external and supernaturally accredited revelation. It was, therefore, Gentile Rationalism, and, in fact, Gentile Rationalism carried to its last degree of perfection. It is this Rationalism, met and refuted by the great Fathers of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries, that lies at the bottom of our author's thought, and which he labors to reproduce with a zeal — we cannot say ability — not unworthy of a disciple of Plotinus, Proclus, and Porphyrius.

This should not surprise us. There is nothing new under the sun. The old Gentile world exhausted human reason ; and it is not possible, even with a full knowledge of all the Church teaches, taking human reason alone as the basis of our system, to surpass the old Alexandrian Syncretism, or Neoplatonism, as it is sometimes called. In constructing it, the human mind had present to it, as materials, all the labors and traditions of Gentilism in all ages and nations, and also all the teachings and traditions of Jews and Christians, as well as of the Jewish and early Christian sects ; and it was, from the point of view of Rationalism, the *resumé* of the whole. It was the last word of heathendom. In it Gentilism, collecting and combining all that was not the Christian Church, exerted all her forces and all her energies for a last desperate battle against the Nazarene, the triumph of the Cross. Catholicity or Rationalism is, as every one knows or may know, the only alternative that remains to us since the preaching of the Gospel. Impossible, then, is it to depart from Catholicity without falling back on Rationalism, and, if a little profound and consistent, upon Neoplatonism, as Rationalism in its fulness and integrity. All heresies are simply attempts to return to this Rationalism, and in it they find their complement, as may be historically as well as logically established. All your modern philosophies are regarded as profound and complete

only as they approach it. Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Cousin, Leroux, De Lamennais, Hermes, Schleiermacher, Carlyle, Emerson, Parker, all belong to the Alexandrian school, and only reproduce, more or less successfully, its teachings, and to the best of their ability renew the war it waged against the Christian Church.

It is no objection to what we assert, that the sects and many of the modern philosophies retain some or even the greater part of the Christian dogmas. Neoplatonism did as much. We must not forget that Neoplatonism is subsequent to the Christian Church ; that it took its rise in the school of Ammonius Saccas, in the beginning of the third century of our era ; that it received its form and development from Plotinus, who flourished about the year of our Lord 260 ; and that it proposed itself as the rival rather than the antagonist of Christianity. Its aim was to satisfy the ever recurring and indestructible religious wants of the human soul, without recognizing the Christian Church, or bowing to the authority of the Nazarene. It was not the Christian doctrines, abstracted from the Christian Church, and received as philosophy on the authority of reason or even private inspirations, instead of the authority of our Lord and his supernaturally commissioned teachers, that it opposed. It was willing to accept Christianity as a philosophy, or a part of philosophy ; but not as a religion, far less as a religion complete in itself and excluding all others. Hence, it, as well as the Church, taught one Supreme God existing as a Trinity in Unity, the immortality of the soul, the fall of man and the corruption of human nature, the necessity of redemption, self-denial and the practice of austere virtue ; that we are bound to worship God, must live for him, and can attain to supreme felicity only in attaining to an ineffable union with him. In the simple province of philosophy it was often profound and just. In many things it and Christianity ran parallel one with the other. Not unfrequently do the Alexandrian philosophers talk like Christian Fathers, and Christian Fathers talk like Alexandrian philosophers. There is Neoplatonism in St. Gregory Nazianzen, in St. Basil, and St. Austin. The most renowned of the Fathers studied in its schools, as distinguished Doctors now study in the schools of the philosophers of France and Germany. But Neoplatonism was at bottom a philosophy, and whatever it held from Christianity, it held as philosophy, as resting on a human, not a Divine basis. The philosophers transformed Christianity, so far as they accepted it, into a philosophy ; while

the Fathers made Neoplatonism, so far as they did not reject it, subservient to Christianity, to the statement and explication of Christian theology to the human understanding, keeping it always within the province of reason, and never allowing it to become the arbiter of the dogmas of faith, or to supersede or interfere with the Divine authority on which alone they were to be meekly and submissively received. The Fathers, therefore, were not less Christian for the philosophy they did not reject, nor the Alexandrians the less Gentile Rationalists for the Christian doctrines they borrowed. One may embrace, avowedly, all Christian doctrine, without approaching the Christian order, if, as Hermes proposed, he embraces it as philosophy, or on the authority of reason ; for the Christian, to be a Christian believer, must believe God, and therefore Christianity, because it is his supernatural word, not because it is the word of human reason or human sentiment, as contend our modern Liberal Christians.

It would be interesting to show historically the resemblance of the whole modern un-Catholic world to the old Alexandrian world represented by Plotinus, Jamblicus, Porphyrius, Proclus, and Julian the Apostate ;— how each heresiarch and each modern philosopher only reproduces what the old Christian Fathers fought against and defeated, — how each progress in this boasted age of progress only tends to bring us back to the system which the Gregories, the Basils, and their associates combated from the Christian pulpit and the Episcopal chair ; but we have neither the space nor the learning to do it as it should be done. Yet no one who has studied with tolerable care the learned Gentilism of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries of our era, and is passably well acquainted with the modern Rationalism of France and Germany, and the movements of the various heretical sects in our day, can doubt that our own nineteenth century is distinguished for its return to Gentilism, and has nearly reproduced it under its most perfect form. The various forms of heathenism had become effete ; no one of them any longer satisfied the minds or the hearts of its adherents. An age of skepticism and indifference had intervened, attended by a licentiousness of manners and public and private corruption which threatened the universal dissolution of society. Individuals rose who saw it, and felt the necessity of a general reform, and that a general reform was impossible without religion. But they would not, on the one hand, accept the Church, and could not, on the other, hope any thing

from any of the old forms of heathenism. The world must have a religion, and could not get on without it. But how get a religion, when all religions were discarded, when all forms of religion were treated with general neglect or contempt ?

The Reformers saw that they must have a religion, and, since none existed which was satisfactory, none which was powerful enough to meet the exigency of the times, they must make one for themselves ; — that is, form one to their purpose out of the old particular religions no longer heeded. Alexandria was their proper workshop, for there were collected or lying about in glorious confusion all the necessary materials. They began with the assumption, that all religions are at bottom equally true, and that the error of each is in its exclusiveness, in its claiming to be the whole of religion, and the only true religion. Take, then, the elements of each, mould them together into a complete and harmonious whole, and you will have the true religion, a religion which will meet the wants of all minds and hearts, rally the human race around it, and be “ The Church of the Future.” Hence arose the Alexandrian Syncretism, combining in one systematic whole, as far as reason could combine them, all the known religions of the world, which, under the name of philosophy, but which became a veritable superstition, disputed the empire of the world with Christianity for full three hundred years.

What is the movement of our day, but an attempt of the same sort ? By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the various forms of heresy, in which the Protestant spirit had developed itself, and which had attempted to reproduce Gentilism without forfeiting their title to Christianity, had exhausted their moral force, and the age began to lapse again into the old license and corruption. Never in its worst days was there grosser immorality and corruption in the Roman Empire than prevailed in England during the earlier half of the last century, under the reigns of George the First and George the Second. Deism was rife in the court, in the schools, in the church, among the nobility and the people. Germany was hardly better, if so good ; and of France under the regency of the profligate Duke of Orleans, or under Louis the Fifteenth with his *parc au cerfs*, we need not speak. Literature was infidel throughout, and atheism became fashionable. To the rabid infidel propagandism, begun by the English deists, and carried on by Voltaire and his associates, under the motto, *Écrasez l'infame*, soon succeeded, as of old, profound skepticism and indifference. Neither false re-

ligion nor no religion could rouse the mind from the torpidity into which it sank. Exclusive heresy, or, as we may say, sectarianism, born from the Protestant Reformation, though producing its effects far beyond the limits of the so-called Protestant world, had caused all forms of religion, about the beginning of this century, to be treated as equally false and contemptible.

But, once more, individuals started up frightened at the prospect they beheld. They felt and owned the eternal truth, *Man cannot be an atheist*. They saw the necessity of a general reform, and that a general reform could be effected only by religion. But, disdaining the Church as did the old Alexandrians, and seeing clearly that all the particular forms of Protestantism were worn out, they felt that they must have a new religion, and to have it they must make it for themselves, or reconstruct it out of such materials as the old religions supplied. The principle on which they proceed is precisely the Alexandrian. To them all religions are equally true or equally false, — true as parts of a whole, false when regarded each as a whole in itself. Take, then, the several religions which have been and are, mould them into a complete, uniform, and systematic whole, and you will have what the Editor of *The Boston Quarterly Review*, and Chevalier Bunsen after him, call “The Church of the Future,” and Dr. Bushnell and his friends call “Comprehensive Christianity,” — what Saint-Simon denominated *Nouveau Christianisme*, and M. Victor Cousin brilliantly advocates under the name of Eclecticism, borrowed avowedly from the Neoplatonists.

In perfect harmony with this, you see everywhere attempts to amalgamate sects, to form the un-Catholic world into one body, with a common creed, a common worship, and a common purpose. While the philosophers elaborate the bases of the union, statesmen and ministers attempt its practical realization. This is what we see in “Evangelical Alliances” and “World Conventions,” in the formation of “The Evangelical Church” in Prussia, and the union of Prussia and England in establishing the bishopric of Jerusalem. The aim is everywhere the same that it was with the Alexandrians, the principles of proceeding are the same, and the result, if obtained, must be similar. The movement of the un-Catholic world now, how much soever it may borrow from Christianity, however near it may approach the Catholic model, can be regarded, by those who understand it, only as a conscious or unconscious effort to reproduce the Gentile Rationalism of the old Alexandrian school.

The identity of the two movements might be established even down to minute details. The most fanciful dreams of our Transcendentalists may be found among the Alexandrians, — either with those who disavowed Christianity, or the sects, professing to retain it, allied to them. The very principle of Transcendentalism, namely, an element or activity in the human soul above reason, by which man is placed in immediate communion with the Divine mind, is nothing but the *Ecstasy* or *Trance* of the Neoplatonists, or their *fifth* source of science ; and the Alexandrian theurgy and magic are reproduced in your Swedenborgianism and Mesmerism. Moreover, the Protestant Reformation itself not only involved as its legitimate consequence a return to the Alexandrian Rationalism, but was in some measure the effect of such return. To be satisfied of this, we need but study the history of the Revival of Letters and the controversies of the schools in the fifteenth century. We say nothing of the Revival in so far as it was simply a revival of classical antiquity under the relation of art, or beauty of form, — under which relation it was in no sense censurable, but perhaps a progress. Christian piety and learning can coexist with barbarism in taste, and want of elegance and polish in manners, but do not demand them. The Revival, however, was, in fact, something more than this, and something far different from it. Those Greek scholars who escaped from Constantinople when it was taken by the Turks, and who spread themselves over Western Europe, did not bring with them merely the poets, orators, and historians of ancient Greece, nor merely more complete editions of Plato and Aristotle ; they brought with them Proclus and Plotinus, and the old Alexandrian Rationalism, with its Oriental comprehensiveness and its Greek subtlety. They made no attacks on the Church, — they professed profound respect for Catholicity, and with Eastern suppleness readily submitted to her authority ; but they deposited in the minds and hearts of their disciples the germs of a system the rival of hers, which weakened their attachment to her doctrines, disgusted them with the barbarous Latin and *un-Greek* taste of her Monks, and the rigid, sometimes frigid, Scholasticism of her Doctors. These germs were not slow in developing, and very soon gave us the Neoplatonists in philosophy, and the Humanists in literature, of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The former destroyed the authority of the Schoolmen ; the latter, at the head of whom stood Erasmus, the Voltaire of his time, covered the clergy, especially the Monks, with ridicule, and

sowed the seeds of practical, as the others had of speculative, infidelity. Combined or operating to the same end, they prepared, and, favored by the politics of the period, produced, the Protestant Reformation. Not accidentally, then, has Protestantism from its birth manifested a Gentile spirit, misrepresented and ridiculed every thing distinctively Christian, or that it is now undeniably developing in pure Alexandrian Syncretism, gathering itself up as a grand and well-organized superstition to wage war once more on the old Alexandrian battleground, with the old Alexandrian forces and arms, against the Nazarene, as Julian the Apostate always terms our Lord. Was it by accident that Protestantism, wherever permitted to follow its instincts, began by pulling down, breaking, or defacing the Cross, the sacred symbol of Christianity?

The identity of the modern movement with that which resulted in Alexandrian Syncretism may be traced also in the pantheistic tendencies of the day. The Alexandrian school rejected none of the popular gods; it placed Apis and Jove, Isis and Hercules, and sometimes even Christ himself, in the same temple; but all under the shadow of the god Serâpis, the symbol of unity, or rather of *THE WHOLE, THE ALL*, that is, of pure pantheism, in which all pure Rationalism is sure to end. To what does all modern philosophy tend, but to pantheism? Have we not seen Spinoza in our own day rehabilitated, and commented upon as the greatest of modern philosophers? Cousin's Eclecticism is undeniably pantheistic, and less cannot be said of Schellingism or Hegelism. Socialism, now so rife, is simply pantheism adapted to the apprehensions of the vulgar, — refined and voluptuous with the Fourierists and Saint-Simonians, coarse and revolting with the Chartists and Red Republicans.

But we are pursuing this line of remark beyond our original purpose. We may return to it hereafter. In the mean time we invite those who have the requisite leisure and learning to take up the subject, and consider the relation of all the ancient and modern sects to Gentilism, the persistence of Gentilism in Christian nations down to our own times, in spite of the anathemas of the Church and the unwearied efforts of the Catholic clergy to exterminate it, and its all but avowed revival in our own day under the most comprehensive, scientific, erudite, subtle, and dangerous form it ever assumed. In doing this, great attention should be paid to chronology; for *the* Gentilism with which it is the fashion among Protestants and unbelievers to compare Christianity, and from which it is pretended

the Church has largely borrowed, will be found to have been formed two centuries and a half after the birth of our Lord. That stupendous fabric, that systematic organization of Gentilism, which we find in the time of Julian the Apostate, and which fell with him, was not the model copied by the Church, but was itself modelled after the Christian hierarchy, and it is heathenism that has *Christianized*, not the Church that has *heathenized*. The Platonism of modern times, whether on the Continent or in England, is not the Platonism of Plato, but of the Alexandrians, as every one knows who has studied Plato himself in his own inimitable Dialogues, not merely in the speculations of Plotinus, or the commentaries of Proclus.

That our author, born and brought up in the Protestant world, and formed by its Gentile spirit and tendencies, should even unconsciously fall into the Alexandrian order of thought, and labor to reconstruct a system intended to rival the Christian, is nothing strange. In doing so, he only yields to the spirit of the age, and follows the lead of those whom the age owns and reverences as its chiefs. That his system is not Christian, although he would have us receive it as Christian, is evident enough from his *dictum* with regard to miracles. "The miracles ascribed to Christ and his Apostles," he says, (p. 61,) "however conclusive to those who witnessed them, are no evidence to us, until *by other means* we have established the truth of the writings which record them, — that is to say, *until we have proved all that we wish to prove*." There is a sophism in this, which, probably, the author does not perceive. If the writings are the *only* authority for the miracles as historical facts, that we must establish their historical *authenticity* before the miracles can be evidence to us, we concede ; but not their *truth*, that is, the truth of the mysteries they teach, the material object of faith, — therefore the matter we want proved. The miracles are not proofs of the mysteries, but simply motives of credibility. "Rabbi, we know that thou art come a teacher from God ; for no man could do these miracles which thou doest, unless God were with him." Ordinary historical testimony, though wholly inadequate to prove the mysteries, is sufficient to prove the miracles as facts, and, when so proved, they are evidence to us in the same manner and in the same degree that they were to those who witnessed them. It does not, therefore, follow that we must prove, without them, all we want proved, before they can be evidence to us.

But this by the way. The author in his *dictum* asserts ei-

ther that Christianity is not provable at all, or that it is provable without miracles ; but no Christian can assert either the one or the other. The former is absurd, if Christianity came from God and is intended for reasonable beings. God, as the author of reason, cannot require us to believe, and we as reasonable beings cannot believe, without reason, or authority sufficient to satisfy reason. The latter cannot be said without reducing Christianity to the mere order of nature ; for a supernatural religion is, in the nature of things, provable only by supernaturally accredited witnesses, and witnesses cannot be supernaturally accredited without miracles of some sort. To deny the necessity of miracles as motives of credibility, or to assert the provability of Christianity without them, is to deny the supernatural character of Christianity, and therefore to deny Christianity itself ; for Christianity is essentially and distinctively supernatural. Without the miracles, Christianity is provable only as a philosophy, and as a philosophy it must lie wholly within the order of nature ; since philosophy, by its very definition, is the science of principles cognizable by the light of natural reason. Rationalism turns for ever within the limits of nature, and, do its best, it can never overleap them. It can never rise to Christianity ; all it can do is, by rejecting or explaining away the mysteries, discarding all that transcends reason, to bring Christianity down to itself, — a fact we commend to the serious consideration of all who pretend that our religion, even to its loftiest mysteries, is rationally or philosophically demonstrable. The Christianity they can prove as a philosophy is no more the Christianity of the Gospel than the Neoplatonism of Proclus and Plotinus was the Christianity of the Gregories, the Basils, and the Austins.

The author also betrays the unchristian character of his order of thought in his third discourse, entitled *Spiritual Despotism and the Reformation*. He says, indeed, in this part of his work, some very handsome things — in his own estimation — of the Church ; but, as he says them from the humanitarian point of view, on the hypothesis that she is a purely human institution, and therefore a gigantic imposition upon mankind, we cannot take them as evidences of his Christian mode of thinking. If the Church is what we hold her to be, these humanitarian compliments and apologies are impertinent ; and if what he holds her to be, they betray on his part a very unchristian laxity of moral principle. An infallible Church, the Church of God, needs no apologies ; man's Church, or the Synagogue of Satan,

deserves none. But, although the author maintains that the Church was very necessary from the fifth to the fifteenth century, — that she preserved our holy religion, and without her Christian faith and piety would have been lost, Christianity would have been unable to fulfil her mission, and the European nations would have remained uncivilized, ignorant, illiterate, ruthless barbarians,—he yet holds that she was a spiritual despotism, and the Protestant Reformation was inevitable and necessary to emancipate the human mind from her thralldom, and to prepare the way for mental and civil freedom.

According to the author, the spiritual despotism of the Church consisted in her claiming and exercising authority over faith and morals,—over the minds, the hearts, and the consciences of the faithful. If we catch his meaning, which does not appear to lie very clear or distinct even in his own mind, the despotism is in the authority itself, not simply in the fact that the Church claims and exercises it. It would be equally despotism, if claimed and exercised by any one else, because it is intrinsically hostile to the rights of the mind and to the principles of civil liberty. Consequently, he objects not merely to the *claimant*, but to the thing *claimed*, and rejects the authority, let who will claim it, or let it be vested where or in whom it may.

But this is obviously unchristian. If we suppose Christianity at all, we must suppose it as an external revelation from God, a definite and authoritative religion, given by the Supreme Lawgiver to all men as the Supreme Law, binding upon the whole man, against which no one has the right to think, speak, or act, and to which every one is bound to conform in thought, word, and deed. All this is implied in the very conception of Christianity, and must be admitted, if we admit the Christian religion at all. The authority objected to is therefore included in the fundamental conception of the Christian revelation, and consequently we cannot denominate it a spiritual despotism without denominating Christianity itself a spiritual despotism, which, we need not say, would be any thing but Christian.

The author's order of thought would carry him even farther. If the authority of the Church is a spiritual despotism for the reason he assigns, the authority of God is also a spiritual despotism. The principle on which he objects to the Church is, that the mind and the state are free, and that any authority over either is unjust. The essence of despotism is not that it is authority, but that it is authority without right, will without reason, power without justice. We cannot suppose the exist-

ence of God without supposing the precise authority over the mind and the state objected to. If this authority, claimed and exercised in his name by the Church, is despotism, it must be, then, because he has no right to it ; if no right to it, he is not sovereign ; if not sovereign, he does not exist. If God does not exist, there is no conscience, no law, no accountability, moral or civil. To this conclusion the author's notions of mental freedom and civil liberty, pushed to their logical consequences, necessarily lead.

Every Christian is obliged to recognize, in the abstract, to say the least, the precise authority claimed and exercised by the Church over faith and morals, over the intellect and the conscience, in spirituals and in temporals ; and it is a well-known fact, that all Christian sects, as long as they retain any thing distinctively Christian, do claim, and, as far as able, exercise it, and never practically abandon it, till they lapse into pure Rationalism, from which all that is distinctively Christian disappears. It cannot be otherwise ; because Christianity is essentially law, and the Supreme Law, for the reason, the will, the conscience, for individuals and nations, for the subject and for the prince. If our author's order of thought were Christian, he could not object to the authority in itself ; he would feel himself obliged to assert and vindicate it somewhere for some one ; and if he objected to the Church at all, he would do so, not because of the authority, but because it is not rightfully hers, but another's, — which would be a legitimate objection, and conclusive, if sustained, as of course it cannot be, by the facts in the case. His failure to object on this ground is a proof that his thought is not Christian.

The author's notions of authority and liberty are not only unchristian, but exceedingly unphilosophical and confused. He has no just conception of either, and is evidently unable to draw any intelligible distinction between authority and despotism on the one hand, or between liberty and license on the other. He can conceive of authority and liberty only as each is the antagonist or the limitation of the other ; he ingenuously confesses that he is unable to reconcile them, and presents their reconciliation as a problem that Protestantism has yet to solve. " To adjust the respective limits of these antagonists, — Liberty of thought and Ecclesiastical authority, — and bring about a lasting treaty of peace between them, is the yet unsolved problem of the Reformation. The Reformers attempted to solve it, and strove in vain to confine the torrent they had set in motion, within cer-

tain dikes of their own construction. The spring-tide of free inquiry, not yet perhaps at its flood, is sweeping away their barriers, and ages may elapse before it subsides into its proper channel, after cleansing the earth of a thousand follies and abuses." (p. 160.) All this proves that his order of thought is unchristian, and that his conceptions of authority and of liberty are not taken from the Gospel. No intelligent Christian, no sound philosopher even, ever conceives of authority and liberty as antagonists, as limiting one the other, or admits that their reconciliation is an unsolved problem, or even a problem at all.

The Christian, even the philosopher, derives all from God, and nothing from man, and therefore escapes the difficulty felt by our author and the Reformers. He knows that authority is not authority, if limited, and liberty is not liberty, if bounded. Consequently, he never conceives of the two in the same sphere, but distributes them in separate spheres, where each may be supreme. God is the absolute, underived, and unlimited Sovereign and Proprietor of the universe. Here is the foundation of all authority, and also of all liberty. Before God we have no liberty. We are his, and not our own. We are what he creates us, have only what he gives us, and lie completely at his mercy. We hold all from him, even to the breath in our nostrils, and he has the sovereign right to dispose of us according to his own will and pleasure. In his presence, and in presence of his law, we have duties, but no rights, and our duty and his right is the full, entire, and unconditional submission of ourselves, soul and body, to his will. Here is authority, absolute, full, entire, and unbounded, — as must be all authority, in order to be authority.

In the presence of authority there is no liberty ; where, then, is liberty ? It is not before God, but it is between man and man, between man and society, and between society and society. The absolute and plenary sovereignty of God excludes all other sovereignty, and our absolute and unconditional subjection to him excludes all other subjection. Hence no liberty before God, and no subjection before man ; and therefore liberty is rightly defined, full and entire freedom from all authority but the authority of God. Here is liberty, liberty in the human sphere, and liberty full and entire, without restraint or limit in the sphere to which it pertains. Man is subjected to God, but to God only. No man, in his own right, has any, the least, authority over man ; no body or community of men, as such, has any rightful authority either in spirituals or temporals.

All merely human authorities are usurpations, and their acts are without obligation, null and void from the beginning. If the parent, the pastor, the prince has any right to command, it is as the vicar of God, and in that character alone ; if I am bound to obey my parents, my pastor, or my prince, it is because my God commands me to obey them, and because in obeying them I am obeying him. Here is the law of liberty, and here, too, is the law of authority. Understand now why religion must found the state, why it is nonsense or blasphemy to talk of an alliance between religion and liberty, a reconciliation between authority and freedom. Both proceed from the same fountain, the absolute, underived, unlimited sovereignty of God, and can be no more opposed one to the other than God can be opposed to himself. Hence, absolute and unconditional subjection to God is absolute and unlimited freedom. Therefore says our Lord, " If the Son makes you free, you shall be free indeed."

The sovereignty of God does not oppose liberty ; it founds and guaranties it. Authority is not the antagonist of freedom ; it is its support, its vindicator. It is not religion, it is not Christianity, but infidelity, that places authority and liberty one over against the other, in battle array. It is not God who crushes our liberty, robs us of our rights, and binds heavy burdens upon our shoulders, too grievous to be borne ; it is man, who at the same time that he robs us of our rights robs God of his. He who attacks our freedom attacks his sovereignty ; he who vindicates his sovereignty, the rights of God, vindicates the rights of man ; for all human rights are summed up in the one right to be governed by God and by him alone, in the duty of absolute subjection to him, and absolute freedom from all subjection to any other. Maintain, therefore, the rights of God, the supremacy in all departments of the Divine law, and you need not trouble your heads about the rights of man, freedom of thought, or civil liberty ; for they are secured with all the guaranty of the Divine sovereignty. The Divine sovereignty is, therefore, as indispensable to liberty as to authority.

We need not stop to show that the Divine sovereignty is not itself a despotism. The essence of despotism, as we have said, is not that it is authority, but that it is authority without right, will without reason, power without justice, which can never be said of God ; for his right to universal dominion is unquestionable, and in him will and reason, power and justice are never disjoined, are identical, are one and the same, and are indistinguishable save in our manner of conceiving them. His

sovereignty is rightful, his will is intrinsically, eternally, and immutably just will, his power just power. Absolute subjection to him is absolute subjection to eternal, immutable, and absolute justice. Hence, subjection to him alone is, on the one hand, subjection to absolute justice, and, on the other, freedom to be and to do all that absolute justice permits. Here is just authority as great as can be conceived, and true liberty as large as is possible this side of license ; and between the two there is and can be in the nature of things no clashing, no conflict, no antagonism. How mean and shallow is infidel philosophy !

Taking this view along with us, a view which is alike that of Christianity and of sound philosophy, we cannot fail to perceive that the objection urged against the Church is exceedingly ill-chosen. The Church, if what she professes to be, — and we have the right here to reason on the supposition that she is, — represents the Divine sovereignty, and is commissioned by God to teach and to govern in his name. Her authority, then, is his authority, and it is he that teaches and governs in her and through her ; so far, then, from being hostile to liberty in one department or another, she must be its support and safeguard in every department. The ground and condition of liberty is the presence of the Divine sovereignty, for in its presence there is no other sovereignty, no other authority, consequently no slavery. The objection, that the Church is a spiritual despotism, is grounded on the supposition that all authority is despotism and all liberty license, — that is, that liberty and authority are antagonist forces, — which would require us to deny both, for neither despotism nor license is defensible. Authority and liberty are only the two phases of one and the same principle ; suppose the absence of authority, you suppose the presence of license or despotism, which, again, are only the two phases of one and the same thing. To remove license or despotism, you must suppose the presence of legitimate authority. The Church being the representative of the Divine sovereignty on the earth, introduces legitimate authority, and by her presence necessarily displaces both despotism and license, that is, establishes both order and liberty.

The difficulty which Protestants and unbelievers suppose must exist in conforming reason, which is not always obedient to will, to the commands of authority, arises from their overlooking the nature of authority. The authority is not only an order to believe, but it is authority *for* believing. The author-

ity of reason in the natural order is derived from God, not from man ; and the obligation to believe the axioms of mathematics or the definitions of geometry arises solely from the fact, that reason, which declares them, does, thus far, speak by Divine authority. If it did not, reason would be no reason for believing or asserting them. The same Divine authority in a higher order, speaking through the Church, cannot be less authoritative, or a less authority for believing what the Church teaches. Hence the command of the Church is at once authority for the will and for the reason, an injunction to believe and a reason for believing. The absolute submission of reason to her commands is not, as some fancy, the abnegation of reason. Reason does not, in submitting, fold her hands, shut her eyes, and take a doze, like a fat alderman after dinner, but keeps wide awake, and exercises her highest powers, her most sacred rights, according to her own nature. What more reasonable reason for believing than the command of God ? — since, in the order of truth, his sovereignty is identically his veracity. To suppose a Catholic mind can have any difficulty in bringing reason to assent to the teachings of the Church, believed to be God's Church, is as absurd as to suppose that an American who has never been abroad can have any difficulty in believing that there is such a city as Paris, or that Louis Napoleon Bonaparte has recently been elected President of the French Republic ; or as to suppose that the logician finds a difficulty in bringing his reason to assent to the proposition that the same is the same, that the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time, or that two and two make four.

It is not the Church that establishes spiritual despotism ; it is she who saves us from it. Spiritual despotism is that which subjects us, in spiritual matters, to a human authority, whether our own or that of others, — for our own is as human as another's ; and the only redemption from it is in having in them a Divine authority. Protestants themselves acknowledge this, when they call out for the pure word of God. The Church teaches by Divine authority ; in submitting to her, we submit to God, and are freed from all human authority. She teaches infallibly ; therefore, in believing what she teaches, we believe the truth, which frees us from falsehood and error, to which all men without an infallible guide are subject, and subjection to which is the elemental principle of all spiritual despotism. Her authority admitted excludes all other authority, and therefore frees us from heresiarchs and sects, the very embodiment of spiritual

despotism in its most odious forms. Sectarianism is spiritual despotism itself ; and to know how far spiritual despotism and spiritual slavery may go, you have only to study the history of the various sects and false religions which have heretofore existed, or which now exist.

In the temporal order, again, the authority claimed and exercised by the Church is nothing but the assertion over the state of the Divine sovereignty, which she represents, or the subjection of the prince to the law of God, in his character of prince as well as in his character of man. That the prince or civil power is subject to the law of God, no man who admits Christianity at all dares question ; and, if the Church be the Divinely commissioned teacher and guardian of that law, as she certainly is, the same subjection to her must be conceded. But this, instead of being opposed to civil liberty, is its only possible condition. Civil liberty, like all liberty, is in being held to no obedience but obedience to God ; and obedience to the state can be compatible with liberty only on the condition that God commands it, or on the condition that he governs in the state, which he does not and cannot do, unless the state holds from his law and is subject to it. To deny, then, the supremacy of the Church in temporals is only to release the temporal order from its subjection to the Divine sovereignty, which, so far as regards the state, is to deny its authority, or its right to govern, and, so far as regards the subject, is to assert pure, unmitigated civil despotism. All authority divested of the Divine sanction is despotic, because it is authority without right, will unregulated by reason, power disjoined from justice. Withdraw the supremacy of the Church from the temporal order, and you deprive the state of that sanction, by asserting that it does not hold from God and is not amenable to his law ; you give the state simply a human basis, and have in it only a human authority, which has no right to govern, which I am not bound to obey, and which it is intolerable tyranny to compel me to obey. "Let every soul," says the blessed Apostle Paul, the Doctor of the Gentiles, "be subject to the higher powers ; for there is no power but from God ; and those that are, are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth power resisteth the ordinance of God. . . . Wherefore be subject of necessity, not only for wrath, but for conscience' sake." (Rom. xiii. 1-5.) Here the obligation of obedience is grounded on the fact that the civil power is the ordinance of God, that is, as we say, holds from God. But, obviously, this, while it subjects the subject to

the state, equally subjects the state to the Divine sovereignty. Take away the subjection of the state to God, and you take away the reason of the subjection of the subject to the state ; and we need not tell you that to subject us to an authority which we are not bound to obey is tyranny. See, then, what you get by denying the supremacy of the Church in temporals !

The Church and the state, as administrations, are distinct bodies ; but they are not, as some modern politicians would persuade us, two coördinate and mutually independent authorities. The state holds under the law of nature, and has authority only within the limits of that law. As long as it confines itself within that law, and faithfully executes its provisions, it acts freely, without ecclesiastical restraint or interference. But the Church holds from God under the supernatural or revealed law, which includes, as integral in itself, the whole law of nature, and is therefore the teacher and guardian of the natural as well as of the revealed law. She is, under God, the supreme judge of both laws, which for her are but one law ; and hence she takes cognizance, in her tribunals, of the breaches of the natural law as well as of the revealed, and has the right to take cognizance of its breaches by nations as well as of its breaches by individuals, by the prince as well as by the subject, for it is the supreme law for both. The state is, therefore, only an inferior court, bound to receive the law from the supreme court, and liable to have its decisions reversed on appeal.

This must be asserted, if we assert the supremacy of the Christian law, and hold the Church to be its teacher and judge ; for no man will deny that Christianity includes the natural as well as the supernatural law. Who, with any just conceptions, or any conceptions at all, of the Christian religion, will pretend that one can fulfil the Christian law and yet violate the natural law ? — that one is a good Christian, if he keeps the precepts of the Church, though he break every precept of the Decalogue ? — or that Christianity remits the catechumen to the state to learn the law of nature, or what we term natural morality ? Grace presupposes nature. The supernatural ordinances of God's law presuppose the natural, and the Church, which is the teacher and guardian of faith and morals, can no more be so without plenary authority with regard to the latter than the former. Who, again, dares pretend that the moral law is not as obligatory on emperors, kings, princes, commonwealths, as upon private individuals ? — upon politicians, as upon priests or simple believers ? Unless, then, you exempt the state from all obligation

even to the law of nature, you must make it amenable to the moral law as expounded by the Church, Divinely commissioned to teach and declare it.

Deny this, and assert the independence of the political order, and declare the state in its own right, without accountability to the Christian law, of which it is not the teacher or guardian, supreme in temporals, and you gain, instead of civil liberty, simply, in principle at least, civil despotism. If you deny that the Church is the teacher and guardian of the law of God, you must either claim the authority you deny her for the state, or you must deny it altogether. If you claim it for the state, you, on your own principles, make the state a spiritual despotism, and on ours also ; for the state obviously has not received that authority, is incompetent in spirituals, is no teacher of morals, or director of consciences. If you deny it altogether, you make the state independent of the moral order, independent of the Divine sovereignty, the only real sovereignty, and establish pure, unmitigated *civil* despotism.

There is no escaping this conclusion ; and hence we see the folly and madness of those who assert in the name of liberty the independence of the political order, and exclaim, in a tone of mock heroism, " Neither priest nor bishop shall interfere with my political opinions as long as I am able to resist him ! " Bravo ! my young Liberal ; but did you know what you are doing, you would see that you are laying the foundation, not of liberty, but of despotism. Hence, too, we see that our author must be mistaken, when he asserts that the Protestant Reformation, in its essential principle, was " a revolt of free spirits against profligate despotism. " It was no such thing. Its objections to the Church, reduced to their substance, were simply, the Church is a spiritual despotism because she claims supremacy over reason, conscience, and the state ; and it objected to her, not because it was she who claimed that supremacy, but because it rejected the supremacy itself, let it be claimed by whom it might. This our author himself concedes, contends, and proves. Its argument was, the Church claims to be the Church of God, and no Church of God can claim supremacy over reason, conscience, and the state. But the Church does claim this supremacy, therefore she cannot be the Church of God. The principle of the argument is, that God could not delegate the authority to any Church. But if he could not, it must have been because he himself did not possess it. Therefore the essential principle of the Reformation, in the last analysis, was

the denial, on the one hand, of the sovereignty of God over reason, conscience, and the state, and, on the other, the assertion of the absolute independence of man, and of the temporal order, which is either pure license or pure despotism, according to the light in which you choose to consider it. The real character of the Reformation was the substitution of human sovereignty for the Divine ; and hence, in its developments, wherever it is free to follow its own law, we see it result either in pure humanitarianism or pure pantheism, as it does or does not combine with religious sentiment. And either is the denial of both authority and liberty ; for all authority is in the Divine sovereignty, and all liberty in being bound to it alone, that is, in freedom from all human government resting merely on a humanitarian basis, whether ourselves, the one, the few, or the many, as every one would see, if it were understood that authority over myself, emanating from myself, is as human and therefore as illegitimate, as much of the essence of despotism, as authority over me emanating from other men. Is it not said in all languages that a man may be the slave of himself, of his own passions, his own ignorance, or his own prejudices ? Under Protestantism we may have civil and spiritual despotism, or civil and spiritual license, the only two things that man can found, without a Divine commission and subjection to the Divine law ; but authority and liberty are possible and can be practically secured only under the Divine order represented by the Church, or an institution precisely similar to what she professes to be, the Divinely commissioned teacher and guardian of both the natural and the revealed law.

That this conclusion will be acceptable to our politicians, young or old, we are not quite so simple as to suppose ; but we are not aware that it is necessary to consult their pleasure. They have in these, as they had in other times, the physical power to do with us as seems to them good. They can decry us, they can pull out our tongue, cut off our right hand, and at need burn our body, or cast it to the wild beasts ; but this will not alter the nature of things, make wrong right, or right wrong. Civil and spiritual despotism is not the less despotism because practised by them, and in the name of humanity and the people. We desire to have all due respect for them ; but we must confess that we have not yet seen their title-deeds, the papers which prove them to have a chartered right from Almighty God to be the sole governors of mankind. We have no authority for pronouncing them infallible or impeccable ; we have

seen no reason for supposing their ascendancy, freed from the restraints of the Divine law, is either honorable to God or serviceable to man ; we have not found them always exempt from the common infirmities of our nature ; and we think we have seen, at least heard of, politicians who were ambitious, selfish, intriguing, greedy of power, place, emolument even. In a word, we have no reason to believe that they monopolize all the wisdom, the virtue, the generosity and disinterestedness of the community, or that they never need looking after, and therefore never need a power above them, under the immediate and supernatural protection of Almighty God, to look after them, and to compel them to keep within their own province, to respect religion, and to refrain from inflicting irreparable injuries upon society. Even should they, then, clamor against us, or do worse, it would not greatly move us, and would tend to confirm us in the truth of our doctrine, rather than lead us to distrust its soundness or its necessity.

We need hardly say that we advocate no amalgamation of the civil and ecclesiastical administrations. They are in their nature, as we have said, distinct, and the supremacy of the Church which we assert is by no means the supremacy of the clergy as politicians. We have no more respect for clergymen turned politicians than we have for any other class of politicians of equal worth, perhaps not quite so much ; for we cannot forget that they, in becoming politicians, descend from their sacerdotal rank, as a judge descending from the bench to play the part of an advocate. We have had political priests ever since there was a Christian state, and many of them have made sad work of both politics and religion. We have nothing to say of them, but that they were politicians, and their censurable acts were performed in their character of politicians, not in their character of priests. The principle we assert does not exact that the Church should turn politician, and thus from the Church become the state, or that the clergy should turn politicians ; it exacts that both she and they should not. The clergy as politicians fall into the category of all politicians, and their supremacy as politicians would still be the supremacy of the state, not of the Church. The state is supreme, if politicians as such be supreme, let them be selected from what class of the community they may. The principle exacts, indeed, the supremacy of the clergy, but solely as the Church, in their sacerdotal and pastoral character as teachers, guardians, and judges of the law of God, natural and revealed, supreme for individuals and

nations, for prince and subject, king and commonwealth, noble and plebeian, rich and poor, great and small, wise and simple ; not as politicians, in which character they have and can have no preëminence over politicians selected from the laity, and must stand on the same level with them. We do not advocate — far from it — the notion that the Church must administer the civil government ; what we advocate is her supremacy as the teacher and guardian of the law of God, — as the supreme court, which must be recognized and submitted to as such by the state, and whose decisions cannot be disregarded, whose prerogatives cannot be abridged or usurped by any power on earth, without rebellion against the Divine majesty, and robbing man of his rights. As Christians, we must insist on this supremacy ; as Catholics, it is not only our duty, but our glorious privilege, to assert it, and to understand and practise our religion as God himself, through his own chosen organ, promulgates and expounds it.

We know how hateful this doctrine is to politicians, to the world, and to the devil, who seek always to find a rival in the state to the kingdom of God. We know that the representatives of the state in nearly all ages of Christendom, and in nearly all nations, have resisted it, and been encouraged, sustained, in their resistance, by ambitious priests and courtly prelates. We know that it is now resisted by every civil government on earth, that the kings of the earth stand up, the princes conspire together, the nations rage, and the people imagine vain things, against the Lord and against his Christ, saying, Let us break their bonds asunder, let us cast away their yoke from us ; but we cannot help that. We know the truth, and dare assert it ; we know the rights of God, and dare not betray them. We cannot be false, because others are, — shrink from proclaiming the supremacy of the moral order, because now more than ever it is necessary to proclaim it. We do not understand the heroism that goes always with the popular party, or the loyalty that deserts to the enemy the moment that his forces appear to be the most numerous. We know the moral order is supreme, and shall we fear to say it, lest sinners tremble, the wicked gnash their teeth, and the multitude threaten? We know our Church is God's Church ; that she is the judge of God's law, and has the right to denounce, as from the judgment-seat of the Almighty, whoever violates it, and to place king or peasant under her anathema, who refuses to obey it. She has the right, the Divine right, to denounce moral wrong, spiritual wrong, political wrong, tyranny

and oppression, wheresoever or by whomsoever they are practised, and to vindicate the rights of God, and, in so doing, the rights of man, let who will dare threaten or invade them. We are subject to God, but to him only; and are we afraid to assert the fact? Are we not free before all men?

The Church is the Divinely appointed guardian of truth, virtue, liberty, because she is the representative of the Divine sovereignty on earth. Kings and potentates, commonwealths and mobs, may rise up, as they have often risen up, against her; politicians may murmur or denounce, the timid may quake, the faint-hearted may fail, the cowardly shrink away, and the disloyal join her persecutors; but that can neither justify them, nor unmake her rights, nor depose her from her sovereignty under God,—make it not true that she represents the moral order, and that the moral order is supreme. That supremacy is a fact in God's universe, an eternal and primal truth; and let no man dare deny it, who would not be branded on his forehead traitor to God, and therefore to man; and let him who fears to assert it in the hour of thickest danger be branded poltroon. It is the glory of the Church that she has always asserted it. She asserted it in that noble answer of her inspired Apostles to the magistrates,—"We must obey God rather than men"; she asserted it in her glorious army of martyrs, who chose rather to die at the stake, in the amphitheatre, under the most cruel and lingering tortures, than to offer incense to Jupiter or to the statue of Cæsar; she asserted it by the mouth of holy Ambrose, Archbishop of Milan, when he forbade the emperor Theodosius the Great to enter the Church till he had done public penance for his tyrannical treatment of his subjects, and drove him from the sanctuary, and bade him take his place with the laity, where he belonged; she asserted it in the person of her sovereign Pontiff, St. Gregory the Seventh, when he made the tyrant and brutal Henry the Fourth of Germany wait for three days shivering with cold and hunger at his door, before he would grant him absolution, and when he finally smote him with the sword of Peter and Paul for his violation of his oaths, his wars against religion, and his oppression of his subjects; and she asserted it, again, in the person of her glorious Pontiff, Gregory the Sixteenth, who, standing with one foot in the grave, confronted the tyrant of the North, and made the Autocrat of all the Russias tremble and weep as a child. Never for one moment has she ceased to assert it in face of crowned and uncrowned heads,—Jew, Pagan, Arian, Barbarian, Saracen,

Protestant, Infidel, Monarchist, Aristocrat, Democrat ; and gloriously is she asserting it now in her noble confessor, the Bishop of Lausanne and Geneva, and in her exiled Pius the Ninth.

You talk of religious liberty. Know you what the word means ? Know ye that religious liberty is all and entire in the supremacy of the moral order ? The Church is a spiritual despotism, is she ? Bold blasphemer, miserable apologist for tyrants and tyranny, go trace her track through eighteen hundred years, and see it marked with the blood of her free and noble-hearted children, whom God loves and honors, shed in defence of religious liberty. From the first moment of her existence has she fought, ay, fought as no other power can fight, for liberty of religion. Every land has been reddened with the blood and whitened with the bones of her martyrs, in that sacred cause ; and now, rash upstart, you dare in the face of day proclaim her the friend of despotism ! Alas ! my brother, may God forgive you, for you know not what you do.

But we have said enough to show the unchristian as well as the unphilosophical character of our author's thought, which we are willing to believe he does not fully comprehend, and from the logical consequences of which, were he to see them, we are anxious to believe he is prepared to recoil with horror. His thought is unphilosophical, because it conceives authority and liberty as antagonists ; it is unchristian, because it reduces Christianity to mere Rationalism, and revives Alexandrian Gentilism ; because it denies the Divine sovereignty, and the supremacy in all things of the spiritual or moral order ; because it denies moral accountability, and involves unmitigated despotism or unbounded license as the inevitable doom of the human race. As a philosopher, we hold his work in contempt ; as an historian, we deny its authenticity ; as a Christian, we abhor it ; as a friend of liberty, civil and religious, we denounce its principles, as fit only for despots or libertines.

There are matters of detail in the work to which we seriously object, but, as we have shown the unsoundness of the book in its principles, it is not worth while to waste time or argument in exposing them. The author has expended no inconsiderable thought and labor in constructing his work, but, like all the works which rank under the head of *philosophy of history*, it is shallow, vague, confused, worthless. The writers of philosophy of history may have great natural talents, they may have varied and extensive learning, but they start wrong, they attempt

what is impossible, and never go to the bottom of things or rise to their first principles. They never reach the ultimate ; they never attain to science ; and only amuse or bewilder us with vague generalities, crude speculations, or unmeaning verbiage. There is an order of thought of which they have no conception, infinitely more profound than theirs, which, when once attained to, makes all their views appear heterogeneous, confused, weak, and childish.

We have no disposition to treat our young Kentuckian rudely, or to discourage him by an unkind reception. We know him only through his book. His book is bad, but we every day receive works which are far worse. We do not believe that he means to be a Pagan ; we do not believe that he even means to be a Rationalist ; we are sure that he does not mean to deny the moral order ; and this is much for him personally, but it is nothing for his book. In judging the man, we look to his intention ; in judging the author, we look only to the principles he inculcates. If these are unsound or dangerous, we have no mercy for the author, though we may abound in charity for the man. Mr. Nourse does not understand his own principles ; he has not seen them in all their relations, and does not suspect their logical consequences. He has undertaken, without other guide than a few books which, themselves unsafe guides, he has read, but not digested, to do, after the study of a few months, what no mortal man could accomplish with all the libraries in the world, were he to live longer than the world has stood. How could he expect to succeed ? We hold him accountable for his rashness in undertaking such a task, not for having failed in its accomplishment.

- ART. II. — 1. *The Will of Stephen Girard, with a Short Biography.* Philadelphia, 1848. *Final Report of the Building Committee of the Girard College.* Philadelphia, 1848. *Arguments of the Defendants' Counsel and Judgment of the Supreme Court, U. S., in the case of Vidal versus The Mayor, &c., of Philadelphia.* Philadelphia, 1848.
2. *Reports of Cases argued and adjudged in the Supreme Court, January Term, 1844.*

SEVENTEEN years have elapsed since the death of Stephen Girard, the Philadelphia banker, who, having left France, his

native country, in the humble capacity of a cabin-boy, succeeded, by his industry, enterprise, and good fortune, during a long life, in amassing many millions of dollars. It is very generally believed that deposits made by his countrymen, the white inhabitants of St. Domingo, in the intention of emigrating to the United States, which the subsequent massacre prevented them from reclaiming, formed a considerable part of his capital. His wealth, however it may have been acquired, gave him influence and importance in society, which generally estimates merit by the success which crowns exertion.

Quandoquidem inter nos sanctissima divitiarum
Majestas : etsi funesta pecunia templo
Nondum habitas, nullas nummorum ereximus aras.

Banks were unknown in the days of Juvenal : else he could not have affirmed that money was without temple or altars. Of the modern worshippers of this divinity, Girard was one of the most devout. He was ever at her shrine, which he would not abandon even on the Lord's day, to kneel at the altars of the Eternal. Yet he never formally renounced the Catholic religion, in which he had been baptized, and, as we must suppose, instructed in his early years ; he occasionally professed, with a Frenchman's pride in a national inheritance, *Je suis Catholique* ; and although his death-bed was attended by no priest, and he departed unshriven and unabsolved, his friends sought and obtained for his mortal remains the privilege of interment in a Catholic cemetery. It is due to those concerned to state that the interment was not accompanied by any religious ceremonies.

We are not disposed to deny Mr. Girard any praise which is due him, although we believe he was not at all remarkable for amiability of character, or the general charities of life. It is certain, however, that, during the prevalence of the yellow fever in Philadelphia in the year 1793, he united with other citizens in the adoption of measures for the relief of the sufferers, and he is believed to have distinguished himself by his activity in their behalf, even at the risk of his own health. He also distributed from time to time alms to the poor, although not with a liberality proportioned to his wealth. The disposition of his property which he has made in his will is indicative of a humane feeling for the sick, and for distressed widows, but above all, for orphans. He was not distinguished by tender attachment to his relatives, to whom he left but a fraction of his immense estate ; giving almost the entire sum to the city authorities for the im-

provement of certain localities, and especially for the erection of a college for poor orphans, and bequeathing no less than three hundred thousand dollars to the State on condition of the enactment of laws for the execution of his designs. The directions which his will contains for the better order of the city police, and for certain changes to be made in Water Street and on the wharves, are specimens of his peculiarity of mind. The details of the College buildings show his confidence in his own judgment, and his unwillingness to leave any thing to the discretion of others, if he could possibly arrange it by his own foresight. The result has been in one instance no way creditable to his science, since the vast College halls, which he directed to be built with groined ceilings, are utterly useless for the purposes for which he designed them. "The reverberation of sound in these rooms, in consequence of their magnitude and their arch-formed ceilings, renders them wholly unfit for use; and unless a level ceiling is thrown in at the top of the cornices, or some other means adopted to destroy the reverberation, they can never be used for the purpose of school or recitation rooms." Such is the report of the architect who raised this splendid edifice. It is remarkable that the city councils, whilst thus scrupulously exact in following out the plan, although advised of the defect, availed themselves of some loose words of the will, which gave them a certain discretion in points not deemed by the testator capable of specification, to surround the building with a magnificent portico, the columns of which added immensely to the cost of the structure. Hence the two millions, which Mr. Girard left for the erection of the building and for the support of the College, have been almost entirely absorbed in its erection; and the residuary estate, which he allowed to be used in case of deficiency, becomes the sole resource for the support of the institution.

Although the mental capacity of Mr. Girard was chiefly manifested in the closeness of his commercial dealings, and his foresight and sagacity in money concerns, we cannot deny him the praise of having conceived a project of a noble and benevolent character, which, if unalloyed, would have deserved general admiration. He designed to erect a home for three hundred orphans, and furnished funds from which that number could be at all times supported. To this princely munificence, to use a European phrase, he added a provision for their instruction in practical science, so as to qualify them for the various stations which might be allotted to them in society. The restrictions,

with which he accompanied this generous bequest, take from it much of its grandeur, and give it the character of an experiment to train youth independently of religious influence. The obnoxious clause is couched in these terms : " I enjoin and require that no ecclesiastic, missionary, or minister of any sect whatsoever, shall ever hold or exercise any station or duty whatever in the said College ; nor shall any such person ever be admitted for any purpose, or as a visitor, within the premises appropriated to the purposes of the said College. In making this restriction, I do not mean to cast any reflection upon any sect or person whatsoever ; but, as there is such a multitude of sects, and such a diversity of opinion amongst them, I desire to keep the tender minds of the orphans, who are to derive advantage from this bequest, free from the excitement which clashing doctrines and sectarian controversy are so apt to produce ; my desire is, that all the instructors and teachers in the College shall take pains to instill into the minds of the scholars the purest principles of morality, so that, on their entrance into active life, they may from inclination and habit evince benevolence towards their fellow-creatures, and a love of truth, sobriety, and industry, adopting at the same time such religious tenets as their matured reason may enable them to prefer."

There can be no difficulty in ascertaining the meaning and intent of Mr. Girard. He wished the orphans to remain strangers to religious controversy until their entrance into society. He professed no desire that they should be educated in a spirit hostile to revelation, which would dispose them to reject for ever revealed doctrines ; on the contrary, he supposed that they would adopt them, and only desired that their choice should be freely and maturely made, after their departure from the College. Within its precincts he wished no doctrinal teaching, but the purest moral discipline. By what standard this was to be regulated, and by what sanction it was to be enforced, he neglected to state. He seems not to have thought that the moral law, in its practical details, abounds with matters of controversy ; and that a law without a sanction, in the shape of a penalty to be incurred by the transgressors, is nugatory. He neglected to state whether the code of morals was to be determined by the unassisted instincts of reason, or by the *dicta* of philosophers, or by the decalogue and other precepts of the Mosaic dispensation, or by the maxims of Christ as recorded in the New Testament. He forgot to say whether the highest rewards, with which its observance should be recommended,

should be the approbation of the superiors of the institution, marks of distinction and privileges, with the hopes of a favorable position on going forth from College ; or whether the glory of heaven should be painted to the orphan's imagination to stimulate him to virtue. He did not perceive that the future punishment of sinners is a subject of vehement controversy, and that the harmony of sentiment which he wished to exist might be disturbed as well by a discussion as to the eternity of torments as by adverse discourses on the Trinity or Transubstantiation.

We may appear unjust to the memory of Mr. Girard in charging him with an antichristian design, especially as the highest legal authority has decided that such a construction of his will is inadmissible ; but we are not here concerned with the legal interpretation ; we speak of its plain common sense meaning. For the sake of our country, its institutions and laws, we are glad that the provisions and injunctions of the testator can all be literally observed in a way to defeat his professed object, and that Christianity is still recognized as the basis of our common law so far as to authorize the infusion of some portion of its vivifying spirit into an institution which was meant to exclude its influence. The orphans for whom Mr. Girard designed his College were to be chosen between the ages of six and ten, and were to remain in it until between the ages of fourteen and eighteen, to be trained in the mean time in morality, but kept free from doctrinal bias, so that after their entrance into society they might embrace such religious tenets as their matured judgment might prefer. Before this period their education was manifestly to be unchristian.

The heirs of Mr. Girard were led to believe that the bequest was assailable on many grounds, but especially from its apparent opposition to the Christian religion, which is the basis of the common law as received in Pennsylvania. Accordingly, a suit was instituted in the District Court of that State in the name of Vidal and others against the city corporation ; but the decision was adverse to the pretensions of the claimants. The case was brought by appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, and was ably argued by Messrs. Jones and Webster on the part of the appellants, and by Messrs. Binney and Sergeant, as counsel for the city corporation. We regret that we did not preserve the papers which contained the arguments of the learned counsel, since those urged by the appellants are omitted in the report published by the Trustees of the College. We re-

collect well the impression produced on the public mind at the time by the eloquent tribute paid by Mr. Webster to Christianity, as the guiding star of youth, and the bond of society. Had it been shown that the will was antichristian, not merely in its spirit and design, but also in its positive injunctions, the objection might have proved fatal, unless indeed the Court, borrowing the principle of the civil law, should regard the irreligious restrictions as null, and maintain the bequest stripped of these odious appendages ; but the counsel for the corporation contended that the object of the testator was not to exclude Christian influence from education, and at all events that the provisions of the will could be literally complied with, without such exclusion. This latter position was adopted by the Court, which also countenanced the benign interpretation of the intent of the testator. In the absence of the Catholic Chief Justice, who was suffering from sickness, the eminent constitutional jurist, Mr. Justice Story, delivered the unanimous judgment of the Court, by which the validity of the bequest to the city is irrevocably settled.

In the motives of the decision, it is explicitly stated that religious instruction may be given by laymen employed in this institution, and that the Bible and other religious books may be used for that purpose. "The testator does not say that Christianity shall not be taught in the College. But the objection itself assumes the proposition, that Christianity is not to be taught, because ecclesiastics are not to be instructors or officers. But this is by no means a necessary or legitimate inference from the premises. Why may not laymen instruct in the general principles of Christianity as well as ecclesiastics ? There is no restriction as to the religious opinions of the instructors and officers. Why may not the Bible, and especially the New Testament, without note or comment, be read and taught as a Divine revelation in the College, — its general precepts expounded, its evidences explained, and its glorious principles of morality inculcated ? What is there to prevent a work, not sectarian, upon the general evidences of Christianity, from being read and taught in the College by lay teachers ? Certainly there is nothing in the will, that proscribes such studies." Having quoted the injunction of Mr. Girard, that pure morals should be inculcated, the learned Judge continues : "Now, it may well be asked, what is there in all this, which is positively enjoined, inconsistent with the spirit or truths of Christianity ? Are not these truths all taught by Christianity, although it teaches much

more ? Where can the purest principles of morality be learned so clearly or so perfectly as from the New Testament ?” This legal interpretation of the will defeats the manifest intentions of the testator. If the Bible become a class-book, as is in fact already the case, it is impossible to restrict the inquiries of the pupils as to the doctrines which it contains, and religious opinions will necessarily be formed long before their minds are matured, as Mr. Girard expresses it. If laymen may instruct in the general evidences of Christianity, they may unconsciously bias their pupils in favor of special doctrines. Is it possible to inculcate the moral maxims of Christ, without indicating to the pupil his authority, whether he was a sage who drank deeply at the fount of reason, or a messenger from God to men, or a Divine person incarnate ? The doctrines which He taught will be inquired into by those who respect His moral maxims, and the conflicts of opinion may be great, notwithstanding the absence of authorized instructors. But we rejoice that such is the legal construction of the will, and that the light of Christian truth, as well as the pure influences of Christian morals, may penetrate the walls of the College, despite of all the restrictions of the testator. In this sense we understand Mr. Joseph R. Chandler, President of the Board, who, in an eloquent address, pronounced on the occasion of placing the crowning stone on the main building, August 29, 1846, ventured to offer a solution of the difficulty, which, however, is far from being satisfactory : “ But is religious instruction, then, to be excluded ? Is the pupil of the Girard College, an institution directed by the councils of Philadelphia, to be kept in ignorance of a God ? of his duties towards his earthly companions, and his Heavenly Father ? God forbid ! I trust that a spirit of vital piety will pervade every lesson that falls upon the ear and the heart of the pupil, and that all the atmosphere of the place will be impregnated with the spirit of religious truth ; so that, if not the invigorating streams of Christian instruction, by the ministers of heavenly doctrine, at least the refreshing dews of grace, may be hoped for, from the constantly instructive precepts and examples of those to whose plastic influences shall be committed the minds of the orphans, to be fashioned to the means of individual usefulness, public benefit, and eternal happiness.” This splendid verbiage can mean only that the light and grace of God can penetrate the walls of an institution from which His ministers are excluded. It offers no apology for the intolerant proscription ; it suggests no means by which the provisions of the will may be reconciled with the necessity of religious minis-

trations ; and is, on the whole, less creditable to the respected speaker than the significant silence of Mr. Nicholas Biddle, on occasion of laying the corner-stone.

The Bill of Rights in Pennsylvania says : “ All men have a natural and unalienable right to worship God according to the dictates of their own conscience and understanding.” Judge Story remarked : “ It is said, and truly, that the Christian religion is a part of the common law of Pennsylvania ; yet it is so in this qualified sense, that its Divine origin and truth are admitted, and therefore it is not to be maliciously and openly reviled and blasphemed against, to the annoyance of believers, or the injury of the public.” With these principles before the Court, we are somewhat surprised that the provision of the will which prevents the exercise of the duties of the Christian ministry within the College premises should not be deemed a nullity. According to the almost universal belief of all sects, the ministry is of Divine institution, and some acts are so peculiar to it that they can be performed by persons of no other class ; there are also duties to be practised by believers which require ministerial aid. We can easily understand how ministers may be excluded from all offices in the institution, and may be denied the privilege of preaching within its walls ; but we do not conceive it compatible with the Bill of Rights to deny orphans the spiritual aid of the ministry in any circumstance when their conscience dictates to them that it is necessary.

There are duties of religion to be performed by youth as well as by those of advanced age ; and it should not be supposed that Mr. Girard meant to prohibit their performance, when dictated by conscientious conviction, for he has expressly enjoined that the orphans be impressed with a sacred regard for the rights of conscience. “ I desire,” he says, “ that by every proper means a pure attachment to our republican institutions, and to the sacred rights of conscience as guaranteed by our happy constitutions, shall be formed and fostered in the minds of the scholars.” Among these is to assist on the Lord’s day at the public worship of God celebrated by an authorized minister of religion. Mr. Binney, the other counsel of the corporation, remarks that Mr. Girard “ has not prohibited the trustees from sending the pupils to their respective churches, if they or their friends have any, without the walls.” If this be done, much of the objectionable character of the institution would be removed. But if this privilege be denied the orphans who may demand it,

how can it be pretended that the rights of conscience are respected ?

In order to bring the institution into harmony with the public policy of Pennsylvania, and the spirit of our constitutions and of our age, and to harmonize the provisions of the will, it is not sufficient that a vague system of Christian ethics be taught in the College ; freedom of religious belief and practice must be admitted. Did we hope that our words could have any influence, we would respectfully suggest to the directors of this institution, that, to secure the rights of conscience, the religious profession of the surviving parent of the orphan, or of other nearest relative, should be marked on the College-books, and entire liberty allowed to such relative to place in the orphan's hands a catechism, or other doctrinal or devotional book, and to procure for him at suitable times religious instruction, outside of the College precincts. Mr. Sergeant, in his able argument before the Supreme Court, observed : " The Bible may be used, and so may all devotional and religious exercises which pious laymen think conducive to the welfare of youth." Doctrinal discussions, either by teachers, or between the pupils, may be prohibited ; but how can the rights of conscience be said to be respected, if the orphans be prevented from seeking instruction in the faith which they may prefer ? By denying to the parent, or relative, the privilege of providing for the religious instruction of the orphan, even in the imperfect manner now indicated, every one who sets value on the Christian doctrines, as professed in the society to which he belongs, is debarred from the advantages of the benefaction of Mr. Girard, which he can enjoy only on sacrificing his religious predilections. The bounty is proffered on the condition of consigning the orphan to those who will studiously conceal from him the Christian tenets, however earnestly they may inculcate a system of morality derived from the Gospel. Thus all conscientious professors, who hold the necessity in order to salvation of believing any revealed doctrines beyond the existence of God, are denied the benefit of this charity. Catholics especially, who cling with so much tenacity to faith, and consider it the most precious treasure they can leave to their children, are placed in the necessity of foregoing any participation in an institution founded by one who was nominally a member of their communion. Is this the respect for the rights of conscience which the Pennsylvania Bill of Rights demands, and which Mr. Girard insists shall be inculcated by the teachers in his College ?

Notwithstanding the protestation of Mr. Girard that he meant no disrespect, the exclusion of clergymen, even as visitors, from the premises appropriated to the purposes of the College, indicates that he cherished a horror of all who appeared in a sacred garb, and repelled them as profane intruders from the favored seat of his power :

Procul, O ! procul este profani,
Et toto discedite luco.

Yet here, in behalf of the orphans, and of all connected with the institution, we would invoke the application of the rule which determines the meaning of a particular clause by reference to the whole context and object. His design was to prevent doctrinal contentions, for which purpose he would have no clerical professors or visitors. Visits with a view to inculcate religious opinions by occasional addresses on religious topics are plainly forbidden ; but did the founder mean that clergymen should be denied the mere gratification of treading the grounds attached to the institution ? The general principle, that enactments of a painful and odious nature are to be reduced to the narrowest possible compass, — *odia sunt restringenda*, — should be here applied ; and the term *visitors* taken in its technical signification, as official superintendents, or occasional instructors. Even if the words appear too definite to be explained away, they are so inconsistent with the spirit of our country that they should not be reduced to practice. Is it fit that any class of citizens be excluded from any public institution by a general ban ? Every American, surely, must feel mortified when he is repelled from one of the institutions of his country, merely because he is a minister of Christ. We know of a recent instance, in which an American gentleman, who had left the bar for the altar, presented himself in company with some ladies to visit the Girard College. One of the Trustees — a most liberal gentleman — met him at the gate, and told him that duty compelled him to exclude him, whilst the ladies whom he accompanied were admissible. A French clergyman, who with some strangers went merely to see the buildings, met with a similar repulse a short time before, and could not penetrate into the vast mansion which the munificence of his countryman had erected. Was this truly the will of Mr. Girard ? If it was, it is too intolerant to be reduced to practice. The brother of the President of the College is, we are informed, a Presbyterian minister. Must he be denied the privilege of visiting his brother ? In sickness and in death must

the President be restricted in his intercourse with so near a relative. No high-minded man would purchase the office at such a sacrifice. Will the directors risk any thing by forbearing to inquire into the profession of their visitors whilst they do not attempt to preach, teach, or otherwise disturb the harmony of the institution? This proscription is felt most in regard to the sick and dying, who may desire the consolation, advice, and aid of a minister of religion. Not only the orphans, but all the inmates of the institution, will be deprived of religious succour in death, if the literal interpretation of the term be strictly insisted on. In the name of liberty of conscience we enter our protest against it. In Scotland, so long distinguished for its intolerant spirit, a Catholic clergyman, as well as any other, can now penetrate wherever his ministry is sought, and can call on the public authority to support him in the exercise of his functions. In the vicinity of the city of Penn, no clergyman is allowed to pass within the precincts of the Girard College, even although his ministry is called for by the dying. This should not be. If the orphans have forfeited their religious rights, on receiving the bounty of the founder, the President and officers of the institution, and even the domestics, have rights which must be respected. The Trustees will deserve the thanks of all the friends of liberty of conscience by restricting the meaning of *visitors* to those who come to instruct in doctrine, and leaving the silent exercise of religion, as well as the intercourse of life, unrestrained. If they do otherwise, it is mockery to speak of the rights of conscience.

The ingenuity of Mr. Binney suggested a device for meeting this formidable objection. "The power of the Trustees, for the accommodation of the pupils, to erect an infirmary without the walls, is left by the will without restraint, either express or implied." Is there any probability, we would ask, that this power will be exercised? Is it not cruel to leave so great a number of orphans in a state in which, if any of them be attacked by sickness, he cannot receive the aid of a minister of religion, even for rites which the vast majority of Christians deem of imperative necessity? The infirmary outside the walls has not been erected, and the suggestion of Mr. Binney, having served its purpose, is not likely to be attended to. With all deference to the high legal knowledge of the learned counsel, we would suggest that clergymen might be admitted to an infirmary within the walls, as long as no other exists, on the principle that the rights of conscience must be respected. Whatever power

Mr. Girard could exercise in regard to teachers or visitors, he had no right to interfere with the necessary offices of religion. The minister of Christ may penetrate into the deepest dungeon to give to the most abandoned culprit religious consolation, and may accompany him to the scaffold, to impart to him in death the pardon which human justice denies him. Shall the College walls be more impenetrable than the prison gates, and the dying orphan less comforted than the expiring criminal? If Christianity be, even in the most qualified sense, the basis of the law and policy of Pennsylvania, what spot in this free State can there be on which the exercise of the Christian ministry, in the imminent danger of death, is wholly prohibited? Let the Bill of Rights, and the injunction of Mr. Girard of pure attachment to the rights of conscience, be present to the minds of the directors of this institution, and they will find no motive for hesitation, when the dying orphan calls for the minister of religion.

It is a principle of the civil law, that immoral and impossible conditions in marriage contracts and wills should be disregarded. If this were applied to the will of Mr. Girard, the charitable object would be attained, without inflicting on the orphans the calamity of an unchristian education. Understanding the testator as directing that they should be trained in moral principles without any doctrinal bias, — that is to say, that they should be taught to be just, pure, temperate, and beneficent, without any instruction in the revealed mysteries as believed by any portion of the Christian world, — we hold the prescription to be essentially immoral. In inculcating morality, it saps its foundation; it leaves it to rest on mere reason, without any supernatural sanction; it gives no standard by which it may be ascertained; it points to no means by which it may be practised. Whilst professing zeal for morals, it levels a deadly blow at them, by depriving them of the support of religion, which alone can declare with certainty what is lawful and what is forbidden, and furnish aid to fulfil that which is beyond the natural strength of fallen man. It may be contended that Mr. Girard did not mean to exclude religion from the home of the orphans, but sought only to prevent strife and contradiction. His words clearly show that he wished them to remain free from religious predilections until they should enter into society. It is plainly immoral to leave youth without religious guidance and aid until such an age, since the passions will necessarily become excited, as the human body acquires strength and develops itself, and the untaught youth may ask himself to no purpose how he can

repress the tumults in his veins. Besides, the injunction is impossible to be executed. In order to prevent the doctrinal collisions which shocked his imagination, it was not enough to exclude religious instructors, whose office binds them to inculcate doctrinal views ; all the professors and inmates of the institution should be rigorously bound to observe the strictest silence on all differences in doctrine ; the Bible, which is the great field of controversial strife, should have been excluded from the schools ; and all books treating of doctrine, whether incidentally or professedly, should have been kept out of the hands of the orphans. In whatever way they may become acquainted with the varieties of Christian sects and opinions, they may form their own views, and enter into society with prejudices as strong as those of persons familiar with the discordant sounds of the professed ministers of the Gospel. There is only one way of preserving the minds of youth from doctrinal collisions : it is by instructing them in the truth as it is in Christ, — as taught by the Church, which is the pillar and ground of the truth.

We are far from seeking to introduce the Catholic religion into this College as a general standard ; but we have a right to demand that its professor be not virtually excluded by the restrictions put on the practice of religious duty. Catholic orphans should not be denied admission, unless they consent to peril their faith, and forego the exercise of their religion. Catholics should not be deprived of a share in the offices attached to it, unless they consent to run the risk of dying without benefit of clergy. We ask no liberty to teach or propagate our doctrines within the College, although we cannot understand how the Divine commission to preach the Gospel to every creature can be restricted by the will of a wealthy banker. We do not seek to erect our altars on the unhallowed spot which he desired should be trodden by no minister of God ; but it is our duty to give the Christian sacraments to those who seek them at our hands, as they have a right to demand them. To restrict them, or us, in the peaceable exercise of these Christian rites, is to trample on the manifest rights of conscience.

We have written this article from a sense of the injustice done to Catholics especially, by the construction practically put on the will of Mr. Girard. The directors of the College have adopted the Protestant version of the Bible, and have thus virtually made it a Protestant institution. Protestants feel little difficulty in placing their children there, because their latitude of sentiment contents them generally with a vague doctrinal sys-

tem, particularly when it is united with good living, that is, with all those earthly comforts which are needed for our bodily well-being. Protestants eagerly seek and cheerfully accept office in it, since they are not generally under a strong feeling of conscientious duty to avail themselves of the aid of the ministry in life or death. Faith alone — reliance on Christ — will, they believe, save them, without ministerial interposition. The institution was designed to be unchristian ; it is now Protestant. There are, indeed, in it some few children of Catholic parents, whose surviving parent or relatives have not paused to reflect on the guilt of abandoning the orphan to infidelity or Protestantism, for the sake of some worldly advantages. There is one Catholic among the teachers of a secondary rank, and perhaps some others in inferior employment, who most probably have not calculated on their being denied the last rites of religion, if death should assail them within the walls of this establishment. It is right that the public should know these facts, and that the directors should be held responsible for the practical construction which they have given to the will, defeating without scruple the intentions of the testator, to the prejudice of that body of Christians to whom he should be supposed to have entertained no hostile feeling. It may seem that a review is not the most suitable medium to procure a remedy ; but it were lost labor to address the city councils, or the directors of the College, who, although all honorable men, cannot understand the conscientious scruples of their Catholic fellow-citizens on matters connected with education. The management of the public schools continues to be the same, notwithstanding the efforts made to obtain due consideration for the religious scruples of the children of Catholics. If there arise not among Protestants some generous man, whose rule is not self-interest, public prejudice, or momentary expediency, Catholics cannot hope for equal justice in any department, until their numbers may force the respectful consideration of their rights. Yet we do not despair that such an advocate will be found, whose talents will be employed to enlighten public opinion, and to obtain merely what we seek, — that conscience may be subject to no restraint, and that the child or the adult may, in no public institution, or in private, be compelled to do that which he conscientiously scruples, or be withheld from performing that which he feels bound, to perform.

ART. III. — *The Republic of the United States of America : its Duties to itself and its Responsible Relations to other Countries. Embracing also a Review of the Late War between the United States and Mexico ; its Causes and its Results ; and of those Measures of Government which have characterized the Democracy of the Union.* New York. 1848. 12mo. pp. 322.

As an electioneering document, this flimsy production with a pompous title might be suffered to pass without animadversion ; but regarded as a grave work, intended to instruct the American people in their political rights and duties, or to defend the late war with Mexico and the general policy of the Democratic party, the only merit we can award it, if indeed so much, is that which the author says is the only merit he claims, — namely, the purity of its motives. The author is neither a scholar nor a statesman. His philosophizing on history and the formation and growth of nations is borrowed from a bad school ; his statements are entitled to no credit ; his principles are unsound and pernicious ; and his reasoning is seldom logical or conclusive. The sum and substance of his work is : This is a great country ; we are a great people ; and the greatness of the country and of the people is all due to the *expansive* democracy.

We yield to no man in the interest we take in the real progress and welfare of the American people ; but we are thoroughly disgusted with the ignorance and inflated vanity of our pretended patriots. We have no sympathy with those who are continually saying, Isn't this a great country ? Are not we a great people ? Territorially considered, we *are* a great country ; and in our ceaseless activity and industrial enterprise, we *are* a great people ; but that we are great in any other sense does not yet appear. We have shown ourselves great neither in art nor science, neither in religion nor morals, neither in statesmanship nor general or special intelligence. We have, in fact, nothing whereof to boast ; and a rigid self-examination would convince us that we have made, instead of the most, the least of the advantages with which Providence has favored us.

Indeed, we are usually disposed to distrust the head or the heart of the American who makes loud pretensions to love of country. A man must have a country before he can love it, and it must have been for a long series of ages the home of his fathers before he can feel his bosom glow with genuine patriot-

ism. Our population is too recent, too floating, too little fixed to any particular locality, to feel that it has a country, — to be capable of that strong attachment to its native land, to the scenes and associations of home, without which patriotism does not and cannot exist. The grandfathers of comparatively few of us were born on the soil we inhabit. There are few homesteads in the country that have been held from father to son through three generations. We have no ancestral halls ; we have no ancestors ; but are, in some sense, ourselves our own sires. There are few spots in the country around which many memories can cluster, few shrines the pilgrim heart can visit, few materials for national poetry. Our poets cannot find a song without going abroad. We are only a huge trading town, in which business men from all parts of the world are temporarily congregated for purposes of gain or livelihood, each with his own local associations and attachments, and speaking his mother tongue, unknown to all but himself. The people of the United States, as a whole, have very little in common. They have not a common origin ; they have not even a common national name, or any common national associations. How, then, can they have genuine patriotism, — that deep, loyal, ineradicable attachment to one's natal soil which we are accustomed to express by that word ? We may have national vanity, national pride, and be ready to uphold the rights or the interests of our country against all others ; yet true love of country we have not, and it is rarely that without an effort we bring ourselves to say, *my country*.

We say not this by way of reproach. The thing was inevitable. It is no fault of the race or races which have taken possession of the country. The great bulk of our people are of English, German, and Irish descent, and no people are more remarkable for love of country than those from whom we have sprung. In their own respective countries they are patriots ; but, torn from their natal soil, and transplanted to a strange land, they cannot at once feel themselves at home ; they cannot transfer at once to this strange land those affections which fastened them to England, Germany, or Ireland, hallowed by the joys and sorrows, the fears and hopes, the loves and hates, the toils and struggles of their forefathers from time immemorial. How can we sing the songs of our fatherland in a strange country ? Time, no doubt, will correct the evil, and cure the defect. In time, we shall grow into a nation, be melted into one people, and find ourselves at home in this western world.

Then we shall have genuine patriotism, — that patriotism which springs from the heart. But now the less we say of patriotism, the more will it be to our credit. The less we boast, the less we affect the language, in speaking of the United States, which the people of other countries adopt in speaking of their native land, the more good sense and the better taste shall we exhibit. We must have a household before we can without affectation use household words. We wish our young authors who affect so much Americanism would bear this in mind, and talk of things which are, and not of things which are not.

We can sympathize with those who are struck with the greatness and magnificence, under a material point of view, of the United States, and even with those who indulge high hopes for the American people. That the American people have a destiny we do not doubt ; that they have a great and glorious destiny we would fain hope ; that they are on the road to such a destiny we have yet to be convinced. At any rate, writers like the one before us, whose highest ambition appears to be to court them, to strengthen their dangerous tendencies, and flatter their corrupt passions, are not likely to aid them in attaining it. There may be courtiers in a republic as well as in a monarchy, and their influence is no more to be deprecated in the latter than in the former. The principle on which the courtier acts is that the pleasure of the sovereign is the rule of right and wrong. His study is to find out and anticipate his sovereign's pleasure. It is the same in a democracy. Under a democracy, the people are held to be the sovereign, and the democratic courtiers make it their study to ascertain the popular instincts, wishes, or passions, and to provide as far as possible for their gratification. They hold, as a principle, that popular instincts and passions are infallible, and not only maintain that it is lawful for the people in all cases to follow them, but denounce all who assert the contrary as enemies to the people, as the friends of tyrants and tyranny, as deserving the reprobation of both God and men. They get the ear of the sovereign, and will let him hear no voice but theirs. They keep at a distance all those counsellors who would appeal, not to his passions, but to his good sense, and render unavailable whatever of practical wisdom and moral honesty the great body of the people may possess. They drive the people on to their ruin, and prevent all effectual interposition for their salvation.

We speak not lightly of the people ; we have no disposition to depreciate their intelligence or the general correctness of their

motives ; but they are almost always the dupes of unprincipled demagogues. If the good sense, if the practical wisdom, if the moral honesty of the people could always be rendered available, — if the appeal could always be made to their reason instead of their passions, to their judgments instead of their caprices, — our estimate of their capacity for self-government would be as favorable as that professed by our democratic friends. But we must always bear in mind that man has fallen, that his nature has been corrupted, and that, collectively as well as individually, the people are prone to evil, and that continually. When they resist their inclinations, silence the clamor of their appetites and passions, and listen only to the voice of reason, which, though obscured by the fall, yet survives in every man, they in general take correct views and come to safe conclusions ; but they listen far more readily to appetite and passion, and follow with far greater facility the suggestions of corrupt desires than the sober lessons of reason. To do evil demands no violence to natural inclination ; to practise virtue always demands an effort. This is true of every one of the people individually, and therefore must be true of the whole collectively. Hence it follows that the demagogues, though but small men themselves, have always more power with the people than have wise and virtuous statesmen, and all popular governments have a tendency to become the exponents of popular corruption instead of popular reason and virtue.

If, then, we hope for our country, it is always with fear and trembling. The chances are against its attaining that destiny which seems to have been promised it. It is certain that we started with many advantages. We had a new and virgin soil, of vast extent and boundless fertility ; we were far removed from the example and corruptions of the Old World ; we had, as much as a people can have, the shaping of our destiny in our own hands ; and yet we have already at least the germs of every vice and every evil to be deplored in old and worn-out nations. There is no denying this. We have adopted the European system of industry, and, with half a continent of unoccupied land, we experience the extreme of poverty. Poverty more than keeps pace with the increase of wealth ; public and private morals are daily deteriorating ; crime is on a rapid and startling increase ; law has lost its sanctity, and loyalty is extinct. Population, indeed, augments, new territory is acquired, and our external prosperity receives no check. But, internally, we do not prosper. The heart is rotten, and the people will

accept no remedy. Their minds and hearts are turned away from all that makes the true glory of a state, and they have neither the patience nor the cultivation requisite to their conversion. They who see this can do little towards correcting it, for their lessons can avail nothing unless they are considered; and who in these times will pause to consider? Fail to flatter the people, fail to encourage their tendencies, or to sympathize with them in their delusions, and, however much you may be commended by individuals, you will be pronounced unpopular, admission at court will be denied you, and your influence, though you speak with the eloquence of an angel, the love of a saint, and the wisdom of a sage, will be null. Your words will bring no echo but the derisive laugh of the brainless and heartless demagogues who are urging the people on in a career of individual and national ruin.

The evil here is greater than most people, even intelligent and well-disposed people, suspect. Every people, consciously or unconsciously, struggles with all its power to realize the last consequences of the principles it adopts. If those principles are unsound, the whole tendency, the whole labor, of the nation is to its own destruction. But in a popular government, it is next to impossible to correct unsound principles before the ruin comes. It is only in two ways that the destructive consequences can be seen before they are practically developed,—that is, either by the teachings of religion, or by philosophy. In a democracy, little reliance can be placed on the former. When the people are taught that they are sovereign, they will submit to no religious teaching that attempts to control them. Religion must be their subject, not their master,—serve, not govern them. Moreover, the people never do and can never be made to understand that religion ever does or ever can condemn any thing not directly opposed to her formal and express teachings. As long as they profess the creed and observe the prescribed form of worship, they will never believe that any principles they adopt and follow in the temporal order are irreligious, or matters concerning which religion has any thing to say.

The other method is not more effectual. The people are not philosophers. There are very few persons in any nation who can take up the national policy, reduce it to its principles, and show what, according to the ordinary course of history, are the logical consequences they necessarily involve. The great body of the people, even of the educated classes, cannot do it,—cannot even understand it when it is done. The few may do

it, may publish the result, and utter the solemn warning ; but to what end ? The people are blind to the one and deaf to the other ; they go on their way, heedless of both. If they could be made to pause, if they could be made to listen, and to comprehend what is said, the evil could be averted ; but in a democracy this is extremely difficult, if not absolutely impossible. All is lost upon them, for no man has or can have influence over them, but in his sympathy with them. Hence it is, that, when they have once adopted mischievous principles, it is in vain to attempt to induce them to abandon them. You can never make them see the unsoundness of those principles, or believe them dangerous, and all you will gain by the attempt will be your own unpopularity.

Here is a point which our modern democrats appear to us to overlook, or at least one to which they attach far less importance than it deserves. They all, as far as we have seen, without a single exception, proceed on the assumption, that man retains his primitive innocency, and human nature its primitive integrity. If this assumption were allowable, the purely democratic form of government would be a safe, and, perhaps, the best, form of government. But, unhappily, this is not the fact. The philosopher no more than the Christian can deny that man has fallen. The evidences of the fall stare us in the face, let us go where or turn which way we will. We do not distrust the popular reason, even fallen as man is ; and if the people would follow their reason, we should find no fault with the democratic theory. But the people, collectively as well as individually, follow inclination, appetite, passion, which have been corrupted by the fall, and not reason, which has remained comparatively uncorrupted. Here is the fact, and here is the difficulty. Carried away by their appetites and passions, they will not pause long enough to hear the voice of reason, or to profit by the instructions of those who see their error, and the proper policy to be adopted. What they want is authority, which, itself enlightened and controlled by reason, shall hold them in check, and compel them, at times, to do violence to their own inclinations, and to act contrary to their own wills. This authority democracy cannot supply. Democracy can restrain individuals, whenever they violate the public sentiment ; but it has no power to punish even individuals for crimes which the public sentiment does not condemn, — far less has it power to restrain the people collectively ; for then the restrainer and the restrained, the governor and the governed, become in every respect identi-

cal. In fact, the democratic government is expressly devised, not to restrain the people in their collective action or public conduct, but to relieve them of all restraint, and to give them free scope to do whatever they please, to follow without let or hindrance whatever is the dominant passion or sentiment for the time being.

Unhappily, it is hardly safe in this country for a man who regards his reputation to utter these plain and commonplace truths, — which is an additional proof that they *are* truths, and important truths too. Within the last twenty-five years, it has become the fashion with a large portion of our community to regard our American institutions as purely democratic, and to denounce what is not democratic as anti-American. We say *within the last twenty-five years* ; for, prior to that time, unless for a brief period under the old Confederation, there was not and never had been in the country a party that even acknowledged itself to be purely democratic. The Republicans, as distinguished from the Federalists, though they may have had democratic tendencies, scorned the name of Democrat. To the charge brought against them by the Federalists of being Democrats, they were accustomed, even within our own memory, — and we are not very old, — to reply with great indignation, “No, I am not a Democrat, I’m a Republican.” In many parts of the country, they do not even now take the name of Democrat, but adhere to the name of Republican, which they bore in the time of Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe. The name began to be used during the administration of John Quincy Adams, but became general only after the second election of Andrew Jackson. We owe the present popularity of democracy, in great measure, to the influx of English and Scotch radicals, at the head of whom were Frances Wright, Robert Dale Owen, and Robert L. Jennings, — to the writings of Amos Kendall, William Leggett, and George Bancroft, — to the administrations of Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren, — and to the declamations, cant, and sentimentality of our abolitionists and philanthropists.

Prior to General Jackson’s administration, the institutions of this country had never received, except from a few individuals, a democratic interpretation. General Jackson was a great man ; the American people idolize his memory, and we have no wish to detract from his merits ; but he was, in the higher sense of the word, no statesman. He was a man of heroic impulses, of a strong mind, and an iron will ; but a man who had made no profound study of political science. No one doubts his integ-

rity, or his devotion to what he believed for the best good of the republic ; but like all strong-minded men, men of great natural parts and little science, he had a tendency to cut rather than untie the Gordian knot of statesmanship. He appears never to have understood that our government is a government *sui generis*, — not any one of the simple forms of government, but a peculiar combination of them all. Instead of seeking to preserve them all as nicely adjusted by the Convention of 1787, he sought to simplify the machine, and he gave an undue prominence to the monarchical element on the one hand, and to the democratic element on the other. He did more, perhaps, than any other President we have had for the external splendor of the republic ; but we are obliged to add, more also for the destruction of the Constitution and the corruption of public morals.

We speak not here for or against the measures supported or opposed by General Jackson's administration. In most of the measures of his administration, especially in regard to the United States Bank, we agreed with him, and have seen no reason to change our views. We are aware of no measure which he proposed that in itself tended to disturb the nicely adjusted balance of the Constitution. The evil was done, not by the measures he proposed, but by the principles on which he acted, and defended himself and his measures from the attacks of his enemies. He was, if we are not mistaken, the first of our Presidents who confounded the will of the people, expressed through caucuses and newspapers, with the will of the people expressed through legal and constitutional forms, — that is, who confounded the people as population with the people as the state ; thus preparing the way for the Rhode Island rebellion, generally justified by his party. In this one thing he inflicted, we fear, an irreparable injury upon his country ; for in this he unchained that very spirit of wild and lawless democracy which the Constitution was avowedly intended to repress. That he foresaw what he was doing, we do not pretend. He had a violent and powerful opposition to contend against, and he availed himself of such supports as were at hand, or as his sagacity assured him would be available. He cared little for forms. The people who rule through the Constitution are the same people who speak outside of it ; and what does it matter whether we follow the will expressed in the one form or the other ? The people are sovereign, and their will is the law. If we only get that will, what difference can it make how we get it ? None in the world, if the will, whatever the form in which it is col-

lected, is always sure to be the same will. But the presumption always is, that it will not be the same, otherwise constitutions would be insignificant. The presumption is, that the popular will expressed through legal and constitutional forms will be the popular will regulated by reason, while that expressed irrespective of such forms will be the popular will subjected to popular passion. The Constitution is intended to be a contrivance for collecting the popular reason separated from popular passion, and enabling that which is not corrupt in the people to govern without subjection to that which is corrupt. The voice of the people, speaking through legal and constitutional forms, is ordinarily the voice of reason, — perhaps as pure an expression of reason as with human infirmity we can obtain ; but the voice of the people outside is the voice of corrupt nature, of faction, of demagogues, disorderly passion, and selfish interests, to which it is always fatal to listen. This distinction appears to have escaped the observation of General Jackson and his friends, and the consequence has been the fashion of interpreting our institutions according to the principle of pure democracy, instead of so interpreting them as to restrict the sphere of the democratic element.

It having been made by General Jackson and his friends popular to regard our institutions as democratic, there is an almost universal tendency now to place our sole reliance for good government on the democratic element, which they unquestionably contain, and to bring out that element in greater prominence, and to provide, as far as possible, for its exclusive dominion. The demagogues, the party in power, and the party out of power, alike make their appeals to it alone. Philanthropists, radicals, advocates of equality, political or social, business men, friends of monopoly wishing to make the government a mere instrument in their hands for promoting their own private interests, — all appeal exclusively to democracy, and seek to sweep away every barrier erected by the wisdom of our fathers against popular caprice or popular passion. The Whig party, sometimes claiming to be conservative, is no less democratic than its opponent. Since 1838, when the *Boston Atlas*, with a questionable policy, denounced the aristocratic Whigs, and asserted the necessity of descending into the forum to take the people by the hand, the Whig party have had no distinctive principles, and both the great parties of the country have simply been striving to see which should, if the word may be allowed us, *out-Democrat* the other. Exception made of individual

Whigs, it is hard to say which of the two parties, the Whig or the Democratic, is the more conservative, and retains the most respect for the Constitution. Henry Clay, the embodiment of the worst democratic tendencies of the country, obtained more votes as a candidate for the Presidency in the Whig convention, held at Philadelphia last summer, than Daniel Webster, who is distinguished for his constitutionalism. It is the Whig party that would abolish the presidential veto, and by so doing throw the whole power into the hands of the majority for the time, and establish legislative despotism.

Nevertheless, since both parties claim to be democratic, neither can offer any effectual check upon the tendency of the country to pure democracy. Both parties are necessarily compelled to make democratic appeals, and to give, as far as possible, a democratic interpretation to the Federal and State Constitutions. Both, wherever there is opportunity, favor exclusive democracy. Take the alterations effected in several of the State Constitutions, whether by one party or the other, and they all tend to remove restraints on the popular will, to expose the government more immediately to every fluctuation of popular opinion. Their aim is, in all cases, to bring the government nearer to the people, and to give them a more direct voice in its administration. Such among others is the provision recently adopted in several of the States for electing the judges of the several courts immediately by the people; such also is the tendency favored in many of the States to alter, abridge, or abolish the common law. In New York, and a few other States, the democratic tendency has proved strong enough to invade even the sacred precincts of the family, and, under the pretence of protecting the wife against her husband, to prepare the virtual abolition of the marriage relations. If the tendency continues, it will not be many years before the notion that the husband is the head of the wife will be entirely exploded, and universal suffrage and eligibility be extended to women as well as to men. We already have Woman's Rights Associations; and we believe the women in the State of New York — a State as notorious for its practical transcendentalism as our city is for its theoretical — have already put forth a declaration of their independence of the tyrant, man. Whether they mean to support it by force of arms or by force of charms does not yet appear. But these are all signs, and pregnant signs, which deserve the serious attention of all who retain their senses or the least regard for social order and public virtue. On the

principles on which it has become fashionable to defend democracy, it is impossible to defend "the ascendancy of the male sex," to maintain that the husband is the head of the wife, or to vindicate the authority of the father over his children. Domestic government must soon go, and with it, of course, all government.

But, strong as the democratic tendency has become, severe as is the blow which our institutions have already received, we hope it is not too late to retrace our steps, and to return to the Constitution. Unquestionably, the democratic element enters largely into our political system, and the American statesman is never at liberty to neglect it, or to labor to suppress it; but it is not the only element, nor the generative principle of our institutions. The American system is complex in its origin, and to interpret it by any one principle is to mistake it. It contains other elements as sacred, as fundamental, as essential, as the democratic element itself; and the statesman is as much bound to consult and preserve them as he is to consult and preserve it,—perhaps, if there be any difference, even more so, because they were expressly intended as a counterpoise to democracy.

The Constitution is sacred and inviolable. It is the supreme law of the land, and binds the people both individually and collectively. Whence it derives its legitimacy and supremacy, we do not now inquire; for its legitimacy and supremacy must be conceded, or else we must maintain that we have no legal order, and are subject to mere arbitrary will, which, whether the will of one, of the few, or of the many, is the essence of despotism. But if the Constitution is legitimate and supreme, the people collectively and individually are under it, bound to obey it, and have and can have no power, directly or indirectly, to alter its fundamental or essential character,—consequently, are bound to the best of their ability to preserve it substantially as it is. The Constitution, or the instrument we call the Constitution, contains, indeed, a clause providing for its own amendment; but the Constitution can authorize amendments only in its own interest, such as tend to preserve its original type or idea, and to secure or facilitate its realization.

On this power to amend there is much loose and even wrong thinking among our politicians. When the civil society is once constituted, it is supreme, the political sovereignty vests in it, and there is and can be, in that society, no power over it. The powers of the convention called to amend the constitution, what-

ever their limit or extent, are derived from the civil society, and can be only such as it can delegate. It can delegate all the powers it possesses, saving its own existence and supremacy as civil society. It cannot part with its inherent sovereignty, nor dissolve itself. But civil society exists in its constitution. The constitution is the fundamental law of the state, that which *constitutes* civil society, or gives to society its entity as a political or civil individual. Suppose the constitution, you suppose civil society ; take away the constitution, you destroy civil society. As the general has no existence without the particular, the constitution does not create civil society in general, but a particular civil society, and therefore must be itself a particular civil constitution. Hence the existence of any given political society depends always on its particular constitution. Any essential change of that constitution will, then, be the dissolution of that particular civil society. But, as no civil society can authorize its own dissolution, it follows that the convention can have no power, under the authority to amend the constitution, to touch, in any degree whatever, any of its essential principles, and is limited to such amendments as are perfectly compatible with the preservation of its fundamental and substantial character.

We are treating here of conventions held under civil society in pursuance of a constitutional provision. If we suppose the people in the state of nature, and a convention for constituting civil society, a different principle, no doubt, holds. If it be a fact,— which, however, we do not admit,— that the French Revolution of February, 1848, dissolved political France, annihilated the entire civil society, and reduced the French people to the state of nature, the National Assembly which was convened, or which came together, had, no doubt, plenary powers, and was free to give to the French nation any civil constitution, within the law of nature, it deemed advisable. But the constitution decided upon, if legitimate, the moment it was established, became the supreme law of the land, sacred and inviolable. Civil society, civil France, was then reconstituted, and henceforth French sovereignty vests in this civil France, and all bodies henceforth convoked, ordinary or extraordinary, depend on it for their powers. Hence there is always a radical difference between a convention to constitute civil society and a convention under civil society to amend the constitution. The former holds under the law of nature, and has all powers which that law does not forbid ; the latter holds under the constitution, and has no powers but those which it confers.

The modern doctrine of democratic politicians on this head, that sovereignty vests, not in the people as civil society, but in the people back of it, or prior to it, is unsound. Back of civil society, or anterior to it, in what is called the state of nature, the people have no normal existence ; for civil society itself is coeval and coextensive with the human race. To ascend to its origin, you must ascend to the origin of man himself ; for he is essentially social, and society is impossible, inconceivable even, without government of some sort. In point of fact, civility is as essential to the conception of the normal man as is sociality itself. The so-called state of nature, save as a metaphysical abstraction, if ever found, is abnormal, exceptional, not prior, as an actual fact, to civil society, but subsequent thereto. It is never prudent to follow the speculations of the political theorists of the last century, who in nearly all cases, to use a homely expression, placed the cart before the horse. That a people may lose civil society and lapse into what is called the state of nature — that is, be reduced to the natural law alone — is conceivable, may sometimes happen ; and when so, they may, no doubt, come together in convention, and, if able, reconstitute civil society, reorganize the state, under any form they please, not repugnant to the law of nature ; not, however, in consequence of any inherent sovereignty vesting in them, not because they are the normal origin of all civil power, but from the necessity of the case, — the necessity of having civil government, and there being for them no other way of getting it. But rights founded in necessity cease with the necessity itself. The necessity ceases the moment the civil society or the state is reconstituted ; consequently, from that moment ceases the right or sovereignty of the unconstituted people, or people back of civil society, under the simple law of nature.

We cannot, therefore, accept the theory which places the convention assembled in pursuance of a constitutional provision on the same footing with the convention of the people prior to civil society, under the law of nature, — a theory which supposes the people antecedently to civil society inherently sovereign and the source of all the legitimate powers of the state. This theory of popular sovereignty we eschew, because it is repugnant to the fundamental idea of government. Civility and sovereignty are identical, or, at worst, inseparable, and one cannot be without the other. Suppose sovereignty, you suppose the state ; suppose the state, you suppose sovereignty. Suppose the people sovereign anterior to civil society, you suppose civil society

anterior to civil society ; that is, that the same thing can both be and not be at the same time ! The people are sovereign, we grant ; but as civil society, that is, as constituted, made a political person or individuality, — not the people as mere population, back of civil society and out of it, in which sense they never have a normal existence, and, where there is civil society, no existence at all.

The notion, therefore, that the clause authorizing a convention to amend the constitution is simply designed to establish an orderly or regular method of appealing to a power back of the constitution which originally made it, and therefore competent to unmake it, must be regarded as unsound ; for no such power exists, or can be conceived. We cannot suppose such power to survive the constitution of civil society without denying civil society itself, by converting it into a mere voluntary association, and making law a mere voluntary agreement. No statesman, if at all worthy of the name, will for a moment confound the state with a voluntary association. The state — what we mean by civil society — is something established (*status*), fixed, immovable ; but nothing is established, fixed, immovable, that depends on volition. A voluntary association has no coercive power, and voluntary agreements in the absence of law may or may not be observed, at the option of the parties. Government cannot be founded in compact. If the people back of the constitution, that is, back of the civil society, are the source of power, they have the power to change the constitution at will, — to alter, enlarge, contract, or revoke the powers they delegate to civil society, as seems to them good. Grant that they have agreed that they will do it only according to certain formalities, these formalities they impose upon themselves, and nothing hinders them from throwing them off at will. They are responsible for their observance only to themselves, and if they choose to dispense themselves, who is wronged, who has a right to complain ? If the people back of civil society are the origin of the state, the real, persisting sovereign, and if the state derives from them, *Dorrism* is true, and the late decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, condemning it, is indefensible. But *Dorrism* is subversive of all political order, for it asserts the constant presence in the community of a power competent to disregard the existing authorities, to annul the constitution, and substitute another in its place at will.

The error lies in supposing that the powers of civil society

are derived. The powers of civil society are inherent in it as civil society, and civil society itself is derived from no human source whatever; for its office is not to obey men, but to rule them, both individually and collectively. Nothing can be more absurd than to suppose it derives from the very multitude it is to govern. Government dependent on the governed is no government at all. Civil society derives from God, the source of all power, (*non est enim potestas nisi a Deo,*) who immediately, as in the case of the Jews, — mediately, by the operations of his Providence, in other cases, — constitutes it, commissions it, defines its powers, and commands us to obey it for his sake. They are as miserable statesmen as Christians who preach political atheism, and suppose the state is conceivable with only a human basis. The nations, as well as the individuals, who forget God, shall be turned into hell. Neither the state nor the individual can withdraw from dependence on God, and live, “for in him we live, and move, and have our being,” — *in ipso vivimus, et movemur, et sumus.*

The true doctrine is, that, though the people are indeed sovereign, they are so only as civil society, in which the sovereignty, under God, inheres; that is, the sovereignty vests in the *civility*, not in the *popularity*, and popularity must be civility, before the people are sovereign. Consequently, the convention assembled in pursuance of a constitutional provision is not an appeal to a power or sovereignty back of the state, or civil society, but a body under the state, and subject to it. Then it has no power over the state. Then, since the state is in the constitution, begins and ends with it, it cannot alter or touch the essential character of the constitution, and the power to amend is necessarily restricted to amendments in the proper and legal sense of the term, as we have defined in the beginning. What we mean is, that a constitution once established is fixed in right forever; and there is, under God, no power in the state or outside of it, that can alter it fundamentally, or change its essential principles. Our Constitution is essentially republican, and federal republican, and can never be legally changed into a monarchy or into a consolidated republic. If in the written constitution there is a clause which appears to authorize such a change, it is nugatory, because repugnant to the organic constitution of the state.

We must always distinguish between the written constitution and the constitution of civil society, — what we call the organic constitution. This precedes the convention, and is its law.

The written constitution presupposes it, but does not create it, or even modify it. All it does is to provide for the wise and just administration of government under it and in accordance with it. Our politicians err not in assuming a power back of the written instrument, but in assuming that power to be the people back of civil society, and therefore concluding that the convention is competent to alter the fundamental constitution of the state. So far as the written instrument marks or declares the civil constitution, it is unalterable; but so far as it merely provides for the administration of government in accordance with it, it is alterable, in the way and manner authorized by law.

Now it is clear to every man who has studied the subject at all, that the fundamental constitution of the American state, whether we speak of the Union, or of the several States, is not pure, simple democracy; and therefore any direct or indirect attempts to render it purely democratic are unconstitutional, and forbidden by the supreme law of the land, in like manner as would be any direct or indirect attempts to render it a pure aristocracy, oligarchy, or monarchy. The original and fundamental idea of our institutions is sacred, inviolable, obligatory, for our whole people, both collectively and individually, whether in convention or out of it. This idea is not simple, but complex, and is, no doubt, far from being at all acceptable to political theorists of one school or of another; but this, perhaps, is a merit. We cannot understand to what good use political theorists can be put, or under what obligation any statesman is to consult their pleasure. Speculators on government, next to speculators on religion, are the greatest public nuisance we are acquainted with. Thank God! the early settlers of this country were, for the most part, plain, practical men, of strong good sense, and no political speculators. They were ardent lovers of liberty, no doubt, as are all true men, but without any conception of what in these days of infidel raving and flimsy sentimentalism passes under that sacred name. They were Englishmen, and they brought with them the institutions of their mother country, as far as these could be adapted to the circumstances in which they were to be placed in this new world. Their political system was fundamentally the English system. When the colonies attained to majority and set up for themselves, they retained the system, simply modified, again, to meet their new circumstances. It is in this system we are to seek the type of our Constitution, not in modern democratic theories.

Our Constitution is fundamentally the British Constitution, without the hereditary House of Lords and the hereditary monarchy. These are excluded, for the king and lords were not here ; and the essential difference of our Constitution from the British lies precisely in excluding these, and in the contrivances adopted to supply their absence.

The democratic doctrine of the sovereignty of the people back of civil society finds no place in the British system. The Commons are powerful ; but they are an estate, not the entire civil body ; and they derive their power in the administration from the civil constitution, not from the law of nature, and hold it as a franchise, not as a natural right. The state knows nothing of the "rights of man," in the sense of the notorious infidel and charlatan, Thomas Paine, the great political teacher, mediately or immediately, of a large proportion of the American youth ; it knows only the rights of Englishmen. Liberty with it is British liberty, and authority British authority. The same principle holds with us. The American people, politically considered, are the English Commons transported here ; and their rights derive, not from the law of nature, as dream our political theorists, but from civil society, which grants and guaranties them. Let no American believe in Thomas Paine, the Thetford weaver. Let no man believe any more in Mr. Bancroft's *History of the Colonization of the United States*, a brilliant work, nay, an able work, but whose author, like Gibbon, possesses the art of falsifying history without misstating facts, and who has written, not for the sake of giving the history of his country, but of promulgating his humanitarian theories of government and religion. Our liberty is not natural liberty, but American liberty ; we possess our rights, not because we are men, but because we are American citizens. The right of suffrage is not a natural, but a civil right, and in its nature is a civil trust ; the right of the majority in ordinary cases to rule, so important a feature in our system, derives from civil society, not from nature ; for under the natural law all men are equal, and each man is independent of all others.

The Declaration of Independence left a gap in our system, a serious defect, because the people representing the Commons were not the entire civil body. This defect the conventions and congresses of the time undertook to supply, and to supply out of such elements as American society afforded. But they, at first, did it only imperfectly ; they left too large a margin to the Commons, — ample space to develop into a pure democracy,

which would have been fatal to the American state. To prevent this result, and to provide more effectual checks against the democratic tendency, which soon became excessive, the Convention of 1787 was assembled to amend the Constitution. In this sense they could amend it, for amendments which supply defects and tend to preserve the essential idea of the Constitution, secure the more perfect realization of its original type, are lawful, as we have conceded. That the Convention was assembled for the purpose of more effectually supplying this defect which our separation from Great Britain left in our Constitution, and to provide stronger checks against the democratic tendency, is undeniable. Mr. Madison's reports of the debates in the Convention fully establish it. "The evils we experience," said Mr. Gerry, "flow from excessive democracy."* Mr. Randolph observed that "the general object was to provide a cure for the evils under which the United States labored; that, in tracing these evils to their origin, every man had found it in the turbulence and follies of democracy; that some check, therefore, was to be sought for against this tendency of our government."† Other distinguished members said as much; no one contradicted them, and the Convention evidently took it for granted that their chief mission was to guard against excessive democracy, and without introducing the hereditary elements which the Constitution excluded. It is also clear, from the same authority, as well as from other sources, that the Convention did not provide as strong checks against democracy as they wished, or believed to be necessary, for fear, if they did, they would be unable to get their amendments adopted by the people.

It is well known that General Washington, the Father of his country, and at least one of the soundest heads and purest patriots the country has ever produced, apprehended from the first that too much liberty was allowed to democracy; and so did Adams, Hamilton, and all the distinguished men of the old Federal party, — men who, though decried by Mr. Jefferson and the French Jacobins, were the great men of their times, and whose practical political views contrast favorably with the brilliant and fanciful theories of their opponents. The Federalists have passed away; their party is among the things that were; they may have had their faults, and have erred in particulars; but the stability of the government and its constitutional purity de-

* *The Madison Papers*, p. 753.† *Ibid.* p. 758.

pend on a speedy return to their general principles. We may well say this, for we were reared in the doctrine that they were traitors to their country and the bitter enemies of liberty. But we have lived long enough to find that Liberty's best friends are seldom those who make the loudest professions of friendship and drink the deepest toasts in her honor. Mr. Jefferson was regarded as a great friend of liberty, but he, when President, knowingly, deliberately, as he himself confesses, violated the Constitution of his country, which he had sworn "to preserve, protect, and defend."

As the weak point in our Constitution is the too great strength of democracy, or the feebleness of the checks provided by the Convention of 1787 against it, the American statesman, in order to be faithful to the Constitution, must study to strengthen these checks as far as he can constitutionally, and to repress the tendency of democracy to become exclusive. This was, as is well known, the policy pursued by General Washington, in his administration, and also by his immediate successor, the elder Adams. Let politicians say what they will, it is due to the constitutional administrations of Washington and Adams, to the high-toned conservative principles on which they were conducted, and to the little deference that under them was paid to demagogues and radicals, that our government has not now to be numbered among the things that were. Washington and Adams identified the people with civil society, not civil society with the people; recognized the popularity in the civility, not the civility in the popularity; and placed the government on a legal and conservative basis, from which it required the iron will and immense energy of General Jackson to remove it, and from which even he could not entirely remove it. The effects of the wise and profoundly conservative policy of the administrations of Washington and Adams are still felt, and have given to the administrations which have succeeded them all that they have had worthy of commendation. It is only by a sincere and hearty return to that policy that we can hope to save the country from the curse of lawless and shameless democracy, — a democracy which can, if left to itself, develop only in anarchy, which must be the precursor of military despotism.

A favorable opportunity offers itself now for this return. General Cass — an able, in many respects a worthy, man, but the representative of the expansive or progressive democracy, of "the manifest destiny" principle — has been defeated, and the American people have elected to the chief magistracy,

in opposition to him, a man of great force of character, of firm will, a practical cast of mind, free from the rage of theorizing, brought up in the camp, and therefore accustomed both to obey and to be obeyed, unpledged to systems or parties, and of immense popularity. If he comprehends his position, and is equal to it, he has a glorious opportunity of proving himself a second Father of his country, and of rivalling Washington in his civic wisdom and virtue, as he has already approached him in his brilliant military achievements. Never since Washington had a President of these United States so fine a chance to distinguish himself by rendering important services to his country and to the world. Now is the **TIME** ; we hope General Taylor is the **MAN**. If the present time is not improved, it is all but in vain to hope for another. With the false doctrines of our popular politicians, with the strong democratic tendency of our people, with the fearful progress radicalism has already made, with these democratic and socialistic revolutions hourly occurring abroad, shaking the Old World to its centre, and reacting on us with a tremendous force, it is to be feared, that, if we do not now take measures to strengthen the barriers against the popular movement, and to secure the supremacy of the Constitution and the majesty of the state, it will henceforth be for ever too late. We hope in a good Providence that the new American administration will duly consider this matter, place the government once more, after so many years, on the conservative basis, and study to consolidate order and liberty within the state, rather than to extend our territories, and captivate us with the false glow of a delusive external splendor.

ART. IV. — 1. *Discourse on the Right Rev. John Dubois, D. D., Bishop of New York, Founder of Mount St. Mary's, and Superior of St. Joseph's.* Pronounced in Mount St. Mary's Church, January 24, 1843, on the Occasion of a Solemn Service for the Repose of his Soul, by **REV. JOHN McCaffrey**, Superior of the Seminary, and President of the College of Mount St. Mary's.

2. *Discourse on the Right Rev. Samuel Gabriel Bruté, D. D., Bishop of Vincennes.* Pronounced in Mount St. Mary's Church, August 19, 1839, on the Occasion of a Solemn Ser-

vice for the Repose of his Soul, by the REV. JOHN McCaffrey, Superior of the Seminary, and President of the College of Mount St. Mary's.

WE knew that we were going to College — to a *Catholic* College — somewhere among the mountains. We were — we speak personally, not editorially — too young to know its exact location, or to care much about it. It seems a century ago ; but we distinctly remember a dismal aversion to the black-gowned priests of Rome, who were soon to be our only guardians. It was a bright May morning ; and as we watched the graceful and ever-varying outlines of the Blue Ridge, we caught a glimpse of two white specks in the distance. " The College and the Church," cried the driver. We made no reply, but looked with the " fixed gaze " of Dante on Beatrice, as if, even then, we had a presentiment of the influence they were to exert on our after lives.

As we approached, those white specks became stately buildings. And then, after passing through an avenue of noble oak and chestnut trees, we stood upon a smooth terrace, where a band of youths were slowly pacing, muttering over strings of beads. A tall man in an ominous cassock offered to conduct us to the church. We ascended the hill, — and a blaze of beauty burst upon us, such as we had never seen before. We knew not which was lovelier, — the sunset skies above, or the broad, verdant, limitless plain beneath, that looked tranquillity. For a moment, home-sickness and childish apprehension vanished, and all was joy.

But we descended ; my companion left me, and I stood desolate and lone with the man in the cassock. He soothed me like a father, but he could not check my tears. That night — how well I remember it ! — I knelt by my little cot and prayed to the genie of Aladdin to transport me far away. And it was not without a hope of being heard ; for I had read the *Arabian Nights* until I half believed them. However, I woke exactly where I lay down, and rose a student of Mount Saint Mary's College, Maryland, doomed to a most matter-of-fact breakfast of dry bread and coffee.

The first day was, by prescription, dedicated to a ramble over the mountain. There were numerous flower-gardens — very small and very pretty — scattered at intervals along a shady ravine, through which a clear, cold stream, abounding in crawfish, went merrily trickling. And what surprised me most was

to find, in almost every nook, three small wooden crosses planted in beds of green moss bordered by round, white pebbles. All along the slope of the hill were neat and durable paths, some broad, some narrow, frequently intersecting each other, and many of them terminating in a time-worn grotto. I was told they were made by Mr. Bruté. I did not know that I was treading hallowed ground, and, for some time, regarded Mr. Bruté as a good old industrious day-laborer, who had been well paid for his work. I had yet to learn that his wages were not of this world.

The days went rapidly by, — home-sickness disappeared, — I went through all the *hustlings*, — was initiated into the mysteries of “Gunjers” and “The Jug,” and expanded into a regular mountaineer. How the heart glows even *now*, to review our Thursday joys! — to recall the rapture with which we shouldered our guns, and from sunrise to sunset, through creek, and den, and swamp, pursued with unwearied foot the hapless bird and fated squirrel! or the ecstasy with which we cast the seine in the “Ram’s Hole” or “Crabb’s Dam,” and dashed through the waters like hunted otters! And when evening came, those memorable debates in the Philomathian and the aspiring Philalethian! — who that has shared them can ever forget them? *Then*, it was an every-day feat to climb the mountain for two miles at a steady trot, and descend at a run with the captive rabbit, — bait the traps and all, — in less than an hour. There was no dyspepsia *then*. And the rag-balls, with “Friday” for the devil, — the concerts, with “Major’s” eye flashing through Figaro, — the annual supper and the annual oyster, — Christmas, St. John’s day, St. Cecilia’s, and the Twenty-second, each graced with the quarterly turkey, and — but I could go on for ever.

I do not write for all; and the emotion that thrills me as I write may appear unwarranted and ridiculous. There are some who will see only an unmeaning jargon in the words that bring back to me and *others* the sweet, the balmy morning of life. But there are many, here and far away over the waters, — the gallant, unbroken band of *mountaineers*, who have adorned the sanctuary and the battle-field, whose hands are ever clasped wherever they meet, whose hearts still leap at the mention of their Alma Mater, — *they* will weep tears of joy when others sneer, and feel a meaning where others find none.

I speak of myself, but not for myself alone; it is a language that sounds from Maine to Louisiana, from Missouri to Florida,

— a language that is heard among the snows of Canada, amid the orange groves of Rio, and in the fair isles of the Caribbean Sea. Would that I could express more worthily this sacred voice of love and gratitude !

The years went by without a pang, except when idleness incurred the frown of love. The name of Mary, the Blessed Virgin Mother of Jesus, became familiar to me, and I could not resist an inclination to pray to her and become an idolater—to that extent. Soon I ventured to make the sign of the cross, and to respond to the litanies. And at last, by the mercy of God, I knelt before the chapel altar, — the waters of regeneration were poured upon my head, — and I rose, a Catholic.

Ever blessed moment !—not only for me, but for another who knelt beside me, and was received into the bosom of the Church.

Shall we be sneered at for remembering and repeating this ? for clinging to a past that was full of light and beauty ? They are shouting around us, — “ Begin to live ! — the realities of life are before you, — onward to riches, rank, and fame ! ” So cried Catiline. We plunged into the world and tried its maxims ; and we found, that, instead of beginning to live, we were *beginning to die*. We tried the realities of life and found them shadows, — Dead Sea fruits that turned to ashes on the lips. We tasted human applause, and felt, that, in setting our hearts on it, we had incurred the frown of God. We lifted the spangled veil from the face of riches, rank, and fame, and saw the cankered Mokanna beneath it. We tried the round of fashion, and detected its heartlessness, its hopelessness, its martyrdom.

No ! in that little chapel where we received Catholicity, we began to live and to pursue realities ; and the fulfilment of our baptismal promises is still our only reality. And as we look around us, and see the true-hearted and the strong-minded groping in darkness for the light we there received, — as we feel more keenly every hour, that Catholicity is our only anchor, our only solace in danger, in despondency, in joy, and in death, — who can wonder that we turn with overflowing hearts to Mount St. Mary's, where our life began, and speak of her with a tenderness that makes the worldling smile ?

Let him read a portion of her history, and he will learn to respect her. After studying the lives of Dubois and Bruté, he will see the meaning of that immortal line, —

“ The world knows nothing of its greatest men.”

John Dubois was born in Paris, on the 24th day of August, 1764, and was educated at the College of Louis le Grand, side by side with Camille des Moulins and Robespierre, — the cross of Christ and the guillotine ! His parents designed him for the army, but Heaven called him to a better warfare : he entered the seminary of St. Magloire, and was ordained priest at the beginning of the Revolution. He did not quail before the storm ; and, refusing to acknowledge the miscreants who were desolating France, left Paris in disguise, and sailed for Norfolk, Virginia.

He was welcomed by James Monroe and Patrick Henry, and celebrated mass in the capitol. Bishop Carroll soon discovered, that, in sheltering the fugitive, they were receiving an angel, and John Dubois became the pastor of all western Maryland and Virginia. Gifted with an iron constitution and indomitable energy, and filled with the Spirit of God, he allowed himself no idle moments, no respite from toil, or relaxation after fatigue. No matter how inclement the weather, or how long the journey, this faithful shepherd never disappointed his flock. Once, on a Saturday afternoon, as, almost exhausted by fatigue, he was entering the confessional, a distant sick call came. Directing the usual preparations for the Sunday mass to be made, he mounted his horse, stopped not until he reached the death-bed, administered the consolations of religion, and, after a journey of fifty miles, and twice swimming the Monocacy at the risk of his life, was again in the confessional at nine o'clock the next morning, without having broken his fast, sang mass and preached, with so little appearance of fatigue, that many of the congregation never suspected that he had stirred abroad in the interval. Efforts nearly as great as this were often his greatest happiness.

He made himself all to all, that he might win all to Christ ; and though habituated to the elegant refinements of the most polished society in the world, he loved to mingle with the rude and illiterate. For “ he was as an eye to the blind and a foot to the lame, and the father of the poor ; and he sat as a king with his army standing about him, and as a comforter of them that mourned.”

With the bold and sanguine spirit that marks the leader, he exhibited his plan of a Catholic church in Frederick, at a time when there was neither money to build, nor Catholics to fill it. But he created both ; and, to the amazement of all, built it, paid for it, and filled it.

This was but the beginning of his mission. In a dense, miry, and almost inaccessible thicket at the foot of a mountain near Emmitsburg, this friendless foreigner, lisping an unknown language, saw a fountain of pure rock water, — that fountain which is now dearer than Helicon to many a heart ! — and he told the people, that *there* he meant to establish a College for the education of their children and the supply of the holy ministry. There were looks of surprise, smiles of incredulity ; many a laugh and jeer went round, and some privately pronounced him crazy. How human wisdom dwindles into littleness beside the bold, indefatigable, heaven-inspired servant of God !

But before proceeding with this great work, he selected a site of unrivalled beauty and grandeur, a stone's throw above the fountain, whence half of Maryland, a large part of Pennsylvania, and something of Virginia are seen, blended into one immense semicircle, and erected the church which still stands a monument of his energy and virtue.

A log building, with a narrow clearing in front, was the beginning of the College, or rather of the Seminary ; for the education of ecclesiastics was his primary object. He was soon surrounded by aspirants to the holy ministry, and the Queen of Sciences was enthroned at Mount St. Mary's.

This was the beginning. In a few years the scene had changed, as if by magic. The thicket was cleared, the stumps of trees were removed, the grounds inclosed and broken into terraces. The water, "taught a better course," flowed through artificial channels to the spot where it was needed ; a garden bloomed with flowers and the fruits of many climes, where but yesterday the fox and wolf were howling ; there were shady walks along the mountain-side, or on the margin of the murmuring brook ; scholars had gone forth to tell their friends what beautiful things were a-doing at the foot of the Blue Ridge. The Feast of Pentecost, 1824, saw a noble edifice on the point of completion, and a hundred youthful students ready to occupy it.

Yet this was the madness at which cool and calculating heads shook so very sagaciously. It was the wisdom of the world ; for how could an exile flying from the sword of persecution, a penniless priest, without one dollar of endowment or donation from the State, with no munificent grant, no rich bequest, with *nothing* but his own energies and the help of God to rely on, — how could *he* be expected to accomplish that to which the authority and treasures of Maryland were scarcely adequate ? "Verily, that which is foolish of God is wiser than men" !

The sun of Pentecost gilded the cross that crowned the cupola of that majestic structure : the next morning glittered in mockery over its ashes and ruins. Roused by cries of terror, at the dead of night, from the sweet sleep of the good man, John Dubois beheld at a glance the ruin of his hopes ; — that new and glorious edifice was on fire, and fierce flames were streaming from every window. Come ye who sicken over the loss of a few thousands which ye scarcely miss, — ye who droop and wither before the frown of beauty, — ye who blaspheme because your cook has spoiled some favorite morsel, — and ye who groan beneath real affliction, — come and take a lesson from this venerable old man ! Mark him, as he sees the harvest of years perishing before him, — mark him, as the ruthless fire that devours the child of his heart lights up his silvery hair and splendid features, — not tearful and heart-broken, as you may suppose, but deliberately arming himself with the sign of the cross, and exclaiming with Job, “ The Lord gave and the Lord taketh away ; blessed be the name of the Lord ! ” And come ye who go to Plutarch for your great sayings, — or to Roman history, — or to the American savage ; — hear this servant of God, though the snows of sixty winters are whitening his head, exclaiming, as he calmly eyes the flaming edifice, which had exhausted his means and his hopes, “ There are some defects in the plan of this building, *which I'll remedy in the next.* ” Go, and contrast it with the reply which has just elected Zachary Taylor President of the United States : it will not suffer even by that contrast.

He kept his word ; — another and a better edifice began to rise, whilst the ashes of the first were smoking. Unscathed by fire and time, it still remains ; and Mount Saint Mary's College, pure as the fountain that gushes beside it, has never ceased, from that moment, to scatter blessings through the world.

To the Mother of God he dedicated his Church, his College, and his Seminary. The hill, the spring, the woods, and every thing around him, were sacred to Mary. And it was not long before the Virgin Queen of Heaven crowned his labors with success far exceeding his brightest hopes.

Yet all this is but the half of what John Dubois accomplished. From the platform of the mountain church may be seen, a mile or two distant in the verdant plain, a group of stately buildings, producing an effect superior to any thing on this side of the Atlantic, — St. Joseph's. When Mother Seaton and her little band of resolute associates left ease and rank behind them,

to feed the hungry, to rear the orphan, to nurse the sick, and, like tutelary angels, to throw themselves between pestilence and its victim, John Dubois gave them a home — when other they had none — on his own consecrated hill. There he consoled, encouraged, and sustained them amid trials and difficulties which would have shaken souls less devout than theirs, and, from the scanty stores of his own poverty, supplied them with bread, when, but for him, they had no alternative but to abandon their undertaking and disperse, or perish for want of food. There he initiated them into the practice of the rules laid down by St. Vincent, and instructed, trained, formed, and directed them all.

But the authority that forms the key-stone of the grand arch of Catholic unity called him from his dear mountain and beautiful valley, — from the spot which he found a wilderness and made a paradise ; and, in the autumn of 1826, he was consecrated to the See of New York. We shall not follow him there, through his unostentatious, but active and untiring, career of benevolence.

A few years ago, that man of God was permitted by Heaven to revisit the scene of his early labors, and to behold again the mansions of piety he had made for others in this life, ere he entered the abodes of bliss which angels were preparing for him in the life to come. He was weak with age and increasing infirmity, but his quick, commanding eye, even *then*, sparkled with energy and benevolence. We knew not what he thought, — he said but little, — he only looked and smiled, as the old and the young tottered or sprang for his blessing. It was the last he ever gave us on earth. At the foot of Blue Ridge, his epitaph is written in living characters that expand and deepen every year. *They* need not the chisel of Old Mortality to preserve them.

In all these labors, John Dubois was seconded by a brother priest from France, — a spirit akin to his own. Simon Gabriel Bruté was born at Rennes on the 20th of March, 1779. He soon gave evidences of superior talent and promise of a brilliant career. In the public schools of his native city, he was distinguished and eminently successful. At the age of twenty, we find him in the medical school of Paris, where, for three years, he attended the lessons of the first masters of the age. The professional chairs were then indeed “ chairs of pestilence,” and impiety reigned among the licentious students. But the young Bruté was armed against this. His virtuous parents had brought him up in the fear and love of God ; and at the begin-

ning of the Revolution, when the prisons were crowded with those who were too noble-minded to conceal or abjure their faith, Simon Gabriel Bruté, then but a boy of tender years, might be seen, in the disguise of a baker's boy, penetrating the prison and supplying the victims of persecution, not only with that bread which nourishes the body, but with the bread of angels, — the food that gives life to the soul. Thus consecrated to heaven in his infancy, he was uninjured by the sneers and sophisms of La Marck and Fourcroy, and, like the children of Israel in the fiery furnace, passed unscathed through the midst of the flames ; “ for the angel of the Lord walked with him.” He defied infidelity, and, throwing down the gauntlet to his professors, came off conqueror, and secured the approbation of the First Consul.

Surrounded by infidel teachers and libertine fellow-students, with the echoes of irreligious sophistry and blasphemy incessantly tingling in his ears, — beset with the bustle and giddy dissipation of the gayest capital in the world, while the star of Napoleon was in the ascendant, and tidings of victory after victory flushed and almost maddened the youthful minds of France, — he thought only of storing his mind with knowledge and sanctifying his soul.

Medicine was not his only study : he excelled in mathematics, philosophy, and drawing. In 1803, he graduated as a doctor of medicine, with the highest honors of the school. It was then, in the budding of his triumph, he turned his thoughts from the cure of the human body to the cure of the immortal soul. After fervent prayer and mature reflection, he took the advice of a prudent director, and, obedient to the Divine voice within, entered the Seminary of St. Sulpitius, at Paris, a candidate for the holy priesthood. There he carried on his studies at the foot of the cross, and laid both deep and strong the foundations of his ecclesiastical learning, on which he reared that solid and magnificent edifice which so long commanded the admiration of all that beheld its towering height and fair proportions.

For five years he devoted the retirement of the Seminary to sacred study and pious exercises, respected and beloved by equals and superiors, and giving an example of humility, simplicity, and obedience. In this manner he went from virtue to virtue, having the word of God “ for a lamp to his feet and a light to his paths.”

A single incident will mark his fearless and disinterested generosity. A young friend of his, having incurred the suspicion

of the imperial government, was threatened with death. Convinced of his innocence, M. Bruté sought to have the case revised. But in vain. As a last resource, he prepared a memorial, hoping to deliver it as the emperor left the chapel. But, foiled by the rapidity of Bonaparte's motions, he pursued him so eagerly, that he was nearly bayoneted by the gens d'armes in attendance.

Soon after his ordination, in such estimation was he held, that he was offered the appointment of assistant chaplain to the emperor. Had he accepted it, this young ecclesiastic might have changed the history of the world. But, in obedience to his bishop, he declined the offer, and taught theology at Rennes, until appointed to the mission of the United States in the summer of 1810, when, bidding adieu to France, he set sail for America, and joined his brethren of the Sulpitian society at Baltimore.

His association with M. Dubois commenced in 1818, when he took charge of the Seminary at Mount St. Mary's College, and nurtured with pious solicitude and zeal the growing institution. If his genius and learning were conspicuous when he expatiated on theology and moral philosophy, they were not the less admirable when he descended to the humble task of teaching youth geography, or explaining the little catechism to children. In addition to his multiplied duties as teacher, he was also confessor to the Sisters of Charity, and for many years pastor of Emmitsburg. His labors were rewarded with the most abundant fruit. His cheerful piety, amiable manners, and lively interest in the welfare of his pupils were sure to win their hearts; while his eminent holiness of life secured their veneration. His exhortations to virtue and piety could scarcely fail of effect, because he recommended what he himself practised. No standard of Christian or priestly excellence to which he pointed could appear too high, since he was himself a living instance of its attainment. If, forgetful of this earth, he always pointed and allured to heaven, he also led the way.

Long before the morning dawn, this "blameless priest" arose to converse with God and give him the first fruits of the day; and when he approached the altar to offer up the holy sacrifice, his heart, full to overflowing, was always overpowered by mingled emotions of reverential awe, gratitude, and love, that often found relief in copious tears. When descending to the discharge of his ordinary duties, like Moses, he bore the marks of converse with his God, and the seraph seemed to have touched

his lips with living coals of fire. His time was divided between prayer and good works, and his recreation was but variety of labor. At one time, you could find him kneeling for hours before the blessed Sacrament, — at another, in his superb library, surrounded by the writings of the fathers and doctors of the Church, pursuing his elevated studies with intense application, — and again, plunging into the mountain torrent, and swimming amid masses of floating ice, to hear confessions on the opposite shore. Or, after a journey of fifty miles performed on foot in a single day, book in hand, praying and reading by turns, and scarcely stopping to take the simple refecton that nature required, you might see him meeting his friends in the evening with a freshness of spirits and gayety of conversation that could not be surpassed.

Often did he strip himself of the garments necessary to his own comfort, to bestow them on some shivering victim of poverty. The bigot, who drove him from his door by day, could not prevent him from bringing clothes and provisions to his needy family by night : ingratitude but inflamed his charity the more. When scandal arose, his soul burned within him until it was extinguished and the evil remedied. When neighbours were at enmity, cowering under the fury of a winter storm, and pelted with driving sleet and snow, he could be seen returning from the blessed work of reconciliation. And when he entered the pulpit, how those who understood him well loved to follow the eagle flights of his genius ! — how they felt their faith shaking off its heavy slumbers, as conscience, from the deep abysses of the heart, responded to his bold appeals, and the spark of charity grew to a consuming flame ! And even those who caught no meaning from his foreign accent went away deeply moved and edified, saying that he appeared to them as an angel speaking to their souls in the name and by the authority of God.

And amidst all these occupations, and others which are recorded only in heaven, Simon Gabriel Bruté and John Dubois, hand in hand, hovered like twin angel guardians over the tender plant, which is now the great, the beautiful Saint Joseph's.

But the time arrived when this " burning and shining light " was to be placed on the golden candlestick of the Apostles, and M. Bruté was appointed to the newly erected See of Vincennes. A splendid episcopacy he would undoubtedly have declined ; but to make new sacrifices, — to take up his lot in poverty and privation among strangers, — to go far from what-

ever was dear to him on earth, — to spread the glad tidings of salvation in the rising West, and use his influence in the mother country to secure missionaries for the land of his adoption, — these were temptations he could not resist. He therefore bowed his head to a thorny mitre, and, in the autumn of 1834, proceeded towards his distant diocese.

At Vincennes he found himself a stranger, poor, and alone. Around him were little more than the wrecks of the Catholic faith and discipline of the original settlers. Every thing was to be commenced, and all was to be effected by himself. In less than eight months, he had travelled more than a thousand miles on horseback over roads almost impracticable, visited every part of his extensive diocese, and was as familiar with the missions of the West in general as if his whole life had been devoted to them exclusively. He then proceeded to Europe for succour, — stood amid the ruins and resurrection of the Eternal City, — received the blessing of the common Father of the Christian world, — offered up the Victim of salvation in the eucharistic sacrifice on the tombs of the Apostles, — scanned with the eye of genius and cultivated taste the noble productions of ancient and modern art, — plunged into the labyrinths of Rome's greatest libraries, — and, by his enlightened curiosity, profound erudition, and virtuous simplicity of manners, won the admiration of Mai and Mezzofanti. At Vienna he was courted by the great, the learned, and the pious, and treated with marked respect by the imperial family. In his own beautiful France, he found himself encircled by relatives and friends, honored by the noble, the powerful, and admired by all. And then, with more than twenty missionaries, he hurried back to the wilds of Vincennes.

In a short time he opened a College, a free school for boys, which soon numbered eighty pupils, and an orphan asylum for girls, superintended by the Sisters of Charity. The enumeration of his labors and privations would fill a volume. Wasting away under an incurable consumption, he still proceeded on his errand of mercy, going about like his Divine Master, doing good to all. Difficulties that would have disheartened, and obstacles which might have been called insurmountable, but animated his zeal and charity. Once, having commenced a journey of four hundred miles, in such a state of bodily suffering that he could not sit upright on his horse, he nevertheless completed it, without the intermission of a single day. And shortly before his death, he left Vincennes to visit a distant mission, which he had already visited thrice within the year ; and, though so weak and

attenuated that he could scarcely support his tottering frame, he answered, in the absence of the pastor, three distant sick calls on the same day, and, almost dying, administered the consolations of religion to those who appeared no nearer to mortal dissolution than himself.

In 1834, he found one priest and three churches in his diocese : after five years, he left there twenty-three missionaries, and a temple to the living God in almost every town and many a country place.

To such a man death was no unwelcome visitor. As they wept around his death-bed, he murmured, as if to console them, "*I am going home. To-day with you, — to-morrow with God.*" And then, abandoning himself to prayer, he calmly and sweetly surrendered his soul into the hands of his Creator.

The mayor and civil authorities, with the learned societies of Vincennes, passed resolutions to attend his funeral. The whole population poured forth to accompany in solemn silence his honored remains to their last resting-place on earth. They were outnumbered by attendant angels.

In meditating upon the lives and deaths of these men of God, whilst filled with joy and hope for them, we return into ourselves with fear and trembling.

This imperfect narrative of Dubois and Bruté has been compiled exclusively from the discourses, noticed in the beginning, pronounced by the Rev. John McCaffrey, who knew and loved and witnessed many of the shining virtues of those he celebrates. There are no finer biographies in the language than those two noble orations, in which he has given to the world some knowledge of its truly great men. Every page breathes a tenderness and a sincerity which cannot be imitated ; for he wrote from a heart overflowing at the memories that every word suggested. I have not presumed to vary his exquisite language : I felt that it would be injustice to him and to the dead — and to the living. But if this mutilation of his eloquent discourses retains a particle of their beauty and piety, it must be acceptable to every genuine Catholic.

Instead of poring over histories hostile to the Church and inimical to Christianity, or of devouring novels whose insidious poison corrupts the very fountain of domestic peace, whose scenes of gilded guilt are dancing in the giddy brain of youth, and leading on, with siren music, millions of souls to eternal ruin, — instead of weeping for Consuelo or Fleur de Marie, or sobbing tenderly over the fate of Lara, or Hafed, or Selim, or

feeling a *generous* compassion for Milton's Lucifer, — would to heaven that all Catholics would read their Catholic literature, and learn to relish the trials and the triumphs of their saints, and feel with men whose souls are in heaven, instead of sympathizing with empty images shaped in hell ! And would to heaven that Catholic writers, instead of brewing us a stale decoction of Bulwer, James, and Eugene Sue, — instead of wedding theology to fiction and converting Protestants to — anything but Catholicity, — would content themselves with finding proper words for the preservation of the real labors of the real ornaments of our holy faith, instead of decking out their imaginary heroes and heroines in what is, after all, no very creditable costume. Eminent Catholic sanctity actually accomplishes more than most poets and authors can invent or imagine ; and fact is a far better panegyrist of the Church than fancy.

There is no theme more deserving, and more capable of developing true genius and poetry, than the labors of Catholic missionaries from China to California, from Norway to the Sandwich Islands. And what more elevated or praiseworthy occupation can there be than to hold up to the love of all the shining patterns of Catholic piety, and thus share the merits of their illustrious example by a faithful narrative of their virtues ?

We hope to see the Alumni of St. Mary's reproducing the splendid history of the noble and saintly Dubourg, and following that great man through his majestic career of good, from the time that he heard and confirmed the heroic resolution of Mother Seaton, until, in the name of Heaven, " he set out as a giant to run the way " and build up religion in the West. And when the writer is inspired by the memory of Dubourg, let him not forget the names of Nagot and Garnier.

It cannot be long before some master hand, which owes its grace to Georgetown College, will unfold the magnificent life of his Alma Mater, and point out a group of gems glittering almost unseen amid the glorious light that flashes from the crown of the Society of Jesus, — that immortal crown, bright with the blood of countless martyrs and the redemption of half the heathen world.

ART. V. — *The Christian Church and Social Reform. A Discourse delivered before the Religious Union of Associationists.* By WILLIAM HENRY CHANNING. Boston : Crosby & Nichols. 1848. 8vo. pp. 32.

THERE are few men outside the Church for whom we have a warmer personal affection, or a more sincere esteem, than we have for the author of this Discourse, — a nephew of the well-known and lamented William Ellery Channing, the warm-hearted philanthropist, and eloquent Unitarian minister. He is a man of singular purity of mind and sweetness of disposition, — earnest, self-denying, brave, — with more than his celebrated uncle's learning, and occasionally with more than that uncle's eloquence. We have known him for years ; and, before our conversion, we loved him as we loved few men, and hoped more from him, with a single exception, than from any other man with whom we were associated, or whom we were permitted to include in the number of our personal friends. We love him not less now, though our personal intercourse with him has been nearly interrupted, and we have ceased to have any sympathy with his views, plans, or movements.

We have great confidence in Mr. Channing's integrity, as well as in his ingenuousness and candor ; we believe him not unwilling to receive the truth ; and we are sure he would shrink from no sacrifices obedience to it might demand, were he once, through the grace of God, clearly and distinctly to behold it. He is a Socialist, avowedly a Socialist, and a Socialist with as extreme and as utterly objectionable views as any one of the Socialistic sect we are acquainted with ; but he really possesses much *religiosity*, so to speak, and wishes to retain and practise the Christian religion. Doubtless he has ; as all men of his class have, a secret pride, which revolts at the humility of the cross, and obscures the spiritual vision ; but his errors, we must believe, spring rather from his intellect than his will, and are in no small degree due to the prejudices of his education, and the unfavorable influences to which for the most of his life he has been exposed. Educated in that negation of the Christian symbol called Unitarianism, — brought up, as are all Unitarian youth, without any real knowledge of Christianity, without imbibing any thing of the distinctively Christian spirit, and with his mind, his affections, and his hopes turned away from the Gospel, — it is not strange that he was early led into the mazes

of wild theories and vain philosophy. Unable to satisfy either the wants of his mind or of his heart with the negations of his sect, he early became unsettled and restless, asking in vain for something to believe, and still more earnestly for something to do ; careless of the salvation of his own soul, because without any belief in a future judgment, or in God as a remunerator, and confounding the human sentiment of philanthropy with the Christian virtue of charity, nothing in the world was more natural than that he should turn Socialist, and seek to find food for his intellect, his affections, and his activity, in efforts at Social Reform, or the realization of an earthly paradise.

With no infallible Church to direct him, with no external criterion of truth or of good, and recognizing no revelation but the subjective inspirations of the affections, or the Divinity manifesting itself in human instincts and tendencies, he was forced to take humanity, or human nature, as his authority, and the satisfaction of its cravings in time as his end. In a word, he has been obliged, in the absence of the religion of God, to supply its place with "the religion of humanity," as he expressly calls it. But in this he shows two things which we respect, and which give us hope. Even his religion of humanity, — a religion which puts man in the place of God, as beginning, motive, and end, — though a veritable idolatry, and excusable in no one, bears witness to his religiosity, and also to his logical consistency. It is a tribute to religion not without its value, and a proof that he does not shrink from pushing the Protestant movement which he accepts to its last consequences. May we not hope that he will soon see that the worship of humanity is as sad superstition as the worship of wood and stone, and that man falls as far below his dignity as below his duty whenever he worships any other than the infinite and eternal God ?

We have read Mr. Channing's Discourse with great attention, and with an earnest endeavour to ascertain and appreciate its meaning. Abler Socialistic discourses we may have read, but a more genuine or truthful statement of modern Socialism, under its least irreligious aspect, we have not read. It presents a synopsis of the whole teaching of the Socialistic school or sect, on God, nature, religion, the Church, man, society, association, reform, progress, economy, social and domestic. With a hope, not presumptuous we persuade ourselves, that our words may reach the author and receive from him respectful consideration, we venture to take it up somewhat in detail, and subject it to a close and even minute criticism. If, in doing so, we

prove ourselves severe, Mr. Channing, we are sure, will understand that our severity is for the author, not for the man, for whom we have begun by expressing our affection and esteem. In order not to give occasion to the author and his friends to accuse us of misapprehension and misstatement, and to enable our readers to judge of the bearing and appropriateness of our remarks, we shall copy, in its separate divisions, the entire Discourse, as far as we make it the subject of our comments. We begin with the beginning.

“In opening this winter’s course of meetings, let us at once turn our attention to the problem which this age has most at heart to solve ; and, in order to do so, let us consider THE RELATIONS OF THE CHURCH AND SOCIALISM. For that the Christian Church is now the centre of spiritual life in Humanity there can be no reasonable doubt, and as little that Social Reform is the characteristic political movement of this generation. “*Make religion practical, and practice religious,*” is the command of the Divine Spirit more clearly than ever before ; and the *Law of harmonious coöperation* between these two extremes of man’s existence is the thought which is shaping itself in all enlightened minds.

“I. REALISM. — But, in attempting to survey the tendencies of the society into which we have been born, let us be sure, in the outset, that we occupy the firm ground of Realism. By this it is meant, that we should start in our inquiry from the *life* amid which we consciously exist, rather than from absolute *principles* assumed by Idealism, or from partial *experiments* to which Empiricism trusts. If man could ascend to dwell at the fountain-head of truth, he would be reabsorbed in God ; and, by becoming immersed in the flood of transient circumstances, he loses himself in Nature. His appropriate sphere is mediate, between the Infinite One and the Finite Many. He lives by receiving and diffusing life, and grows by assimilating into his own person inspiration from above and experience from beneath. Motives are communicated which he must study to manifest in deeds ; by reflection on ends fulfilled, he gains capacity for larger impulses ; and the medium by which, in him and through him, love and beauty are married and made fruitful, is wisdom. We move and have our being amidst a Divine Reality, whose perfections are progressively revealed in societies, races, and heavens, as solar systems are evolved from parent-suns ; and in proportion to our full communion with Him who is at once the centre and circumference of existence, is our real life. *This life we interchange with fellow-men ; and we live well, just in degree as we conspire with our age, our nation, our neighbours, to embody in Acts the Ideas through which Good evermore flows in to reanimate mankind.* The fatalist gazing on the vast sweeping forces of the universe, the en-

thusiast awaiting the accomplishment of the Almighty's plans, may be tempted to apathy or presumption. But the Realist, who recognizes the exact order of events, and yet hears himself summoned to coöperate with an unfolding creation, becomes a hero. He is at once pious, self-relying, and brave. His energies expand amidst the mighty powers which call him to be their peer. Serene and constant, neither exaggerating nor slighting his special function, assured of the guidance of One Sovereign Will, he bears the cross, he wears his crown, emulous only to discharge the duty which Humanity intrusts to his fidelity, and aspiring to be a pure medium of Divine disinterestedness. His aim is to be made a minister of Providence in his own time and land; calmly confiding, that thus he will be each day regenerate, and that the future will welcome him to ever-enlarging usefulness and joy." — pp. 3-5.

The problem, it will be seen from this, is the relation of the Church to Socialism, or to determine the law of harmonious coöperation between the Christian Church and Social Reform, "the two extremes of man's existence." The author should have defined his terms in the outset, and told us in what sense he uses the words *Christian*, *Church*, *Social*, and *Reform*; but let that pass; we shall find his definition of some of them at least, as we proceed. The first step is to fix the method of inquiry, or to determine the point of departure. This the author fixes in Realism, as distinguished, on the one hand, from Idealism, and, on the other, from Empiricism.

But what is this Realism? We really wish the author had been more clear and precise in his definition. He obviously does not mean by it the philosophical doctrine of a school well known in the history of philosophy, for that school asserted the reality of Ideas, which he denies, since he distinguishes Realism from Idealism. The real as distinguished from the ideal is precisely what is meant by the actual. His Realism, then, is Actualism; and that it is, we conclude from the fact that he identifies it, not with pure being, but with *life*, "the life amid which we consciously exist"; for life is pure being reduced to act, — or being actualized, existing, and performing its several functions.

But what is the meaning of starting with the actual as our point of departure? It must be the assumption of the justness and sufficiency of the actual; for if we declare the actual faulty or insufficient, we must draw either upon past experiments, and seek to complete it by reproducing what has been, or upon the absolute principles of Idealism, and seek to complete it by embodying new ideas in acts, — both of which the author

expressly excludes. But if the actual is just, is complete, satisfactory, what need of reform, social or individual? It strikes us that the author suppresses, in the very beginning, one of the two extremes between which he was to find, or establish, "the law of harmonious coöperation."

According to the author, man must remain below the absolute principles of Idealism and above the partial experiments of Empiricism, — that is, if we understand it, in the actual, — or lose his identity, that is, cease to exist. For, if he "could ascend to dwell at the fountain-head of truth, he would be reabsorbed in God, and, by becoming immersed in the flood of transient circumstances, he loses himself in Nature." Reabsorb is to absorb again; for, in this word, *re* is iterative, not simply intensive. Consequently, the author must hold that man was originally absorbed in God, and has been evolved from him. Evolution denies creation. The author, therefore, denies the Creative Deity, and, therefore, God himself; for the radical and fundamental conception of God is that of Creator, since we recognize his being only in the category of cause, as we apprehend the cause in the effect. What, then, can the author mean, when he talks of God, of the Divinity? and on what authority does he presume to deny God, and the fact of creation? Authority is as necessary to enable us to deny as to affirm. By absorption in God, the author must mean the loss of identity; for he makes it the opposite extreme from losing ourselves in Nature. Hence, the saints will be unable to enjoy the beatific vision, — for in that they are supposed to "ascend to dwell at the fountain-head of truth," — without losing their identity, and ceasing to exist. Hence, again, the author denies even the possibility of the immortality and heaven which our Lord and his Apostles taught, and which all Christians hope for. On what authority does he do this? How does he prove that man cannot dwell *at* the fountain-head of truth, without being absorbed in it, that is, becoming identically it?

Man's "appropriate sphere is mediate, between the Infinite One, and the Finite Many." Will the author tell us what that is which is mediate between God and Nature, between One and Many, between Infinite and Finite, — that is, which is neither the one nor the other, neither Infinite nor Finite? Is there any proportion between Infinite and Finite? If not, as there is not, will he explain to us how something can be mediate between them, below the one and above the other? We had supposed that all which is not Infinite is Finite, and all which is not Finite is Infinite.

Man "grows by assimilating into" — we should say *to*, not *into* — "his own person inspiration from above and experience from beneath." Does this mean that the inspiration is from God, and the experience from the devil? That would be no forced interpretation. If the inspiration is actually received, is it not experience? Why, then, may not experience be from above as well as from beneath? Does the author use the word *inspiration* in its ordinary theological sense? Then he teaches that all men are Divinely inspired. But what proof has he of this? How can there be Divine inspiration, if God is not? and if all men are Divinely inspired, what need of the University — for which, we shall soon see, the author contends — to instruct them, to mediate by intelligence between the Church and the State, the Divine element in man and the human? If he uses the word in a different sense, by what right does he do so, without defining expressly in what sense? Suppose man does grow by the means asserted, — how are we to know whether he grows good or bad, unless we know the character of the inspiration and experience which he assimilates? By what criterion determine that character? "By reflection on ends fulfilled, he gains capacity for larger impulses." Why on ends fulfilled, rather than on ends to be fulfilled? And what business has the author to recur to ends fulfilled, since they can have been only partial experiments, which his Realism excludes? What sort of impulses do we by reflection acquire a capacity for, — good or bad? Are we rendered impulsive by reflection? and are they, who reflect the most, the most impulsive in their character? Impulsive actions are not virtuous actions; for virtuous actions are voluntary, and performed with foresight of the end. The more subject to impulse we are, the less of virtue we have. Is it desirable to enlarge our impulses and diminish our virtues?

"The medium by which love and beauty are married, and made fruitful, is wisdom." What sort of love and beauty, spiritual or sensual, does wisdom unite in wedlock? What children are born to the wedded pair? What is the fruit of the union? Whence comes the wisdom which is its medium?

"We move and have our being amidst a Divine reality." The author evidently means here, by "Divine reality," what he has just called "the life amid which we consciously exist." Is the *life*, which we found to be the actual, the Divine reality? or is the Divine reality simply actuality, — the actual life we live, — the actual universe? Which is the author's meaning? If the former, we live true life, life according to the Divine reality;

and then what need of reform? If the latter, all actuality is Divine reality: how, then, is reform possible? Who ever dreamed of reforming the Divine reality?

“Whose perfections are progressively revealed in societies, races, and heavens, as solar systems are evolved from parent-suns.” How know we that there are any *solar* systems but our own? or if there are, that they are *evolved* from suns? How know we that our earth, for instance, has been evolved from our sun? Are the conjectures of cosmogonists and astronomers a solid basis for *science*? What is the author’s authority for saying that societies, races, heavens are evolved from the Divinity, instead of being created by Him? How knows he that the Divine reality is *progressively* evolving societies, races, heavens? We have great respect for the author, but we cannot believe matters of such vast moment as these on his word alone.

“In proportion to our full communion with Him” — God, the Divine reality — “is our real life.” Full communion with God, with Divine reality, is the same as “to dwell at the fountain-head of truth.” So our real life is in ceasing to live; and in proportion as we attain to it, we lose it, by losing our identity! We have read that “he who will lose his life for Christ’s sake shall find it”; but we do not recollect having before read, that he who shall find his real life in God shall lose it. Our real life is, we agree, in full communion with God; but what right the author has to say this, after having virtually affirmed that such communion would be the loss of our existence, and denied its possibility by virtually denying the existence of God, we are unable to comprehend. Of contraries, one must be false.

“We live *well*, just in degree as we conspire with our age, our nation, our neighbours, to embody in Acts the Ideas through which Good evermore flows in to reanimate mankind.” Which ideas are those? and what right has the author to recur to the ideal? The plain English of this is, we live well, when we conspire with our age, our nation, and our neighbours, to do good. Is the *well-living* in the conspiring or striving to do good, or in conspiring with our age, our nation, and our neighbours? If the former, the author merely utters a truism; if the latter, he assumes that our age, our nation, our neighbours, that is, all men actually living, — for *neighbours*, as here used, must be taken universally, — are right, conspire to the right end, and live well. If so, what is the necessity for reform, social or individual? All are right as they are, as already implied in your Realism; and what more can you ask? Surely, you would not reform right, truth, sanctity?

“ But the Realist, who recognizes the exact order of events.” Who is he ? Who, less than omniscient, can recognize the exact order of events, or even that there is an exact order of events ? Who is able to say that the order of nature has never been or never can be interrupted by miracles, — miracles, whether of mercy or of judgment ? “ And yet hears himself summoned.” By whom ? On what authority ? “ To coöperate with an unfolding creation.” To do what ? How can one coöperate with creation, if there is no creation ? If there is a creation, the author’s doctrine of evolution is false. But to coöperate with an unfolding creation in doing what ? In unfolding creation ? But to unfold creation, if it is unfolded, is the part of the Creator, a portion of His work necessary to complete creation. Is man summoned to aid the Creator to create ? Or shall we say the creation develops itself, and man is summoned to take his share in the work of development ? But self-development is inconceivable, and certainly inadmissible by the Realist, who excludes the ideal ; for development is the actualization of the ideal, the fulfilment of the primitive type or idea. The development necessarily depends on the power on which its subject itself depends. If creation depends on God, He is the developer. If it develops itself, it depends on itself, that is, is independent, self-existent. But an independent, self-existent *creation* is a contradiction in terms. God is independent, self-existent, and therefore is, as the schoolmen say, *Actus purissimus*, and incapable of development. “ Becomes a hero.” If the first requisite is insisted on, no man can be a hero. If only the last, — since, if it means any thing, it can mean only coöperating with the actual in what the actual is actually doing, — any man can be a hero who swims with the current, and does not resist his age, country, or neighbours. Cheap heroism that !

“ Emulous only to discharge the duty which Humanity intrusts to his fidelity.” So man receives his duty from man, and not from God ! Man, then, is the subject of man ! Is this what Mr. Channing calls Liberty ? “ His aim is to be made a minister of Providence in his own time and land.” Does the author use *Providence* and *Humanity* as convertible terms ? If not, here is a mistake. The man is the minister of Him to whom he owes his duty, — from whom he receives his ministry. The author, then, unless for him God and man are identical, should say, in order to be consistent with himself, “ his aim is to be made a minister of ” *man* “ in his own time and land.”

But we pass to consider “ CHRISTENDOM,” the second division of the Discourse.

"II. CHRISTENDOM. — Planted firmly on this ground of Realism, we at once recognize that we are members of the fraternity of nations pervaded by one spiritual life, which is so rightly called Christendom. Let him who is prompted, from the basis of natural science or of arbitrary speculation, to break up, fuse anew, and remould modern civilization after his own image, attempt it. The race will gain good, alike from his truths and his errors; and he will learn self-forgetfulness from seeing how easily the growing Tree of Life absorbs into its mighty trunk the litter of his theories and the soil of his good sense. The Realist will strive only to aid the *development* of Christendom, by blending with it his best life. There is no question now as to the quality or mode of the peculiar inspiration which makes a collective unity out of nations so various in blood, language, tendency. It is enough for our present purpose, to acknowledge that the LIFE of Jesus has been the fertilizing germ of the institutions and manners, of the literature, philosophy, and art, of the worship and conscience, of our progenitors; enough to own, that the Idea of a DIVINE HUMANITY, manifested through Jesus, is yet vital, — elevating the mind of this generation to an ever higher thought of that image of God, which man, collective and individual, was designed to be, and prompting classes and nations to brotherhood by an ever warmer consciousness of the unity of mankind; enough to believe, that the promise of a HEAVEN UPON EARTH, which was the first and last word of Jesus, is in time to be realized, by the inward exaltation of these nations to a piety and humanity like his own, and an extension of their refining sway over the entire globe through the instrumentality of peace. We are assured — are we not? — that some portion of a DIVINE CHRISM anoints us to the work of redeeming man universal from brutality by the miraculous power of good-will. Manifest tokens abound, that Providential agency impels Christendom, as a whole, and in its several communities, to Integral Culture and Unlimited Diffusion of good. Shall we hesitate with grateful reverence to give ourselves up to this heavenly leading?" — pp. 5, 6.

Christendom is here rather vaguely defined "the fraternity of nations," though what nations we are left to conjecture. The author's Realism, we here see, enables him to assert that the life these nations are living is the "one spiritual life," and of course the true life, real life, the life they ought to live. This it can enable him to do only on the condition that it accepts as right and just all actual life. All actual life is right and just. But these nations live an actual life. Therefore, their life is right and just. We must take *life* here in the concrete, as including the facts as well as the principles of life; for the author's Realism, we have seen, excludes the ideal, and therefore the ab-

stract. The author then plants himself firmly on the actual right and justice of the whole actual life of his fraternity of nations, and really asserts a universal Optimism. Whence, then, we repeat, the necessity of reform? If the actual is right and just, and may, as the author evidently maintains, be taken as the criterion of what is right and just, therefore true and good, we cannot understand his ceaseless and most urgent demand for Social Reform, and we wish he would explain it.

"The race will gain good, alike from his truths and his errors." What advantage, then, of truth over error? and wherefore labor to correct error and disseminate truth? How long is it since error became profitable to the human race? The author holds that "to break up, fuse anew, and remould modern civilization" is an error, is uncalled for, and yet he says, let those undertake it who will; and although it cannot be seriously attempted, as every body knows, without infinite confusion and disorder, fierce wars, terrible crimes, and inconceivable suffering, it will be only a useful experiment! Modern philanthropists have queer hearts, and can contemplate crime and misery with a wonderfully serene brow and marvellously quiet nerves.

"The Realist will strive only to aid the *development* of Christendom, by blending with it his best life." Here the author plainly tells us, that all that can be rightly demanded is development, and yet he demands reform. Reform and development are not the same, nor are they compatible one with the other. Development preserves the primitive type or idea, and seeks to fulfil or actualize it; Reform seeks to restore the primitive type, which has been lost, or to impress a new and different one. It *re-forms*, and necessarily presupposes the destruction of the old form; for the *materia formata* must be reduced to *materia informis* before it can receive a new form or a new impression of the primitive form, since there is no intercommunication of *species*. You must melt your wax anew, before you can give it a new impression of your old seal, or an impression of a new one. If, then, you demand reform, you oppose development; if you demand development, you oppose reform. If you are a reformer, you must "break up, fuse anew, and remould modern civilization," and your place is with those who you say are in error; if you are a developmentist, you must stand opposed to them, and your success must be their defeat, and their success must be your defeat. How, then, can you regard their movements with indifference, — say, let them go on, — and pretend that the race will gain by their errors as well

as by your truths ? Have you really no opposition to their erroneous method, — really no confidence in your own true method ?

We are not indulging in mere verbal criticism. Mr. Channing and his friends avowedly demand Social Reform ; and it is evident from their declamations against the past, from their condemnation of the whole present, and their untiring efforts to substitute a new order of society for the existing one, that, when they say reform, they mean reform. Yet when they philosophize, when they undertake to defend their movements, and fix the bases of their operations, they confound reform with development, and assert the continuous progressiveness and progress of man and society. But their logic is no better than their doctrine ; for it refutes itself. If there has been the progress asserted, if man and society have been continually growing better and better, reform is uncalled for ; if reform is called for, the doctrine of progress asserted is false, and the progress alleged has never taken place.

“ The Realist will strive only to aid the development of Christendom, by *blending with it his best life.*” But the life, we have seen, is already the true spiritual life, and “ the fraternity of nations ” is actually all we can ask. What need, then, of further development ? They live the true life ; what more can you ask of them ? And by what right do you, a Realist, planting yourself firmly on the actual, and excluding the absolute principles of Idealism, go to the ideal and demand its actualization ? And, furthermore, have you considered that to actualize the ideal is the province of the actual that is above it, and not of the actual that is below it ? The painter is above his picture, whether the picture in his idea, or the picture on his canvas. If there is a higher ideal for man and society than that already actualized, it is God, not we, who must actualize it. No man — as we often say — can lift himself by his own waistband.

We will not affect not to understand what the author means by blending his best life with that of the fraternity of nations ; for he has told us that man interchanges his real life with his fellow-men, — which, with some important qualifications, we accept. But, if the life blended is not better than the life it is blended with, it cannot aid the development contended for. My life must be better than the actual life of these nations, or I cannot improve the quality of theirs by blending mine with it. Now will the author tell us where he gets a life better than the actual life he wishes to develop ? We know he has said that our real life is just in degree to our full communion with the Divine

reality, and "this life we interchange with fellow-men." But his doctrine is, that we commune with this Divine reality only in its evolutions. This reality is in the centre of our race, and it is, if not only, yet principally, with God in man that we commune, — through the Divine Humanity that we reach Him and receive life from Him. That this is his doctrine, he will not deny. Consequently, we can receive no more Divine life than is in the life of the race, that is, than the race is actually living. The highest degree of this life actualized — and he is confined by his own principles to the actual — is the actual life of Christendom, or "the fraternity of nations," of which we are assumed to be members. Now we demand how the Realist, by communion with this life, which is for him the Divine reality itself, can get a life better than that life now is? If he can get no better life, what aid can he give to its development by blending with it his own best life? *Nemo dat, quod non habet*. If he has no better life, he can communicate no better life. If he can communicate no better life, he cannot improve the actual life of the fraternity of nations.

The author has been deceived by his silent assumption that the doctrines of the Church all symbolize great philosophic truths, or principles of the natural order. We, as members of the Church, are said to live a Divine life by communion with the Church, and by that communion only. This, Mr. Channing supposes, is merely a symbolical way of expressing a great natural fact, or truth of philosophy. The Church here symbolizes humanity in its relations to God, and life by communion with her means, when translated from the symbolical language of faith into the language of science, life by communion with God in man, or the communion of man with his race. When it is said the Christian derives Divine life from God through association with the Church, the scientific meaning is, that man derives Divine life from God through association with humanity. Hence the necessity of association as the mode or medium of Divine life. But were we to concede all this, it would avail the author nothing, *because no Christian ever dreams of deriving from his association with the Church a higher life than that which she has, or which she herself actually lives*. If we profess to derive from communion with her a supernatural life, it is because we believe her to be actually living a supernatural life. Grant, then, the symbolical character of the Church, grant that the interpretation of the symbol given is the true one, the author could, on the strength of the concession, only assert that by commu-

nion with our race we can derive such life as it is actually living, that is, its natural life ; not by any means a higher life, nor that the life we derive from it can react, and exalt its actual life.

Here is the mistake. The author evidently supposes that by communion with his race he can derive a life above the actual life of humanity, and that he can react on humanity, blend this higher life with hers, and thus assist her in actualizing a higher life for herself. But the symbolism on which he relies, even conceding it, does not bear him out. By communion with the Church we receive a higher than our natural life ; but she receives no life from us in return. We receive all from her, we return her nothing. Hence she remains without development. The life she lives was as perfect at first as it is now, and she had as high a life to impart to her children in the Apostolic age as she has in the nineteenth century. She is susceptible of no development from the recipients of her life, and can be developed, if at all, only by the direct and supernatural agency of her Founder. So if she symbolizes, as you pretend, the natural communion of humanity, you must concede, that, though individuals may receive from humanity through that communion such life as humanity has, they can give her back no life in exchange.

We beg Mr. Channing to meditate this point, for, to use a term which he will understand, it is *pivotal* in his system. He evidently supposes that the Divine reality actualizes or perfects itself by its evolutions, and that the evolutions, by a sort of reaction, perform a part in perfecting the evolver ; which is to suppose that the effect reacts on its cause, and develops it. But this is very bad philosophy ; for one might as well say the effect produces its own cause. But it is precisely in this supposition that lies the whole foundation of the modern doctrine of progress. It presupposes a mutual action and reaction of cause and effect, and that both, by this action and reaction, are developed and enlarged. The individual life is derived from humanity, and then reacts on and enlarges hers, which again reacts on and enlarges his ; and thus on *ad infinitum*. Hence, universal and eternal progress is the necessary law of all beings and of all being.

Mr. Channing speaks of "the Idea of a Divine Humanity manifested through Jesus," and assumes it to be yet vital in "the fraternity of nations" which he calls Christendom. But is it correct to speak of ideas as *vital*, that is, living ? Living ideas are ideas actualized, therefore no longer ideas. By the Idea of a Divine Humanity manifested through Jesus, he intends us to understand that the mystery of the Incarnation simply sym-

bolizes the Divinity of humanity, or the fact, as he holds it, that humanity, that is, man, — that is, again, human nature, — is Divine. But what proof has he that man is Divine, — that is, that the human and Divine are identical? What is his authority for asserting that the doctrine of the Incarnation implies any such thing? Who made him the interpreter of the Christian mysteries? Suppose man even to be Divine, whence follows it that that is the sense of the mystery? The Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, as understood by Christians, — and they are, unquestionably, the proper judges of what it is that they believe, — is the reverse of what Mr. Channing supposes; for it asserts the distinction of the two natures in our Lord. The Divine nature is not mingled with or absorbed in the human, nor the human mingled with or absorbed in the Divine; and he only generalizes the doctrines condemned in the Eutychian and Monothelite heresies. He has, therefore, no right to set forth his doctrine under the name of Jesus, or as the hidden sense of the Christian mysteries. If he would avail himself of Christian authority, he must accept it in the Christian sense.

Mr. Channing asserts that “a heaven upon earth was the first and last word of Jesus.” Suppose it was; what then? Does he admit the authority of Jesus? If he does, he should remember that Jesus said, “The poor ye have always with you.” Yet Mr. Channing considers it perfectly practicable to remove all poverty. Jesus said, “It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven.” Yet Mr. Channing is busy with schemes for augmenting the wealth of the world, and for making all men rich. Jesus said, “Seek first the kingdom of God, and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you.” Mr. Channing says, seek these things first, and then the kingdom of God and his justice will follow. We do not, therefore, see what it can avail Mr. Channing, even if our Lord did say what is alleged.

“A heaven upon earth was the first and last word of Jesus.” Be it so. Yet never did Jesus propose a heaven upon earth as the end of man. It was not on the earth, and in time, that he went to prepare mansions in his Father’s house for his followers. But let that pass. “My kingdom,” he said, “is not of this world”; and therefore, even if he proposed a heaven *on* earth, he proposed not a heaven *of* the earth, or a heaven derived from this world, consisting in the happiness which comes from it, — the precise order of happiness Mr. Channing and his

friends are avowedly laboring to secure to all men. If our author admits the authority of Jesus at all, he must admit it throughout. Our Lord either was what he professed to be, or he was an impostor. If an impostor, his authority is good for nothing ; if what he professed to be, his authority is sufficient for all he said, and we are then bound to believe all he said, for he was God himself. The practice which our Socialists have of referring to his authority, when it suits their purpose, and taking his words in a sense of their own, — a sense which even they will not pretend was his sense, but at most only what would have been his sense, if he had thought like them, — is by no means logical, and is utterly unworthy of such a man as Mr. Channing.

“ Some portion of a DIVINE CHRISM anoints us to the work of redeeming man universal from brutality by the miraculous power of good-will.” How does Mr. Channing reconcile the idea of *redemption* with his doctrine of progress ? A moment ago we had presented to us the Divine Humanity, and Mr. Channing, as is evident from a subsequent part of his Discourse, maintains that it is only in humanity that we commune with God ; now we have this same humanity, “ man universal,” reduced below his nature, degraded to the category of brutes, and needing redemption from brutality. If man universal is Divine and progressive, how can he become brutalized, and in need of redemption ? Need we tell the author that the idea of redemption negatives the idea of progress ? Why, again, does the author call *good-will* miraculous ? Nothing is miraculous that is natural. *Will* is certainly natural, for man is inconceivable without it. Is it the *good*, then, that is wanting in human nature, and that can be supplied only by a miracle ? If man’s nature is destitute of good, by what authority do you call him Divine, or speak of “ Divine Humanity ” ? Or is it that the author means not that good-will itself is miraculous, but that it works miracles, is thaumaturgic ? But if the will is natural, in the order of man’s nature, how can it work miracles, since a miracle, by its very definition, is an effect produced in the natural order by a *supernatural* cause ? Will Mr. Channing maintain that natural causes can produce supernatural effects ? If not, why, then, we ask again, does he call the power of good-will miraculous ? If miraculous, it is more than human, and the *good* does not belong to man, and then can be his only through a supernatural medium of communication. But Mr. Channing admits no such *medium*, for the only medium he admits is man, or humanity.

When Mr. Channing speaks of the *Divine Chrism*, he makes allusion to the Christian Sacrament of Holy Orders. If he takes that Sacrament in the sense of the Church, even he himself will not pretend that he has received it ; if he takes it in some other sense, it is another thing, and does not answer to that Sacrament at all. His notion, that the Sacrament symbolizes a great natural fact, and that he has the thing symbolized, is not authorized, for the Sacrament is not symbolical at all. It is either an empty form, a vain ceremony, or it is a Divinely instituted medium through which a peculiar grace is really and supernaturally communicated to the recipient, and which can, *in hac Providentia*, be communicated through no other medium. It is this, or it is nothing, just as the authority of the Church herself is all, or is nothing, or worse than nothing. Mr. Channing has no right to give the Sacrament of Orders any other interpretation than the Church gives it. To suppose a hidden sense to the Sacrament, which was not apprehended by the Church, nay, was denied by her, yet was implied in what she taught, will not be allowable, if you accept, and can avail you nothing, if you reject, her authority ; for if you reject her authority, you reject it for what she teaches implicitly as well as for what she teaches explicitly. If you reject her authority, why do you wish to make it appear that what you teach is only the hidden sense of her teaching, — is the real sense of her sacred mysteries ? Suppose it to be so, is that, on your principles, any proof that it is true ? You have, undoubtedly, as every man has, the right from Almighty God to engage, mind, heart, soul, and body, in the work of redeeming man, universal and individual, from brutality. There is no question of that. But, recollect you, only by the means, and in the way and manner, which He who gives you the right ordains ; for it is never lawful to do good by unlawful means. We may not do evil that good may come. The end does not justify the means, — a principle in morals, which we commend to the serious consideration and daily meditation of all non-Catholics in general, and of all modern philanthropists and reformers in particular. But we proceed to the author's third division.

“ III. THE PRESENT PERIOD. — Now, to take our part efficiently in the special work allotted to Christendom to-day, we need to form a comprehensive judgment as to the present period of its development. This alone will give us conviction, wisdom, zeal. We must not trust to the piety of earlier times to enliven us, or to the opinions of even the wisest of by-gone ages to point out our path. Other

men labored, and we have entered into their labors. True loyalty is to perfect what they planned, to fulfil and more than fulfil their highest longings. A brief historical review will show us where we stand, and what Humanity expects of us.

"Before proceeding, however, to the rapid survey which we must take of the development of Christendom, let us define three terms which will frequently recur in the subsequent remarks. These terms are, **THE CHURCH, THE UNIVERSITY, THE STATE.**

"Every man, every community, every nation, Humanity as a whole, is constituted of three elements, which may be variously designated as love, truth, power, — or affection, intellect, energy, &c. These elements stand related as inmost, mediate, outmost; and mutually influence each other as motive, means, and end. Once again, by their instrumentality, communion is maintained with God, with Spirits, with Nature; so that they may with propriety be named the Divine, the Spiritual, the Natural elements.

"The **CHURCH** is the Divine element in man, the sphere of will. Opening from the central spring of feeling, — Love, One and Universal, — through which the inspiration of God for ever flows in, it widens into the four grand humanitarian affections by which man is made one with his kind. These are Friendship, Conjugal Love, the Family Sentiment, Honor.

"The **STATE** is the Natural element in man, the sphere of use. Commencing from the supply of the lowest necessities of sensitive creatures, — food, clothing, shelter, — it aspires to form substantial conditions of comfort, refinement, and beauty, whereon the social affections may find materials of growth and symbolic manifestation, and whence happiness may raise the religious affection in thankfulness to the Author of good.

"The **UNIVERSITY** is the Spiritual element in man, the sphere of wisdom. Its function is harmonious distribution, — law, — order. It is the bond of reconciliation, the mediator between the Church and State. It determines the relations which should interlink the different departments of existence; it reveals the method of a truly human life.

"From these definitions it is obvious that the Church and State are to each other as Spirit and Body, and that the University serves as connecting Soul. The Church gives inspirations, which the University translates into ideas, that the State may embody them in deeds. Again, from the want or wealth, the success or failure, of the State, the University receives lessons, and thence deduces forms of law, which it presents to the Church, that it may animate them with moral life. In every man, individual and collective, these three elements exist with different degrees of vitality; and sanity, integrity, blessedness, depend upon their equilibrium and harmonious action." — pp. 6–8.

These three constituent elements "stand related as inmost, mediate, outmost ; and mutually influence each other as motive, means, and end." The inmost, love, supplies the motive, truth or intellect furnishes the means, power or energy is the end. Here we observe that these are all three constituent elements of man, humanity, and therefore man has his motive, means, and end in himself ! This is very convenient, and saves him from the necessity of going out of himself. Why, then, does the author insist on Association, assert the *Solidarity* of the race, and tell us man "lives by receiving and diffusing life," — that is, receiving life from, and imparting it to, other men ? Love, or the inmost, is the motive, the outmost is the end. But love, or the inmost, is, again, the Divine element, or God, in man. The end we are to seek, then, since it is the outmost, is the end farthest removed from God. We are continuously progressive ; progress consists in going towards our end. Consequently, we are continually removing farther and farther from God, and our progress is in proportion to the distance we remove from Him. Is this the reason why modern society is asserted to have made such remarkable progress, and why our own age is supposed to have so far outstripped all its predecessors ?

"By their instrumentality communion is maintained with God, with Spirits, with Nature." A moment ago, these three elements were presented as motive, means, and end ; now they are all three presented as means. But as means to what end ? By love we commune with God, by intelligence with spirits, by power or energy with nature. Love is the motive power, intellect is the means, power the end ; that is, love moves us, intelligence enables us, to exercise power over nature. So man is constituted, and is bound to exert himself, to acquire power over nature, or the outward ! But the intellect is mediate between the two, and simply furnishes the means. So the motive and the end are both blind, and the man acts from darkness to darkness, — which we doubt not is the case with our modern Socialists.

We commune with God, according to the author, by love ; that is, God is the object of love, as spirits of intellect, nature of power ; whence we conclude that God is not the object of the intellect, or, in other words, that, though we may love God, we do not know or intellectually apprehend him. If we could intellectually apprehend him, we could commune with him intellectually, and intellect would be as rightfully termed

Divine, on the author's own principles, as the element of love itself. But how is it possible to commune with God by love without communing with him by intellect? To commune with God by love must imply loving him as well as receiving love from him, — unless the author uses language in a non-natural sense, like the Puseyites. But can we love what we do not intellectually apprehend? Can love act before the intellect acts and presents the object to be loved? Has Mr. Channing forgotten his philosophy?

Is the author correct in making the motive proceed from love, that is, will, instead of being addressed to it? Motive, if we understand it, is supplied by intellect, and is that which moves the will to act. It is the ground or reason of the act. The author identifies love and will, to which we do not object; but we never before heard will and motive identified. We have always supposed that the *power* to act and the *motive* to act were very distinguishable, — as much so as the belief of a proposition and the reason or evidence for believing it. Will, we have always been taught, is the power or faculty which we possess of acting from rational motives, or motives presented by intelligence, and hence of acting freely, without physical compulsion, — in which respect the action of will is distinguished from physical action, as the action of the lungs, the circulation of the blood, the contraction of the muscles, or the lightning rending the oak. The action of will is *for* an end, — *propter finem*; physical action, or even instinctive action, is simply *to* an end, — *ad finem*. The reason presents the end and the motive for seeking it, and the will chooses or rejects it, determines to gain or not to gain it. Mr. Channing, therefore, cannot be correct in making the will the motive. By doing so, he destroys the essential character of will, and reduces all human activity to simple impulsive or instinctive activity. Indeed, it is the characteristic of Mr. Channing's school to place instinctive action, which they call spontaneity, above will or voluntary action. But is Mr. Channing aware, that, in doing this, in reducing will to instinct, he is destroying the very condition of all moral action, of all ethics, of all merit or demerit, and placing the goodness of a man in the same category with the goodness of the dog, the horse, or the pig? If he is, we ask him if he expects to reform society, and to realize an earthly paradise, by denying all moral distinctions, all moral accountability, that is, by striking out the whole moral order? Can it be that Fourierism has entirely obliterated that fine

moral sense, that rare conscientiousness, that intense, almost morbid, feeling of accountability, which we so admired and loved and revered years ago in our young friend, and which made him so dear to us, and to all who knew how to appreciate him ?

“ The Church is the Divine element in man, the sphere of will.” The Church, then, is in man, a constituent element of man’s nature ; then not an outward institution, a visible organization, or congregation. As it is restricted to the sphere of will, it can have no authority to teach or to govern, and therefore nothing to do with faith, morals, or discipline. These belong respectively to the University and the State. Have we here the Christian conception ? Is such a Church the Christian Church ? Does it bear any analogy to any thing called the Church in any speech or tongue of men ? Assuredly not. By what right, then, does Mr. Channing call it the Church ? He is an honest man and a brave, and therefore cannot wish to make people believe that he holds to what he does not, or does not hold what he does. How can he justify himself in using a common and well-known term in a sense purely arbitrary, and unauthorized by any analogy in the ordinary sense ? Language is not his or ours ; it is *common* property, and not even Socialists have the right to enter upon and appropriate it as private property, — Communists as many of them are.

“ Opening from the central spring of feeling, — Love, One and Universal, — through which the inspiration of God for ever flows in, it [the Church, Love, the Divine element in man] widens into the four grand humanitarian affections by which man is made one with his kind.” Here it is to be remarked, that the Divine element is identified with love, one and universal. This love, one and universal, we take it, is what the author means by God, or the Divine Being himself. So God, at least in his essence, is one of the constituent elements of man, that is, of human nature ! We do not understand this, or, if we do, we have some difficulty in accepting it. We are made after the image and likeness of God, and we live and move and have our being in him, but not as God. If this is the author’s meaning, why does he make the Divinity merely *one* of the three constituent elements of man ? In this sense, He constitutes our whole being, is the being of our being, under the aspects of intellect and power or energy, as under that of love. But if he means something else, what can he mean, but that man, in so far as he is love, or loves, is God, and in all other

respects is to be distinguished from God, so that man is at once man, a creature, and God, the Creator? Is this his meaning, and what he means by "Divine Humanity," that is, a humanity constituted by a blending or confusion of the human and Divine natures? By restricting the Divine to a single element, and asserting two elements not Divine, he recognizes a proper human nature as distinct from God, at least an imperfect or inchoate human nature; and by making the other element, necessary to the constitution of man, identically God, he compounds man of both natures, and regards the human, on one side, as the complement of the Divine, and the Divine, on the other, as the complement of the human. This is the only meaning we can extract from his several statements. If this is his meaning, it has all the difficulties to contend with, which the Spinozaists allege lie in the way of creation from nothing, and all the unanswerable objections to which pantheism is itself exposed. Mr. Channing seems to have devised it expressly for the purpose of harmonizing the conception of a creative Deity, on the one hand, with the pantheistic conception on the other; the assertion of created beings distinct from God, with the assertion that all is God, and nothing can be distinguished from him,—two assertions, which, being eternally irreconcilable, can give birth only to a monstrous syncretism.

If the author had given man complete as man, having his being in God, yet distinct from God, as the effect from the cause, the creature from the Creator, and merely supposed, over and above, a supernaturally Divine element operative in him, we could easily have understood and accepted his view. If he had, then, defined the Church to be the Divinely constituted medium through which this Divine element, or Divine life, is communicated to man and kept alive and active in him, we should have recognized with pleasure the Christian doctrine, and have had little fault to find with his fundamental principle. And, after all, this is precisely the doctrine which he needs, and to which he must come in order to meet the demands of his own system. But this is not his meaning, as is evident from the fact that this Divine element itself only "widens into the *humanitary* affections, Friendship, Conjugal Love, the Family Sentiment, Honor." With all his influx of the Divinity, therefore, he does not elevate our life above the human. Evidently, then, the Divinity he recognizes in man is the Divinity in our nature, not the Divinity above it.

Taking our author's definition of the Church, what is his

problem? "The Christian Church and Social Reform," he says, are "the two extremes of man's existence," and "the law of harmonious coöperation between them is the thought which is shaping itself in all enlightened minds." But the Christian Church is love, one of the three constituent elements of human nature, and in its expansion gives us the humanitarian affections of friendship, conjugal love, family sentiment, and honor. Here is one extreme. The other is Social Reform. What means a law of harmonious coöperation between them? Is it the reconciliation of Social Reform with friendship and honor, marriage, and parental and filial love and duty? that is, to show how Social Reform can be carried on without wounding these? That is a problem, indeed, but hardly Mr. Channing's. Is it by Social Reform to provide freer and fuller scope for these humanitarian affections? No; for that would make them the end, and they are the inmost, and not the end, since, as the author expressly tells us, the outmost, the other extreme, is the end.

The author says the Church is love, opening from the central feeling, love, one and universal; and that the Church is one extreme, and Social Reform the other. The other extreme from love is hatred. If, then, the Church opens from love, Social Reform must open from hatred. The law of harmonious coöperation between love and hatred must, then, be "the thought which is shaping itself in all enlightened minds." We shall be curious to see that thought when it has fairly shaped itself.

"It [the State] aspires to form substantial conditions of comfort, refinement, and beauty, whereon the social affections may find materials of growth and symbolic manifestation, and whence *happiness may raise the religious affection* in thankfulness to the Author of good." There is much here not easily reconcilable with some other things which have been said, but we let it pass, for we are growing somewhat weary. We remark simply that the author makes the happiness derived from the world, from nature, represented by the State, the condition of religious activity. Happiness produces religion. Men are devout in proportion as they are filled with this world's goods, and "their eyes stand out with fatness"! This is evidently a new discovery; at least, it does not appear to have been known by St. Paul, or by our Lord. We have been accustomed to expect happiness from religion, not religion from happiness. So far as we have observed, prosperity is a far greater

enemy to religion than adversity ; and the poor and suffering, the wronged and afflicted, we have generally found more ready to raise their hearts in devout thanksgiving to God, than those who want for nothing, and “ have more than heart can wish.”

“ It [the University] determines the relations which should interlink the different departments of existence ; it reveals the method of a truly *human* life.” But what guaranties the University ? On one side you have a blind Church, through which streams of generous and noble feelings are pouring themselves in, and on the other the State, equally blind, wielding the whole might of physical power ; between these two blind forces you place the University, and make the truth and sanctity of the one and the wisdom and utility of the other depend on it alone. It is under no regimen, subject to no law, has no Divine revelations, and, even on your own principles, no Divine guidance. Whence is it to derive its own light, and what surety have you that it will not be made the tool of blind zeal, or of equally blind sensuality, and, in either case, precipitate you into the bottomless pit of error and corruption ?

“ The Church gives inspirations, which the University translates into ideas, that the State may embody them in deeds.” These inspirations are blind sentimental impulses ; nothing more, nothing less. What certainty is there that the University, which is uninspired, — which has, at best, only simple human intelligence, — will render them faithfully, and form them into sane ideas ? Is human intelligence infallible ? has it never been known to err ? Again, what certainty is there, that, even in case it should faithfully render the inspirations, the State will properly embody them ? The State represents the physical element, what modern psychologists call sensibility, or the principle of sensation, as distinguished from intellection and volition. It will be pushed by a contrary set of impulses, those of the senses ; and why may it not yield to these, instead of laboring to embody in deeds the ideas the University translates from the sentimental impulses ? Does it never happen in actual life that both understanding and will are led captive by the senses ? May it not, then, happen, as it has often happened, and, indeed, has become a characteristic of most modern states, that the State will lead captive the Church and the University, and thus establish the absolute despotism of the senses over both thought and conscience ? Mr. Channing himself tells us that “ sanity, integrity, blessedness, depend upon the equilibrium of

the three elements, and their harmonious action." What is the guaranty of that equilibrium? It has been disturbed, and the author makes the evils of Christendom in the mediæval ages flow from the predominance of the religious sentiment, the Divine element in man, that is, from the fact that man and society were too religious, too full of God, too subject to Divine inspiration. May not men run to the opposite extreme, and come to have too little of God, and too much of the senses, to answer to Mr. Channing's *beau idéal*? We grant that he is disposed to "give the devil his due," and even to treat him generously; but we do not understand that he wishes to give him exclusive dominion. What guaranty has he, that, in the struggle not to have too much of God, we may not get quite too much of the devil?

But these three elements, the Church, the State, the University, are, in each man, constitutive of his nature. Now, as they exist in man, they are harmonized, are in equilibrium, or they are not. If they are, pray tell us how they can be otherwise in their manifestations? If not, pray tell us how, without something superior to them, you can contrive to reduce their manifestations to harmony? You tell us, here is the Church, as an element of human nature, pouring in a perennial stream of inspirations; here is the University to translate them into ideas; and here is the State to embody them in deeds. All admirable, no doubt; but they are too much or too little. Suppose them to be enough, they are too much, for then no disruption of harmony could ever have occurred; and we know, and you admit, the equilibrium, the harmony, has been and may be disturbed. If they are not psychologically in equilibrium, they cannot be in equilibrium in their manifestations, and are too little for your purpose. You cannot have in the effect what you have not in the cause, and the effect cannot react on its cause, and develop, perfect, or complete its causality, as we have already shown, and as is evident of itself.

It is, perhaps, but fair to the author to say, that, when he speaks of the Church, the State, and the University, as constituent elements of human nature, he probably means only that they are the products, or outward expressions, of those elements. He recognizes in man three elements, which he calls love, intellect, power, but which we may name, more intelligibly, sentiment, intellect, sensibility, or the principle of sensation. Out of sentiment springs the Church; out of sensibility, or sensation, the State; and out of intellect the Univer-

sity, the mediator between the other two. He does not wish these three institutions to be separated, to exist as separate or distinct organizations, but wishes them to be all harmoniously blended in one association, which shall be at once and indissolubly Church-State-University, — *sentiment-sensation-connaissance*, in the language of Pierre Leroux. But as all proceeds from man, and is nothing but the outward expression of the inward, there can be nothing in such association not previously in man himself. But since it is undeniable that the elements expressed do not exist in man in harmony, in equilibrium, it follows inevitably, that there cannot be the harmony, the equilibrium, between the three constituent elements of the association, which is desired or contemplated.

Here is the difficulty. Some method must be devised by which the harmony or equilibrium may be restored or established in the interior of man. How is this to be done? One class of Socialists boldly assert the *natura integra*, which Christians believe was lost together with original justice by the fall; that is, they deny that there is any want of harmony or equilibrium in the interior of man, and maintain that all the elements or forces of man's nature are, interiorly considered, nicely balanced and properly adjusted. The apparent disorder does not originate from within, but proceeds from obstructions without, in the outmost, which prevent the inmost from acting itself out according to its own laws. Remove, then, obstructions raised by ignorance or craft, and all will proceed harmoniously.

But Mr. Channing cannot take this view, because he sees that it is false, knows that the interior harmony asserted is a dream, and no reality; and because he begins by assuming that all action is from within outward, and that the *without* is only the evolution of the *within*. This is clear from his definitions which we have quoted, and from his whole system of philosophy, which supposes the universe itself to be only the evolution of the Divinity in progressive series. Since, then, there is undeniable disorder and disproportion out of man, he must admit disorder and disproportion in man. Hence he says, "In every man, individual and collective, these three elements exist with *different* degrees of vitality; and sanity, integrity, blessedness, depend upon their equilibrium and harmonious action."

To restore, establish, or maintain this equilibrium, which is wanting even in the interior of man, there are only two methods within the reach of those who reject the supernatural. One,

to organize the outward ; but that will not do, because it will be only the image of the inward. The other is to draw upon the interior itself ; but that will not do, because from man's interior you can get only his interior, and that is disordered and out of proportion. Then it is obviously necessary to look beyond man's actual nature, as we say, — beyond man's actual interior life, as Mr. Channing says, — to God, who is harmony itself, and an inexhaustible supply of harmonious life. Hence the necessity of communion with God, religion, which Mr. Channing feels, and strongly asserts. In this he is more clear-sighted than most of his associates, and here we recognize the action of his religiosity.

But how to establish this communion, by means of which we may obtain from God this higher life, is now the problem. It is a difficult one for Mr. Channing, because he feels that he must confine himself to a natural communion, or, to be more strictly exact, to a natural *medium* of communion. He thinks, however, that he has a natural medium of supernatural communion, and therefore of supernatural life. The Church is the outward expression of inward sentiment, that is, the sentiment of love. This sentiment, he assumes, is the medium through which we commune with God, or through which his inspirations flow in to reanimate us. But this inward sentiment, which is a constituent element of our nature, without which we should want a portion of our nature, and should not be men, he next assumes, is identically the One Universal Love, the principle and life of all things, the Infinite and Eternal God. God being thus in our nature, we have in ourselves the infinite Source of life, to which we may recur, and replenish and enlarge our lives at will. Through the four humanitarian affections named, we may constantly receive fresh supplies of a higher and better life. We met this same view, substantially, some time ago, when we were reviewing Mr. Parker's *Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion*, and it is common to all our modern Transcendentalists. But this doctrine, which rests on two unproved assumptions, does not relieve the difficulty ; for the God supposed is not the God out of man and above him, but the God in him, and constitutive of his nature. Communion with him is only communion with our own nature, and, by simple communion with our nature, we can derive no life above it. Whatever be your meaning in making God one of the constituent elements of man's nature, you undoubtedly mean to assert it in a sense which leaves man distinguishable from God ; otherwise

you make man God, and then God only man, which of course gives you nothing to your purpose ; for from man we can get only man. In order that there may be a higher life than man's, God must be conceived above man, and then man must be distinguished from God, and have a fixed and determinate nature, which is human nature. Grant, then, that the Divine in man is in some sense one with the Divine out of man, one as to *essence*, but not one as to *existence*, — grant that the human does not exhaust the Divine, that God in us, as the being of our being, infinitely transcends us, and contains in himself exhaustless supplies of life, infinitely higher than the life man actually lives, — still, through human nature as your medium of communion, you can derive no higher life from him than your natural life. The quantity and the quality of the life to be derived from him is determined, not by the life he contains or is, but by the nature and capacity of the medium through which it is to be communicated. To deny this would be to deny all distinction of natures, species, and even of individuals, and would be to assert that all species and individuals are one, for they all live, and move, and have their being in God, — all derive their life, whatever it is, and such as it is, from God, who is the only Source of life ; and it would, furthermore, be to assert, that man, that all men, brutes, and even inanimate things, are God, at least *in potentia*. The medium of communication must, then, determine both the quantity and the quality of life communicated, for God gives to each being life after its kind, and in proportion to its capacity. Then through a natural medium man can receive from God only his natural life. Can nature be a medium of any thing larger than itself ? Of course not.

We here pass over the author's doctrine of Divine Humanity. Be it that our natural life is Divine, still, to obtain more than we already have by nature, we must have a higher than a natural medium of communion. Here is the grand defect in Mr. Channing's system. He gains nothing by asserting the identity of one element of man's nature with the Divine, for that assertion either represents man as God, or it does not. If it does, it asserts that God is man, and then he contains no more than man, and man can have no higher life than he has ; if it does not, the Divine element in man is not the infinite God, but determinate human existence, and therefore precisely what we mean by human nature, — man existing, — and can be the medium of only the proper determinate life of humanity. What the author wants is a superhuman life for man, — God su-

pernatually present in man, elevating him above his nature, and enabling him to live, intellectually and morally, a life above his natural life. This is what he wants, — what, day and night, he is seeking with untiring perseverance, with a zeal which we honor, with a singleness of purpose which we reverence, and with an earnestness which is worthy of all praise. He wants to live in a higher and more intimate communion with God. Unhappily, his Rationalistic education has led him to suppose that the medium of this communion must be natural. We say *medium*, for we do not doubt that he recognizes the necessity of a supernatural life. It is not the need of supernatural life he denies, but the need of a supernatural medium of its communication. He supposes that God must have made man's nature the adequate medium of all the good man can need or receive. Hence, instead of asking whether God has provided a supernatural medium for the communication of supernatural life, he wastes his fine feelings, his noble intellect, and his great energies, in the vain endeavour to obtain that life through association or the communion of humanity, which compels him to turn for ever within the sphere of that very nature above which it is his earnest endeavour to rise. He is unwilling to admit any *extra* or *super*-human medium of life. Thus it is, he makes the Church, the State, and the University open from elements of human nature, the simple expression of man's interior life. Doubtless he holds that they have a Divine origin, and would regard us as misapprehending or misrepresenting him, if we should assert that he makes them purely human creations; but they are from God only mediately, through the medium of man's nature, which makes them pure human creations, in the only sense in which any thing can be a purely human creation. Here is the source of his difficulty.

That these institutions — or leaving out the University as a separate institution, for it is integral in the Church — are for man, and respond to deep and indestructible wants of his soul, and of his body, we of course do not question. But that they open from our nature, are simply the expression of these wants, is a mere assumption, — an assumption which cannot be proved, and which, if it could be, would entirely destroy their value; for, with all deference to Mr. Channing, *the end of man is not to express himself*, — to give *outness* to his thoughts, sentiments, and sensations, or to embody them in institutions. The expression can never be the end, because, if the being is reasonable, it must be for something, — there must be a *propter quem* of the expression.

To deny this would be to deny reason itself. Man cannot, *in hac Providentia*, live his normal, natural life without the State, or his supernatural, Divine life without the Church ; but what proves that both have not been instituted for man by his Creator and his Redeemer, instead of having sprung out of man's own nature ? Christians assert this ; only a few men assert the contrary, and they are in general more remarkable for their bold theorizing than for their science or practical wisdom. Assertion for assertion, the assertion of the former, even at the very lowest, is worth as much as the assertion of the latter. May we ask Mr. Channing to reflect on this ?

It is no part of our purpose in these remarks to throw the Church in Mr. Channing's face, for our design has been to test his system by principles which he himself admits or must admit as a philosopher. To us, who occupy the high stand-point of Catholicity, it is easy to see that his only recourse for the higher life he wants, and which he feels that he must have, is the Church, the supernaturally constituted medium of supernatural life, — that is, in Christian language, grace. He wishes to secure the supernatural life, and without superseding the necessity of human effort. God doubtless could — we certainly know no reason why he could not — communicate a supernatural life, immediately, without the Church ; but if he communicated it immediately, he would not communicate it through nature ; for to communicate it through nature, even if that were possible, would be to communicate it mediately. Moreover, if he communicated it immediately, there would be no sphere of human activity in attaining it. We could only long for it, and wait passively for its communication. If it is to be obtained by us, and we are to have any part in obtaining it, any merit in living it, there must be a medium to which we can apply, and through which we can regularly obtain it, — that is, there must be the Church. The Church is not needed by God to enable him to communicate the life, but by us, as a regular medium of obtaining it.

The Church lives a supernaturally Divine life, for she is the body of Him who is “ the way, the truth, and the life,” — who has life in himself, and giveth life to all who come unto him. By communion with her we commune supernaturally with God, the exhaustless Source of life, and from him, through her, derive supernatural life. This is precisely what Mr. Channing wants. This meets and removes every difficulty he feels, and gives him all, and more than all, he seeks. Let it be, that, by what Leroux calls “ the Communion of Humanity,” he can

obtain a Divine life ; this does not diminish that life, but gives a superabundant life, — opens to him a life still more Divine, a truly supernatural life, by which man is raised to a higher participation of the Divine nature here, with the promise of a still higher participation of that nature in the *lumen gloriæ*, or beatific vision hereafter. God, in giving us his Church as the supernatural medium of supernatural life, does not make the life we receive by natural communion less Divine, but provides for us a life Divine still, and without which the natural life wants a purpose, is inadequate to our good, and can never conduct to the glory for which our God in his superabundant goodness destined us. In nature, God is a beneficent Creator, a just Sovereign, an inflexible Judge ; in the Church, he is our loving Father, our compassionate Redeemer, our warm personal Friend, who is touched with our infirmities, who pleads our cause as his own, and holds us ever in the arms of his infinite tenderness and love.

There are other things in the extracts we have made on which we should like to comment, but we have exhausted our space, and must reserve them, with the remainder of the Discourse, for a future occasion. We have commented freely, not with asperity, on Mr. Channing's statements, — not, we assure him, for the purpose of giving him pain, but for the purpose of pointing out to him and his Socialistic friends, how vague and confused is the thought, how loose and uncertain the expression, of modern Socialism. This Discourse is a fair specimen. He has written it with care, and has weighed with more than ordinary attention the words he has used. The contradictions and confusion we have pointed out, whether in the thought or the expression, belong to the system, not to the writer. We are aware that his friends accuse him of being loose and illogical ; but we are equally well aware, that, if, in this respect, he appears to disadvantage by their side, it is only because he is really more logical and consistent than they, and because his vision is clearer and more comprehensive than theirs. He is more faithful to the system, and better aware than they of its defects without religion. He has tried to harmonize their conceptions with the Christian, and to give some sort of completeness to them. It is his endeavour to render Socialism religious and systematic, that has involved him in the inextricable mazes of contradiction and absurdity. If his mind had not been in some sense religious, and more than ordinarily logical, he could never have made Socialism appear so utterly irreligious and absurd. If his state-

ment is, throughout, irreligious, illogical, and absurd, it is because such was the intrinsic character of what he had to state. A less ingenuous writer, a more sophistical mind, would have glossed over some things, and suppressed others, and made his statement appear more consistent to the superficial; but he would have been less faithful, and been more wanting in that higher logic which shrinks from no conclusions that follow from its premises. Let no man charge the absurdity to Mr. Channing's statement, and let every one know that he is just to the system. Mr. Channing is no every-day man, and no man of his school has clearer or more comprehensive views, though some may be more adroit sophists. He is inferior in learning to few of them, perhaps to none of them, unless it be Mr. Parker, to whom he is far superior in candor, ingenuousness, and innate reverence for truth and sanctity. Indeed, his views are so clear and comprehensive, and his sense of religion so strong, that we have little doubt that he will soon leave his school behind him, and seek what his heart craves and his mind needs, where alone it can be found, in the Church of God.

ART. VI. — *The Saints and Servants of God.* 1. *The Lives of the Companions of St. Philip Neri, the First Fathers of the Oratory.* New York: Edward Dunigan. 1848. 12mo. pp. 336.

2. *The Life of the Venerable Father Claver, S. J., Apostle of the West Indies; and Memoirs of the Religious Life of Cardinal Odeschalchi, S. J.* New York: The same. 1849. 12mo. pp. 421.

WE are happy to learn, that, contrary to an announcement made some months since, the series of *Lives of the Saints and Servants of God*, commenced by the Rev. F. W. Faber, or, as we should say, Father Wilfrid, is to be continued, and hereafter under the direction and responsibility of the English Oratorians established at Maryvale, to which congregation Father Wilfrid, and those associated with him at St. Wilfrid's, are now attached. The English Oratorians are placed under Mr. Newman, as their Father Superior; and we take this occasion to correct a false impression which some entertain with regard to our feelings towards this distinguished convert from Anglican-

ism. We have had no controversy with Mr. Newman personally, and have never found the least fault with any thing he has written since his conversion. The work of his which we reviewed was written, and in great part printed, before he became a Catholic, while he was *in transitu* from error to truth ; and we censured it, not because we had any lack of confidence in him, but solely because those without, perhaps maliciously, and some few within, inconsiderately, insisted that we should receive it as a Catholic book, to which appeal might be made as authority on Catholic theology. For Mr. Newman personally, especially as the humble and devout Catholic, as the pious and laborious Catholic priest, and Superior of a religious congregation, we have, and have had, no feelings which his warmest friends and most enthusiastic admirers could wish changed.

We regard the establishment of the Congregation of the Oratory in England as among the few consoling events of our times, and as promising great good to the cause of Catholicity in Great Britain, and consequently in our own country. A common origin, a common language, and, to a great extent, similar institutions, manners, and customs, make us, and will long preserve us, and Great Britain, morally and intellectually, one people, and the conversion of the two countries must, in the main, go on *pari passu*. The great obstacle to the conversion of either is Anglo-Saxon pride, and especially pride of intellect. Controversy, however able, learned, conclusive, or judiciously managed, can effect little beyond protecting the weak among ourselves from the incursions of those without. It cannot reach the seat of the evil. The intellect must be humbled, and that can be humbled only through the heart, — only by making men feel their own moral weakness, their own sinfulness, and need of a Redeemer and Saviour. Our hopes for the conversion of England and of this country also arise, not from the number of converts, distinguished or undistinguished, who are almost daily returning to Catholic faith and unity, but from the increasing power, the deeper piety, the bolder tone, and greater spiritual energy, which we witness in the American and English Catholic population themselves. In some quarters we may, indeed, see a miserable namby-pambyism, a disposition to pare Catholicity down to its smallest possible dimensions, born of penal laws and a mistaken loyalty ; but, in general, Catholics are no longer afraid or ashamed to be Catholics in a large and generous sense, and to aspire to the highest and richest forms of Catholic life. This is, indeed, encouraging ; for when once our Catholic pop-

ulation is filled with the Catholic spirit, and becomes assiduous in the practice of Catholic piety, its prayers for the conversion of unbelievers and heretics will be heard, and God will grant any thing in answer to their devout and charitable requests.

It is on the principle we here express or imply that the English Oratorians seem to us resolved to proceed. They are nearly all converts from Anglicanism ; but it is worthy of remark, that, generally, they have been drawn to the Church through the force of her asceticism. They were shaken in their heresy and schism, not by the study of Catholic dogmatics, or works of controversy, but by the influence, under God, of Catholic ascetic literature. They set out with an earnest desire to be holy men, — humble, devout Christians, — and they were obliged to look for the models of what they would be in another communion than their own. They sighed for the Catholic life. They sought help from our spiritual works, and especially from the study of the lives of the Saints. They soon perceived, that, as they could find examples of the saintly life only in the Catholic Church, it was idle to hope to imitate those examples out of her communion. Anglicanism had no Saints, and the stream of holy life had ceased to flow in England at the Reformation. Anglicanism could not, then, be the Church of God, — could not introduce her children into “ the communion of Saints.” Their previous studies, their dispositions, and the motives which had brought them into the Church, peculiarly fitted them to exert, after their conversion, the kind of influence most needed by their countrymen and ours, by causing them to aspire to sanctity, — to be humble, devout, earnest Christians, rather than learned dogmatists or skilful controversialists. They embraced Catholicity under its aspect of sanctity, rather than under its aspect of truth, — as it addressed itself to the heart and conscience, rather than simply as it addressed itself to the intellect. Consequently, they must naturally labor to present it under that aspect, and as it appeals to the heart and conscience, which is the aspect under which it must always be most powerful to subdue the pride of the intellect, and to make men *lovers* of the truth.

The English Oratorians could not better express their own Catholic feelings, or better serve the cause of Catholic truth, than by such a series of biographies of the Saints and Servants of God as was projected and commenced by Father Wilfrid. We do not want dogmatical works, we do not want controversial works ; for in either of those departments we are well sup-

plied ; but all who read only the English language do want works adapted to the great body of the faithful, which shall at once interest their feelings, engage their attention, instruct them in the ethics of their religion, stimulate their Catholic practices, and excite and nourish their piety. Such works are the *Lives of the Saints and Servants of God*. They are more interesting than tales of fiction, more instructive to the people than simple didactic works, and are admitted to belong to the most profitable species of spiritual reading. In reading them we gain more than is in the books themselves ; we gain the prayers and intercessions of the Saints whose lives we read. We are grateful, in behalf of our countrymen and of our children, that the good Fathers have directed their attention to supplying one of our greatest literary wants ; and we hope the Catholic public will duly appreciate and reward their noble and pious undertaking.

The two volumes before us contain, indeed, not the lives of canonized Saints, but exceedingly interesting biographies of saintly men. The first volume named is properly the pendant to the *Life of St. Philip Neri*, the founder of the Congregation of the Oratory. We make an extract from the Preface :—

“ Wonderful indeed is the variety of the saints of God ! The reader will easily perceive a striking difference between the holiness portrayed in this volume and what has been exhibited in others. Not as though any comparison were to be instituted between them for the purpose of disparaging either. God forbid that we should have the miserable temerity to judge otherwise than with loving reverence of the diversities of graces, ministries, and operations which the Holy Ghost vouchsafes to work in the Church ; for in the *Lives of the Saints*, as well as elsewhere, ‘ the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit,’ while they behold Him ‘ dividing to every one according as He will.’ One while, we see St. Joseph of Cupertino, St. Philip’s special devotee, flying through the air from altar to altar, from picture to picture, in Assisi, Fossombrone, and Osimo, in strange, unearthly raptures, a continual object of the wise jealousy and vigilant discretion of the Holy Inquisition, and yet uniting with this marvellous life the most illustrious example of humble virtues, solid piety, and the punctilious sanctification of ordinary actions, and an eccentric playfulness and manner of speech, which seem as though they had been caught from his special devotion to St. Philip. Another while, we behold the heroic virtues of the great St. Vincent of Paul, who, with some exaggeration, is said, like St. John the Baptist, hardly ever to have worked a miracle in his life, but whose life was his miracle, from the variety and greatness of his charitable enterprises, and his union of interior recollec-

tion, poverty of spirit, and simplicity with outward duties which were enough to have overwhelmed any one but himself. Yet in both St. Joseph and St. Vincent 'one and the same Spirit worketh all these things,' dividing His 'prophecies, miracles, graces of healings, helps, governments, kinds of tongues, interpretations of speeches,' separately or conjointly, according to His own good pleasure; and while one person is called to imitate this and another to imitate that, the effect of all upon the mind of a pious and believing reader is to make him cry out with St. Philip, 'O, who can tell the beauty of a soul in grace?' and so to make him yearn with unutterable longings for the vision of Uncreated Beauty which shall constitute the everlasting bliss of the true disciples of the Cross.

"Wonderful indeed is God in His saints; and while the air is darkening with His judgments, and men's hearts are failing them because of the things that are coming upon the earth, how naturally does the Catholic turn to the records of His mercies and the consoling manifestations of His grace in the Lives of the Saints, not so much to bury himself in the interesting study, and thus selfishly forget the heartbreaking work that is going on around him, as to give fresh nerve to his courage, to gain fresh incentives to intercessory prayer, and to see more clearly how the troubles of the Church and of its visible Head have been in all ages regarded by the good as so many additional calls, not to the common attainments of ordinary virtue, but to the rough roads and stony heights of arduous perfection, and heroic faith, and an utter weaning from all created love. O Patria, Patria! may the exile cry, how fair is the vision of thy far-off fields! May I not even bless God for the misery and the wretchedness, for the darkness and the strife, for the treachery and the unkindliness, which only serve to keep my eye more steadfastly turned on thine eternal peace, to detach me from this joyless earth, and to awaken in me the sweetly venturous hope that even I may dare to follow by some one of the luminous tracks which the saints of God have left still glowing across this wilderness of trial? Blessed are they who read in this temper, and who learn day by day to set a price upon one degree of sanctifying grace far above all the joys and honors and reputation of the world, — far, too, above the fulfilment of the schemes for the good of others for which they have fondly toiled, and, what is more, above the supernatural gifts and unearthly privileges of the wonder-workers of the Church, who gained those gifts by being zealous first of all for the better gifts of charity, — a charity that ever burned most brightly and most sweetly in submission and holy self-abjection." — pp. xvi. — xx.

As a specimen of the interest to be found in this volume, we copy entire the Life of Father Agostino Manni, which we very much admire.

“Agostino Manni was born at Cantiano, in the Duchy of Urbino. In his early youth he applied himself eagerly to the study of letters, but somewhat neglected the fervent practices of a devout life; being seduced by the attractions of the world into many of the faults of the thoughtless and the gay. It pleased Almighty God to rouse him from this state of tepidity by showing him one night in a dream a frightful abyss of flames, where the souls in purgatory were suffering dreadful torments. Agostino was horror-struck at witnessing the terrible chastisement inflicted on those small faults of which he had hitherto thought so lightly. In his alarm he had recourse with filial confidence to Mary; he threw himself at her feet without delay, and made her an irreclaimable offering of his heart. In this moment of grace he bitterly repented of all his past indifference, and vigorously resolved upon a thorough change in his mode of life. With this good beginning he entered in all earnestness upon a virtuous course, and with the blessing of his most holy Mother he embraced the Institute of the Oratory, of which, as St. Philip used to say, our Lady was the Mother and the guide. Agostino begged the grace of loving God through the intercession of Mary, often repeating this little prayer in Italian verse:—

‘Mary, deign my heart to move
With thy pure and holy love.’

He experienced such happy effects from his confidence in our Blessed Lady, that he used to say, ‘A soul that has a true devotion to the Blessed Virgin has the greatest blessing a mortal creature can enjoy.’ It was his delight to collect from the Sacred Scriptures and from the Fathers all the various titles with which he could weave a garland to Mary’s praise. With these he composed devout canticles, which he loved to repeat himself and to teach to others. He was in the habit of presenting, as it were, before the eyes of Mary all the nations of the earth; and with a tender compassion for the many unfortunate creatures who were living, some in the darkness of infidelity, others in the errors of heresy, and others again in the mire of their own sins, he would earnestly entreat her to implore for them of her only Son light and grace to free themselves from their misery, and to participate in the blessings of the incarnation. Sometimes contemplating her with her Divine Son in her arms, he begged, by the sweet and tender love with which she caressed the Blessed Child, that she would deign to embrace all sinners, amongst whom the humble priest reckoned himself the most unworthy. He composed a chaplet of simple and touching ejaculations to Mary, which he recited himself with great devotion, and taught to all his penitents. This little rosary was afterwards generally used by the public, and was printed with his other spiritual exercises. One of Agostino’s favorite devotions was to place himself in the presence of God, and imagine himself at the point of death. He used to repeat with

devout attention the recommendation of a departing soul, and then he represented to himself his sweet Mother, whom he had so often invoked in life, assisting him by her powerful aid in this awful moment of death. 'Pray for us sinners, now and at the hour of our death.' He excited himself to a filial confidence in her; he reminded her, that, whilst she was the Mother of God, she was also the Mother and the advocate of sinners; to her, he said, was confided the administration of mercy, and to her he intrusted the interests of his soul, imploring her to receive his spirit in these words of Holy Church: —

'O Mary Mother, full of grace,
Mother of clemency and peace,
Protect us from our evil foe,
And bliss at death on us bestow.'

Thus did he constantly prepare for his final appearance before the judgment-seat of God. The sweet memory of his blessed Mother seemed to be his greatest consolation; he never allowed a day to pass without making some pious remembrance of her, and he often exclaimed aloud, 'Comfort me, Mother of God!' Well might Agostino say, *Venerunt mihi omnia bona pariter cum illa*, — 'All good things have come to me with her'; for her benign assistance facilitated his progress in perfection, and she it was who renewed his fervor in a spiritual life.

"When Agostino first entered the Congregation, he could not understand how the holy father, under an exterior of so much simplicity, could conceal so exalted a sanctity. He afterwards confessed that he often felt an inward misgiving lest others should be scandalized by the ridiculous actions they saw the Saint perform. But when more fully enlightened by God, he clearly saw that this conduct resulted from the most perfect humility, which made St. Philip desire to attract nothing but contempt and to lose all credit for sanctity. He then comprehended the meaning of a maxim he had often heard from the lips of the man of God, that 'he who cannot bear the loss of his own honor and reputation will never advance in spiritual life.' Another favorite saying of the Saint's was, that 'external perfection, separated from the love of God and contempt of the world, is like a tree overburdened with leaves, which receives no nourishment from the root, and consequently in the heat of temptation falls to the ground.' St. Philip was far from leaving uncultivated the good dispositions of his disciple; he exercised him especially in all kinds of mortification; and Agostino, alluding to the tact and skill of the holy father in mortifying both himself and others, thus writes of him: 'He had a thousand wonderful arts and inventions, by which he eradicated from the soul every vestige of self-will, and prepared therein an abode for the grace of God.'

"Agostino had a singular love and esteem for the holy exercise of

prayer, and, meditating upon the blessed effects it produces in a soul, he used to say, 'Every thing depends upon thinking of God and praying to Him'; and, explaining himself, he added, 'While we pray, we amend our lives, we regulate our conduct, and we wash away all the stains of our souls; for the spirit of prayer suffers nothing sordid or impure to remain within us.' He was in the habit of beginning his meditation by placing himself in the presence of the Eternal Father. He then made acts of profound adoration and humility, putting no trust in himself, but confiding with a simple faith in the goodness of God, and saying, 'Eternal Father, behold, I come before Thee, sent by Thy only Son, the Divine Object of Thy everlasting love, and the Source of all my hope. He it is who begs Thee to grant me this grace; I come in His Name, and I bring my credentials, written with His sacred Blood. Behold and read, for therein wilt Thou find that He bestows upon me His infinite merits. I have accepted them; in justice, therefore, Thou wilt not refuse me what I ask. He has given me all things; His merits are no longer His, for He has referred them all to me.' Agostino said, 'I have no fear of not obtaining my petitions, when I remember Thy promise of the Gospel, "If you ask the Father any thing in My name, He will give it you."' 'Still,' he added, 'we must be careful not to hinder the blessings of God by our own evil dispositions. And there is one obstacle to the merciful designs of God, against which we are little on our guard; and that is a certain hardness of heart, which makes us omit to offer up prayers for our neighbour, and which causes our Lord (so to speak) to show a hardness of heart towards us.' He liked not to hear of persons seeking for spiritual sweetness in prayer; but he laid down as a rule, that our great object ought to be the overcoming of our passions, and therefore we should try to leave our meditation more patient and humble, more meek and gentle, than we went to it.' Comparing praying to fighting, he said, 'The soldier does not expect to feel pleasure when he fights, but he strives to conquer.' He quoted upon this subject the words of an eminent servant of God, who said, 'I have ever reputed and do repute it a great thing, to know how to abound in God; the reason is, because thus humility may be practised with much reverence. But a greater thing I have considered, and do consider, the knowledge of abstaining from God; the reason is, because faith is then exercised without further testimony, hope without expectation of reward, and charity without external signs of benevolence. This, indeed, is to gather honey from the rock, and oil out of the hardest stone.' Since the numerous occupations of his calling did not permit Agostino to spend all the time he wished in actual prayer, the pious priest made use of all creatures as means to raise his soul to God. He animated himself in this beautiful practice, saying, 'My soul, by the help of small drops, you will at length arrive at the

ocean of all good. Nevertheless, it is not well to tarry for the sake of rivulets that extend to this sea; stay not without whilst all the good you seek is within.' In this manner every thing he saw seemed to this man of God a ladder, as it were, to raise him to heaven. He used to exclaim, 'What pleasure is there in being a mere spectator of this marvellous world, if we do not recognize in it the Hand of the Creator who formed it?' In order to find God in all his works, he deemed two things especially necessary, namely, faith and love; for by these two wings did he soar from the visible to the invisible world. He constantly addressed this prayer to the Almighty: 'May each created object, O Lord, be to my eyes a glass, wherein I may behold Thy countenance, and be admonished of Thy presence.' He made frequent use of ejaculatory prayers, and particularly esteemed those which had been composed by the Saints. 'Thus,' he said, 'every one may say, "I have in my mind a thought which was first conceived in the heart of a Saint."'

"From the blessed union which Agostino enjoyed with Almighty God he further derived a singular tenderness of heart towards his neighbour. He loved all with the affection of a brother; and so great was his charity, that he seemed to enjoy the good of another no less than if it had been his own personal advantage. He himself remarked, that love and good-will are endowed by God with the peculiar power of rendering all things belonging to others our own, without depriving the possessors of them. It was edifying to behold how much he esteemed and considered even the least amongst his brethren. He looked upon the brothers of the Congregation as so many superiors. He always spoke to them with reverence and affection, and never showed the slightest sign of contempt towards any one. Thus did he apply the maxim of St. Philip, 'We should despise none but ourselves.' Earnestly desiring to see this spirit reign in the Congregation, Agostino sometimes tenderly reminded his brethren of the admirable conduct of their holy father, and of the sweetness of his manners, which were always gentle and affectionate, even when exercising his disciples in the severest mortification. 'We all remember,' he said, 'with what simplicity and condescension our holy father governed us all; how he testified his love for us by often calling us to his room, causing us to play and sing with him, and never commanding us, but, like one of ourselves, rather praying and sweetly showing us what he desired we should do.' This sweetness of spirit so peculiarly distinguished F. Manni, that he was commonly called the Father Sweet Manna. And we may well believe that it was no less pleasing in the sight of God than it was marvellous to the eyes of men, since it was instrumental in gaining many souls to Heaven. Agostino was assiduous in the confessional, and was ready to receive his penitents at all hours of the day. He had a wonderful tact for accommodating himself

to their several capacities, directing them to the attainment of the virtues they most needed, and recommending devotional exercises in proportion to their powers. When he found they were engaged in active occupations, he took especial care that their souls should not be idle before God. To all he advised frequent confession, and he taught them by wise and godly counsels how to make their confessions and communions with the greatest fruit to themselves. He constantly impressed upon them a filial devotion towards our sweet Lady, his own most loving and beloved Mother. For the use of his penitents he wrote many little books of devotion, by which he strove to enkindle the love of God in their hearts, and to instruct them in the practice of virtue. Agostino said that confessors ought to possess in an eminent degree sanctity of life and sweetness of demeanour, because sanctity draws down the blessing of God, and then sweetness (without risk under the safeguard of holiness) attracts the love of their neighbour. It did not satisfy him merely to hear and absolve his penitents, but he thought it necessary to assist them, and in some degree to provide them with salutary remedies against their sins, and not to leave them until he saw their cure completed. He approved the practice of some confessors, who, whenever they heard some grievous sin, first made an internal act of contrition for the injury done to God, and afterwards with gentle admonitions exhorted the unhappy offender to a true penitence. Kindness of manner he deemed particularly requisite in treating with timid souls, in order by gentle means to discover and remedy the hidden wounds of their hearts. He conversed but little with women, and his usual advice to them was, to avoid vanity. He was not in the habit of visiting them in their houses, except in cases of serious illness, and then he always liked to have a companion with him. When he heard their confessions, he was careful to place himself so as to be seen by others at a distance. He imitated St. Philip in refusing to give alms at the confessional, for fear self-interest should in any way prejudice the sincerity of the sacrament.

“Like all the holy men of whom we have written, Agostino had a great tenderness for the poor of Christ. He was in the habit of relieving them every day, more or less, according to his means; and when his money was all spent, he frequently gave away his clothes. He recommended to others this practice of daily alms-giving, saying that it was better to give a little day by day, than a great deal all at once, for we thus preserve in our hearts a love for this evangelical virtue, and perform (so to speak) a kind of ejaculatory alms. He taught those who had nothing to give away to say, at least in their hearts, when looking on the poor, ‘May God, who nourishes the birds of the air, and the fishes of the sea, relieve thee also in thy need.’

“F. Manni was for many years confessor to the fathers of the

Congregation, and it is not easy to describe the zeal and prudence he displayed in this capacity. He was hardly chosen for this office, when he at once made up his mind that he had no longer any time to call his own. During the day he received all who came, even persons who did not belong to the institute, and in the night he never suffered himself to be refused to any one. He seemed almost as much concerned for the faults of others as if they were his own, and he undertook, himself, to make atonement for them. He watched over each penitent as if he had only that single soul to care for; and with all this incessant care and labor, he considered that he did nothing at all. He remembered the toils of St. Philip, and he used to say, 'I have seen more done than I can ever hope to do.' Agostino was much esteemed for his prudence and discernment in the direction of souls, and upon this account Pope Paul V. employed him in order to discern the spirit of Fra Bartolommeo da Salustio, a reformed Franciscan. F. Manni carefully fulfilled this delicate commission, bearing in mind that not so much as a suspicion of evil should rest upon a religious person. He therefore desired that Fra Bartolommeo, who was very severe in his mode of life, should discontinue his great austerities, such as his hair-shirts, chains, &c., saying, as he took off the chain which the holy monk had been wearing, 'Bind thyself not with chains of iron, but rather with the chains of Christ.' He added, 'Father Salustio, it would be better to desist from all singularity, and to resemble the rest of the community, by sleeping upon a straw bed, wearing sandals, and eating the same food as the others do.' Then hearing that he was in the habit of composing little spiritual works, he desired him to write something in his presence. The father with great simplicity immediately took up his pen, made the sign of the cross on it, and blessed himself with it, as he was accustomed to do whenever he wrote, and thus began his composition:—

' God's holy Will on earth to do,
Thine own will to forego,
To care nought for the praise of men,
Nor blush at what is low:
If thou wilt climb the mount of love,
For foes and scorners pray,
Pray likewise that the Will of God
Be done in thee alway.'

In order to try him still further, Agostino now forbade him to say mass, to assist at the Divine Office, or to continue any of his usual exercises of devotion. He thus endeavoured to discover whether this man of God was really free from all reprehensible attachment to these duties, or if, on the contrary, he retained some little vestige of self-love, some lingering trust in these spiritual helps, instead of confiding purely in God. To his prohibitions he did not fail to add harsh corrections, and severe reproofs for the scandal his past life had

given, declaring him unworthy to be ranked amongst the servants of God. Fra Bartolommeo submitted to the trial with the most perfect humility, meekness, and obedience ; he quitted with equal readiness his corporal penances and his mental exercises, and preserved withal a constant peace and serenity of countenance. F. Agostino at last was fully satisfied ; and now, having performed the task required of him by the Vicar of Christ, he thought it right to testify his own feelings of esteem and admiration towards the humble servant of God. One day, therefore, after giving him leave to pursue his customary pious exercises, he suddenly prostrated himself at his feet, and, taking the cord with which Salustio was girdled, he placed it round his own neck, and then implored pardon for all the unkindness he had been forced to show him. F. Salustio, hardly able to bear the sight of another thus humbled before him, replied in sorrowful accents, ‘ Ah ! father, you little know what a demon is hidden beneath this habit ! ’ Our good priest gave an account to the Pope of the solid virtue of Fra Bartolommeo, and begged the forgiveness of his Holiness for all the faults which, in order to obey him, he had committed against this innocent and saintly monk. The Pope was rejoiced at the relation, and he replied, that there was no need of asking forgiveness, since all that had passed had been an occasion of merit for both.

“ F. Agostino had a singular talent for preaching the word of God with that simplicity of style with which it ought always to be delivered. This he had acquired at his own cost. For, once, after he had preached a learned discourse in a somewhat pompous manner, St. Philip (as is related in the Life of the holy father) desired him to repeat it so many times, that his hearers used to say of him, ‘ This is the father who only knows one sermon. ’ Agostino used to say that the whole science of preaching consists in first realizing the subject thoroughly to one’s self, adding, ‘ I can never expect to make others feel what I have not felt myself. ’ He prepared himself for the pulpit by the diligent study of the Holy Scriptures and the Fathers, and his favorite works were the Collations of Cassian, and the writings of St. John Climacus. Conformably to the practice of the institute, he was accustomed to relate pious examples from the Lives of the Saints, and he generally quoted them from the Lives of the Fathers or the Ecclesiastical Annals. The study of the Annals, a work which had taken its rise in the Congregation, he particularly recommended to the members of the Oratory. After employing a sufficient time in study, he placed himself before God as one wholly unprepared, and waited for the Divine Goodness to inspire him with what he was to say. By this means he acknowledged that he had received considerable light from God, both in his words and ideas. He deplored the little fruit produced by sermons, and said that this was principally caused by the preacher seeking his own praise rather

than the salvation of souls, and thus losing all the merit of his labor for the sake of a passing breeze of human glory ; like the clerk of a rich merchant, as he himself expressed it, who, though daily counting out money for others, has his own purse empty. St. Philip, he said, instituted the daily expositions of the word of God in the Oratory, instead of the mortifications and rigorous duties of other religious orders, because this Divine word, preached with earnestness, and listened to with reverence, suffices to sanctify the world. Hence he implied that this holy exercise ought to be as powerful an instrument for the sanctification of Oratorians as the practices of a religious life are for the perfection of monks. Those who are unceasingly occupied in preaching and praying not only sow the good seed in others, but also reap an abundant harvest themselves. He affirmed that preaching served as a powerful stimulant to the soul ; for if the conscience did not feel what the tongue uttered, who would not dread to hear the words, ‘ Why teachest thou to others what thou hast not learned thyself ? ’ He thought that St. Philip could have left his children no richer patrimony than the continual ministration of the word of God, since they must always experience a kind of necessity to become themselves what they strove to render others. It pleased Almighty God to let Agostino witness the copious fruits of his daily sermons ; for many sinners, touched by his earnest words, abandoned the evil courses to which they had been scandalously addicted, and, placing themselves under his spiritual direction, made rapid progress in sanctity. Others entirely quitted the world and embraced a religious life, and it was observed that those who, guided by him, entered some pious institute, generally became men of eminent virtue. By the Divine Goodness F. Manni was also instrumental in the conversion of Jews and heretics, numbers of whom he conducted to the true way of salvation, treating them always with the most profound humility and unwearied charity.

“ As to his manner of life, it was in all respects similar to that of the rest of the Congregation. He carefully eschewed the least singularity, well knowing, that, by resembling the community, virtue shines less in the eyes of men, but is infinitely more precious before God. He insisted greatly upon preserving the true spirit of penance, and, explaining its importance, he observed, ‘ Where there is no mortification, there can be no genuine virtue. Our holy father, in order that his children should acquire this spirit, exercised them in continual exterior mortification, and always desired to see them humbled and abased.’ Agostino observed his institute with rigorous exactness, saying that ‘ the sons of St. Philip possess but few rules, in order that perfection of observance may compensate for deficiency of number.’ During meals he practised a continual mortification, all the more meritorious by being rarely perceptible. He deprived himself of some part of every dish that came to table, and he

used to say that these little acts of self-denial accustom the soul to bridle the senses. He resisted every inclination to avidity in eating, and never tasted any thing out of meals. He disliked wasting either his words or his thoughts upon eatables. He said, with St. Philip, that the temperance and sobriety prescribed for the ordinary meals of the community were sufficient to compensate for the more rigorous fasts and abstinences which were not commanded by the rule. Two things, he added, are to be borne in mind, namely, sobriety and cleanliness. F. Manni always joined in the usual recreations after dinner and supper, and he was wont to contribute in no small degree to the general cheerfulness. He loved to see all meet together in those joyous hours, and in this he resembled the holy father who never allowed his children to absent themselves under pretext of greater quiet and retirement elsewhere, nor would he permit the universal gayety to be disturbed by any appearance of sadness. Speaking of the manner of recreation, he said that it should be accompanied by moderation and a modest cheerfulness, so that, springing from a holy source, it might be in itself good.

"He detested idleness, and all the time he did not give to prayer and works of charity he employed in study, taking, however, especial care that his studies should be according to the spirit of his vocation, and should tend to his own and his neighbour's profit. He displayed a singular charity towards the sick, and delighted in visiting the hospitals. He desired to see this pious practice observed by all the fathers and brothers of the Oratory, saying that St. Phillip used to call it a short road to perfection. He asserted that many of the brothers declared, that by visiting the hospitals they had received the grace of chastity from God. His favorite hospital was that of the mendicants on the Sistine Bridge, where he especially loved to converse with two of the inmates, M. Angelo and M. Bartolommeo, both of them poor in worldly substance, but rich in the gifts of God, as is related in their *Lives*, published in 1671. They considered themselves greatly benefited by the advice and spiritual guidance of Agostino. When they heard of his death, they exclaimed, 'F. Agostino was an angel of God to us poor creatures; truly he was an apostle and a saint!' The same title was given him by the servant of God, Glicenio Landriani, one of the regular clerks of the Pious Schools, who frequented the spiritual exercises of the Oratory, and whose *Life* was published in 1694. He rendered every possible assistance to his penitents when sick, and, as he was ever most devout to our Lady, he used often to throw himself at Mary's feet, and beg her to be their infirmarian, and to obtain for them either restoration to health, or the grace to profit by their sufferings. But with tenfold earnestness did he implore her assistance for them when they approached their last awful passage to eternity, that their death might be precious in the sight of God.

“It seemed natural that one, who had begun his life under the auspices of this heavenly Mother, should likewise end it under her blessed protection. And so it was with Father Agostino Manni. He had endured for many years a painful asthma, and now he was at last confined to his bed. He had recourse with his wonted faith and confidence to our sweet Lady, and he placed the interests of his soul in her tender hands. In these devout sentiments, after receiving the last sacraments with the greatest devotion, he placidly gave up his soul to God, November 29th, 1618. He was seventy-one years of age, having spent forty in the Congregation of the Oratory, and eighteen under the discipline of St. Philip.” — pp. 173–191.

The second volume named contains the life of a devoted Jesuit Father, who labored among the negroes of the West Indies, and the memoirs of Cardinal Odeschalchi, while he belonged to the Society of Jesus. Both are full of interest, and especially at this time, when so many are disposed to forget the eminent services rendered to religion by the great and holy men of the Society.

We hope soon to return to this series of publications, and to speak more at length on its general character, and on some of the topics it suggests for the meditation of the devout Catholic. We have at present only space to commend the entire series to our Catholic community.

ART. VII. — *The Canons and Decrees of the Sacred and Œcumenical Council of Trent, celebrated under the Sovereign Pontiffs, Paul III., Julius III., and Pius IV.* Translated by the REV. J. WATERWORTH. To which are prefixed *Essays on the External and Internal History of the Council.* New York: E. Dunigan & Brother, 151, Fulton Street; London: C. Dolman, 61, New Bond Street. 8vo. 1848. pp. ccliii. and 326.

OUR readers will best form a general idea of what they are to look for in this valuable work, from the editor's Preface, which we copy entire.

“Many years have elapsed since the Editor of this work formed the design of publishing a translation of the General Councils. The advantage, or necessity, of studying the Councils, as one of the

chief records of the faith, morals, and discipline of the Church ; as the main basis and exponents of canon law ; as containing much of the history of the Church and of heresy ; and finally, as forming part of that deposit of doctrine and practice which so many are called upon to receive in the Profession of Faith of Pius IV., — furnished motive enough to regard the undertaking as one of importance and general utility. And it was also thought that a work of this class would be acceptable and advantageous, not only to the ecclesiastical student, but also to all who may wish to make themselves acquainted with the real doctrines of the Catholic Church, as stated and defined, not by individuals, but by her assembled prelates, secured from error, in matters of faith, by the promised assistance of the Holy Spirit, when thus representing in Council the entire Church of God.

“ The Council of Trent has been first prepared for press, because that Council is of more immediate use for the present times ; as the errors of the Innovators of the sixteenth century are there condemned, and the Catholic doctrine is there also stated, on the chief points which still unfortunately separate so many from our communion ; and also because the decrees of discipline and reformation, published by that Council, embody the leading principles of Canon Law, by which the government and polity of the Church are, in a great measure, now regulated.

“ This latter consideration weighed much with the Editor, in inducing him to proceed at once with this last of the General Councils. The times were said to be ripe for a restoration, in this country, of the ordinary discipline of the Church, as regards bishops and clergy ; or, at all events, it appeared to many that the day could not be far distant when such a consummation must be looked for, and when, therefore, it would become, or was becoming, necessary, to enable all, readily and easily, to study the true duties and rights which they would, perhaps soon, be called upon to exercise.

“ It only remains to notice such details in the execution of the work as may be thought likely to interest the reader.

“ 1. The edition of the Council used is Le Plat's copy * of the authentic edition, published at Rome in 1564.

“ 2. Neither time nor labor has been spared to render the translation as faithful a transcript as possible of the original ; the most minute accuracy being essential to the value of a work of this character. Hence, the translation will be found to be a literal, and, as far as was attainable, a *verbatim* representation of the words of the Council ; and where those words seemed either susceptible of a

“ * Antwerpæ, 1779. This edition is very valuable, on account of its vast mass of various readings, and the catalogues of the Fathers present at the Sessions. Two of those lists will be found in an Appendix at the close of this volume.”

somewhat different rendering, or to convey some slight shade of meaning not capable of being reproduced in our language, they have been uniformly placed in the margin.

"3. Many notes, and especially numerous references to previous Councils, had been prepared, to elucidate the meaning of the Council; but, after much reflection, they have been almost entirely suppressed, for fear of infringing on a wise and extensive prohibition, issued in the Bull of Confirmation, against glosses, and other attempts at illustrating the decrees of the Council. Such, then, is the general character, or what it has been the Editor's endeavour to render the character, of this the first translation* of the Council of Trent into the English language; but should any passage or word be discovered, or be thought, to be less accurately translated than might be wished, the translator will feel grateful to have the place pointed out to him, that he may give the suggested emendation a candid consideration, and adopt it, if advisable.

"4. To the canons and decrees are prefixed two historical essays. The first of those pieces treats of the causes and events which immediately preceded and occasioned the convocation of the Council; whilst the second essay is a connected narrative of the proceedings of the assembled prelates and theologians, preparatory to each Session. The one gives the history of the times, the other of the Council; and the second especially will, it is believed, be found useful in elucidating many phrases and canons, and in fixing the meaning of passages and decrees which might labor under some obscurity, if considered only as they stand in the text. In fact, without an intimate acquaintance with the debates in the congregations which prepared for and preceded the public Sessions, it would be difficult or impossible to form a just and an accurate judgment on the form of words used in several of the most important decrees, especially of discipline and reformation.

"5. In compiling both the external and internal history of the Council of Trent, continued use has been made of the noble work of Pallavicino; † and as nearly all the leading facts and statements are derived from that authentic record, it has not been thought necessary to load the margin with references; almost every important circumstance narrated in the essays being capable of being confirmed by reference to that work." — pp. v. — viii.

As far as we are able to judge, Mr. Waterworth has executed the difficult and delicate task he proposed to himself with singular skill, judgment, and fidelity, and he has given us

* "An anonymous translation appeared in 1687; but it is so unfaithful, and even ludicrously absurd, that it must be regarded as rather a burlesque, than a translation, of the decrees."

† *Istoria del Concilio di Trento*, Roma, 1657."

a work of real value, which was much wanted in our English Catholic literature. The introductory essays have been written with great care and labor, and, though brief, leave unstated no important historical fact necessary for the elucidation of the Council. The translation, as far as we have compared it, is successful, and, for the most part, gives the exact sense of the original, without paraphrase, in good idiomatic and intelligible English. Mr. Waterworth has been so successful in this volume, that we hope he will be encouraged to continue his labors, and give us the other works he refers to in his Preface.

We subjoin the remarks with which Mr. Waterworth closes his essay on the internal history of the Council.

“Before closing these essays, it may be well to subjoin a short notice of some of the usual objections brought against the Council.

“It is not unusual with Protestant writers, to copy, without hesitation, the assertion of Fra Paolo, that the Council of Trent deceived the expectations formed of it at its opening, and to represent it as a perfect failure. So far, it is said, from restoring unity, it has rendered a reconciliation impracticable; the reformation of discipline was scarcely attempted, and, where attempted, was touched with too sparing a hand to be effectual; the jurisdiction of bishops was reduced, instead of being enlarged; and the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff was in the same proportion increased.

“1st. To represent the Council of Trent as in any way influencing the conduct, or confirming the separation, of any of the sects whose opinions it condemned, is to gainsay plain facts of history. For all these sects had completely separated from the Church, before a single decree had emanated from the Council. The change of religion in Germany, England, and elsewhere, was an established fact, before the Council was assembled. Before the Council, entire nations abandoned the faith of their fathers; after the Council, no single instance can be adduced of any extensive revolt from the authority of the Church.

“2. Neither is it true to say that a reunion has been rendered more difficult since the promulgation of the decrees of the Council. For what doctrine is there now prominently put forward as dividing the Catholic Church from the innovators, which had not already been defined by some other General Council, held before the Council of Trent? Whether on the sacraments, or on the other doctrines and practices of the Church, the decrees of Trent but followed those of anterior Councils, or the received constitutions of the Sovereign Pontiffs. There is not one article of faith contained in the profession of faith by Pius which cannot be shown to have been defined and believed as Catholic truth, or practised, when a

practical doctrine, throughout Christendom, long before the Council promulgated or enjoined that doctrine or practice.

"3. If there were any so credulous or zealous as to believe that the Separatists would be brought back to Catholic unity by means of the Council, they were indeed disappointed; but disappointed in spite of the warning of experience, and of all the past history of heresy and of the Church. No such hope could ever have been entertained, had they but reflected on the result of the decrees of the earliest, as well as of the more recent, Councils. The Arian heresy was not crushed by the Council of Nicæa; nay, it never was so extended, its ravages and power were never so great, as after the Council which condemned it. So was it after the Council of Constantinople, after that of Ephesus, and even after the magnificent assembly at Chalcedon. Such, then, had been the ordinary result; and there was every thing in the conduct, and doctrine, and declarations of the self-styled Reformers, to prepare men's minds for the conclusion, that the heresies of the sixteenth century would be no exception to the rule. In fact, their fundamental principle, or practical adoption of the absurd system of private interpretation,—their denial of all infallible authority,—would almost necessarily preclude the possibility of submission to the decrees of a Council which was based on principles diametrically opposite. Hence, as is recorded in the preceding pages, both Clement and Paul III. declared that the assembling of a Council was not to be regarded as a means of converting Germany.

"Irreconcilable, then, that separation may be, and reconciliation impracticable; but not on account of the Council of Trent, but on account of the denial of truths which Trent did not affect to discover, or first proclaim, but simply stated and explained, in conformity with the decrees of previous Councils, and the uniform belief and practice of the Christian world. At Trent, therefore, the scattered dogmas were collected, but there was no innovation. Before the Council, whole nations fell away; since the Council, the heresies condemned may count their gains, but can they count their losses? The former are as nothing to the latter.

"II. The reformation of discipline, especially in the ecclesiastical order and government, from the highest to the lowest ranks, cannot be denied by any one conversant with the state of the Church before and after the Council. The extinction of pluralities, the obligation of residence, the annihilation of the mass of privileges and exemptions, the establishment of ecclesiastical seminaries,—these and similar regulations have produced so favorable an effect, that the outward appearance of the Church has been almost entirely changed; and so effective and wise were those regulations, that, at the expiration of nearly three hundred years, they are as vigorous and operative as ever, in preventing those grievous evils which they

were established to remedy. It is very easy to decry the present, and to praise the past ; but it would be difficult to lay the finger on any one century in the history of the Church, in which the outward polity, government, and discipline, whether in the higher or inferior orders of the clergy, can be shown to have been more pure, or free from just subject of complaint. Neither would it be more easy to name an age which has produced men of greater eminence in holiness, in self-denial, in learning, in devotion to God's glory and the salvation of men, in all the virtues and counsels of the Gospel, than have adorned the Church since the time of the Council of Trent. Even Courayer, in his otherwise censorious remarks and notes, inserted in his translation of the history of Fra Paolo, acknowledges the excellence of the disciplinarian reforms.*

“ III. As regards the jurisdiction and authority of bishops, it is a fact, which the slightest knowledge of history will make evident, that bishops have increased in power and honor, in proportion as the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff has been more fully and extensively exercised. And it is also certain, that the bishops, without losing one single particle of the jurisdiction which they enjoyed before the Council of Trent, recovered, by means of that Council, many of the privileges of which they had, by degrees and in various ways, been deprived ; so that, of all the Councils ever held, that of Trent promulgated the greatest number of decrees in their favor, and this on points the most important ; and it might even be safely said, that all the previous Councils united have done less towards restoring their unfettered authority over their subjects, of all degrees, and in consequent diminution of the power of the Roman tribunals, than was effected by the single Council of Trent. A very cursory examination of the decrees of Reformation will establish the truth of this assertion beyond all controversy. And this will suffice to show the emptiness of the statement, that the Papal power was increased by that Council ; the fact being, that not a decree was passed in favor of the Sovereign Pontiff, either by conferring one privilege which he did not enjoy before, or asserting even that preëminence which had been proclaimed in the Council of Florence, and that of Lateran ; — whilst, on the other hand, many graces and dispensations, previously granted freely by the Pontiff, were either suppressed altogether, or greatly limited ; many causes and persons that had been withdrawn from the cognizance of bishops, before the meeting at Trent, were again placed under their jurisdiction by that assembly, — nominally, indeed, as the delegates of the Apostolic See, but practically as completely as if no such form had been introduced to overcome the objections of privileged and exempted persons.

“ It will be useful to close these remarks by a few lines on the

“ * Preface, Vol. I. pp. xxvii., xxviii.”

liberty of the Council ; as it is constantly objected, that the Council of Trent was not free, but was a mere passive instrument in the hands of the Pontiff.

“ But, before coming directly to the question, the reader must be reminded, that the Germans, and other nations, would never consent throughout to the Council being held in any city of the Ecclesiastical States ; so that, in the three reunions of the Council, all the proceedings were conducted in a city subject to the Emperor ; and this even after the votes of two thirds of the Fathers had transferred the Council to Bologna. Neither is it to be supposed that the majority of the bishops were from the Pontifical States, or derived their revenues thence ; the fact being, that the bishops from those States were always but a small and inconsiderable minority, when compared with those who held their bishoprics under the Emperor, and who, therefore, were far more directly under his power and influence than that of the Pontiff. Neither, therefore, as to the place in which the Council was held, nor as to the number of prelates present, was the Pope even upon a parity with the Austrian Emperor.

“ As regards any undue influence exercised by rewards, I am not aware that any accusation has ever been brought, on this head, against the Popes ; but it may not be useless to remark, that there is no one instance of favor or advancement conferred on those who habitually supported the Legates, which their own merits and position did not of themselves justify and require ; whilst several of those most hostile and troublesome during the Council were, when their qualities demanded it, advanced to the highest dignities by the Sovereign Pontiffs. It is true, that, in order to retain some of the poorer bishops at Trent, a pension was assigned them out of the Papal treasury ; but the amount, twenty-five scudi a month, was so trifling, that it was regarded, by the majority of those who received it, rather as a grievance than as a favor ; because, whilst it hindered them from leaving the Council, and returning to their dioceses, under the plea of poverty, it barely sufficed for their subsistence ; whence some of the most violent opponents of the Legates were to be found amongst those who were forced to accept that pension.

“ It now remains to consider, whether the Council was, on any occasion, induced or compelled to pass a decree which really was opposed to the wishes of the Fathers ; or, on the other hand, was prevented, in any instance, from acting as their desires and consciences prompted them.

“ As not a single decree of faith was promulgated to the advantage of the Pope, whilst many decrees of discipline were issued in direct opposition to his interests, and those of his courts at Rome, it is plain, that the plea of undue influence, or compulsion, cannot for a moment be sustained. Neither can that of hindering the Fathers

from passing decrees be better supported. Only two cases have been adduced in support of the accusation : the first, on the origin of the law of residence ; the second, on the origin of the institution of bishops. Now, as regards the first, it has been seen, in this history of the Council, that Pius IV., though averse at first from any definition of a question so doubtful, and so violently debated, not only amongst the Fathers, but amongst Catholic writers, at length directed his Legates to decide it by the votes of the majority. Two of his own Legates were in favor of asserting the Divine origin of residence and one regarded it as of ecclesiastical law ; and if the matter was left undetermined, it was not through the fault or interference of the Pope, but because the Fathers could not sufficiently agree amongst themselves, to justify the promulgation of any decree on the subject. Amongst those who maintained the Divine origin of residence were some of the most strenuous supporters of the authority of the Pontiff ; men afterwards raised to the highest dignities, and even to the Apostolic throne. And it may be doubted whether the effect, which the affirmation of that Divine origin was considered likely to produce, has not been as effectually secured by the zeal and attention of the Sovereign Pontiffs, in this regard, as if the Council had unanimously agreed that bishops are bound to residence by the law of God.

“ Much the same must be said on the Divine institution of episcopacy, in regard of jurisdiction. The subject was left to the votes of the prelates ; and no decision was come to, because no agreement could be arrived at. Whilst, so far was the Pontiff from wishing to exalt his own privileges over those of the bishops, that, when nine tenths of the Fathers were willing to renew in his favor the decree of the Council of Florence, and even to proclaim his superiority over a General Council, he refrained from taking advantage of their readiness ; and this at the desire of the Cardinal of Lorraine, and of a few French prelates, supported by a small number of other bishops, who alone were opposed to the promulgation of decrees so advantageous to his authority. Whence it follows, that, as regards the decrees of faith, only in two instances did the Pontiff interfere at all ; and in those, the matter was eventually left to the unbiased judgment of the Fathers.*

“ The decrees of Reformation present no difficulty : for not only did the Pontiffs leave the Fathers to decide as they pleased on all questions over which they had direct jurisdiction, but, even on those reserved especially to the Holy See, and in regard of his own tribunals, Pius repeatedly directed his Legates to leave the whole to the judgment and votes of the Council ; and his complaint constantly was, that they continued to request his instructions, even

“ * This is acknowledged even by Courayer, T. I., Preface, p. xxix.”

after he had ordered them to leave all to the votes and the wishes of the Fathers. The Cardinal of Lorraine, the Archbishop of Braga, the Emperor of Austria, and the Kings of Spain and Portugal, each and all bore honorable testimony to the conduct of the Pontiff in this regard,—to his repeated injunctions to satisfy their demands in every practicable particular; whilst, if ever the Council was indeed checked in its wishes, it was when it was proposed to correct the abuses, caused by the interference of secular princes in the administration and government of the churches within their dominions. And whereas Pius at once accepted and enforced all the decrees of Trent, within his own territory, and in his own tribunals, detrimental as many of those decrees were to his interests and those of his courts, those princes, with few exceptions, refused to introduce the decrees of discipline, except by degrees, and in proportion as their necessity or utility was clearly manifested by the wants of their states, or the demands of their clergy.”—pp. cclxvi. — ccllii.

These remarks are solid and just, and completely vindicate the Council from the aspersions cast upon it by our adversaries. We find not the least fault with them, but we almost wish the reply to the charge of undue Papal influence on the proceedings of the Council had been omitted. All that is necessary to establish is, that the Council was regular and free. The Pope, on any hypothesis we choose to take, is an integral element of the Council, and whatever influence he exerts on its proceedings or its decisions is only so much of the integral influence of the Council itself. In no case can it be an infringement of the liberty of the Council, unless we suppose the absurdity that the Council can infringe its own liberty. What Catholic ever dreamed of excluding the Pope from the Council? or that, when the Council is congregated, the Pope is to hold his peace, and leave all to the Fathers, without his interference, advice, or suggestion? St. Peter, at the Council of Jerusalem, gave very frankly his view of the matters to be decided, and the Council followed it. It does not appear to have occurred to St. Peter that he must remain silent and passive, leaving it to the rest to decide, without him, the questions at issue. Instead of undertaking to show that the Pope did not exercise the influence charged against him, we would rather simply assert, that, if he did, he had the right to do so. The Pope is a better judge of the extent and limits of his powers than we are. The fact that he exercises a given power is, to say the least, a presumption that he has a right to do it, and we must be informed by a higher authority than his that he has not,

before we can deny it. It does not become us to judge our judge.

It is often better to pass over than to deny the charges of our adversaries, even when we are abundantly able to disprove them. In replying to objections urged, we have to consider our replies not only as they bear upon those without, but also upon those within. The objections we have to meet, for the most part at least, rest on a humanitarian principle, and virtually assume the point they are urged to prove. Resting on a humanitarian basis, they are, and can be, no valid objections against an authority assumed to be Divine and supernatural. If we meet and simply refute them on the humanitarian ground, we run the risk of having our refutations react on Catholics, and create even in them a tendency to regard Catholicity itself only from the humanitarian point of view. It is desirable, no doubt, to silence the arguments and cavils of those without ; but it is far more desirable to maintain sound doctrine, and a high, uncompromising Catholic tone among those who are within. To consent to defend our own doctrines on a low, instead of a high ground, lowers the doctrinal tone of the faithful themselves, and renders them less able to withstand the attacks of the enemy. A line of argument that would be perfectly safe and even judicious in the schools, where the strict rules of logic are observed, may be the reverse when pursued before the people at large, who are unskilled in technicalities, and unable to make or to appreciate nice scholastic distinctions. The people understand us always as conceding what we do not expressly deny, and as giving up what we do not expressly assert.

The Catholic controversialist finds, to-day, his chief embarrassment, in defending the Catholic faith or repelling objections to it, in the concessions made or in the economical methods of argument adopted by his predecessors. He finds that they often deprive him of his readiest and most solid answers to objections, or render it impossible for him to use them without having to maintain a controversy with those within as well as with those without. We hold, that, in discussing the subject before the public, we should refuse to plead to objections which are objections only on the assumption of a false principle. To plead to them is to recognize the principle on which they rest, and to subject us to the inconvenience of having that principle thrown in our face just when and where we are the least prepared for it. To defend the Papacy, for instance, on humanitarian principles, even though we make a reserve in our own

minds in favor of its Divine right, can only tend to prepare the people to regard it as a human institution, and therefore as one to which they are not bound to submit. It is very convenient, in a democratic age and country, to answer objections urged against certain powers which have been claimed and exercised by the Popes, by asserting that they were held and exercised with the assent of the people ; but it is a great inconvenience to have done so, when the people become hostile to them, and assert in our face, as a truth, the principle we had conceded. What the people grant, the people can revoke. This fact, we think, is not unworthy the consideration, at the present moment, of all who have manifested a wish to assimilate the Papal power, at least in some departments, to the democratic principle. Rome is at this moment writing, in very legible characters, a striking commentary on their methods of asserting the legitimacy of the Papal authority and influence.

The Papacy is the element in our Church which is always the most exposed to attacks, because it is the foundation and centre of unity, because it is the chief executive authority of the Church, and because it is that which offers the more immediate and effectual resistance to those who would suppress the independence of the spiritual order, trample on the rights of conscience, and enslave their brethren. St. Peter stands in the forefront of the battle, protecting as well as leading on his troops ; and the enemy knows full well, that, if he can be struck down, they will soon be put to flight or compelled to surrender at discretion. Hence, all the efforts of the enemy are directed against the Papacy ; and no one can have read the history of the Church for the last six hundred years, without perceiving that the greater part of the evils which have afflicted her maternal heart have been occasioned by a disposition, among many even of her own children, to distinguish between her and the Papacy, and to circumscribe the Papal authority and influence within the narrowest limits possible. Hence, the Papacy is that to which all good Catholics should especially rally, and prepare to defend with their hearts and their lives. Whatever tends to lower it, or to favor low and narrow views of it, they must look upon as un-Catholic and dangerous in its effects.

But though the extract we have made has suggested this train of remark, our readers must not for a moment suppose that Mr. Waterworth is in the least degree obnoxious to the censure implied in what we have said. No writers have gone farther in their efforts to circumscribe the Papal authority than

English Catholic writers, and the wisdom of their proceeding may be seen in the leanness which has characterized English Catholics for these three hundred years, and more. They have, indeed, acknowledged the Primacy of St. Peter and his successors, but one can hardly help feeling, when reading their writings, that they regard the Papacy as little better than a blunder, and secretly wish that Almighty God had seen proper to have constituted his Church without it, — or at least, to have exempted Englishmen from the obligation to obey it, especially since the Holy See was to be at Rome, instead of Canterbury or York. They seem always to grudge the Pope every obedience they yield him, and to have no love, no warm, living affection, for the chair of Peter. But we see nothing of this in Mr. Waterworth, although he is an Englishman. Indeed, we owe it to truth and justice to say, that there appears to be a far more healthy and high-toned Catholic feeling growing up among our English brethren. A little namby-pambyism there may be still, here and there, in our mother country, as well as among ourselves, where the old English spirit remains to be exorcised ; but, upon the whole, English Catholics are beginning to set a truly edifying example. They are active, and their press teems with Catholic works,—many of them works of a lofty tone, and of great value. It would seem that the day has gone by when we were to say of them, They are first Englishmen, and then Catholics. They are becoming, rapidly, *Roman* Catholics, and apparently are already far more *Roman* than we are in this country. There is scarcely a periodical in this country that has the courage to use, on some subjects, the strong language which we read habitually in the *London Tablet*, or occasionally in the *Dublin Review*, which, notwithstanding its name, is English rather than Irish.

The English Catholics, in fact, are setting us an example which we should do well to follow, and which, while it consoles us, should excite us to renewed zeal and greater activity. They are far ahead of us. We rely upon them for nearly all the books we read in our own language, and for nearly all the matter that fills our Catholic newspapers. They send us much ; we return them little. This is not as it should be. If we were less engrossed in politics and the world, if we were only resolved to be, first of all, Catholics, and thoroughgoing *Roman* Catholics, our numbers and means are sufficient to enable us to take as active and as important a part in the Catholic movement of the day as our English brethren are taking.

We are too supine, too indifferent, too forgetful of the duty we owe to the Church, and of the blessed privilege of laboring to promote her interests. Let us look across the water to England, and to France, and ask ourselves if we have not reason to blush at the little we do. It really seems to us, that, unless it be some portions of Spanish America, there is at this moment no part of the globe where the great body of the Catholic laity, and especially those in easy circumstances, are so little intent upon the interests of their religion, where they have so little mental activity and energy, as in this free and happy country of ours. May it be so no longer ; but may we all pray God to grant us the grace necessary to perform our share in the great work now going on.

ART. VIII. — *The Vision of Sir Launfal.* By J. R. LOWELL. Cambridge : George Nichols. 1848. 16mo. pp. 27.

THOSE of our readers who have not read this beautiful little volume from the University Press, Cambridge, will be able to form some idea of its general purpose and character from the author's "Note," which we copy, as its most appropriate introduction.

"NOTE. — According to the mythology of the Romancers, the San Greal, or Holy Grail, was the cup out of which Jesus partook of the last supper with his disciples. It was brought into England by Joseph of Arimathea, and remained there, an object of pilgrimage and adoration, for many years, in the keeping of his lineal descendants. It was incumbent upon those who had charge of it to be chaste in thought, word, and deed ; but one of the keepers having broken this condition, the Holy Grail disappeared. From that time it was a favorite enterprise of the knights of Arthur's court to go in search of it. Sir Galahad was at last successful in finding it, as may be read in the seventeenth book of the Romance of King Arthur. Tennyson has made Sir Galahad the subject of one of the most exquisite of his poems.

"The plot (if I may give that name to any thing so slight) of the following poem is my own, and, to serve its purposes, I have enlarged the circle of competition in search of the miraculous cup in such a manner as to include, not only other persons than the heroes

of the Round Table, but also a period of time subsequent to the date of King Arthur's reign."

Mr. Lowell may be right in calling the Holy Grail the cup from which our Lord communicated his disciples at the last supper, but, properly speaking, the Holy Grail, or San Greal, was not the cup, but the blood, *Sanguis realis*, from the side of our Lord, when on the cross, which the legend asserts was received into the cup, and preserved in it. The name is a corruption of the Latin *Sanguis realis*, or of the French *Sang réel*. Mr. Lowell has materially changed the character of the old legend. In the original legend, the knight, after performing his devotions and preparing himself for the search, went forth in pursuit of the Holy Grail, and the poet simply narrated his adventures, and his success or his failure. Mr. Lowell dispenses with the devotions, with the actual pursuit and adventures, and contents himself with making his knight see a vision. This alteration is characteristic of the difference between the early Romantic Age and our own. The old knights of romance, whatever the defects of their lives, — and they were rarely perfect models, — were always devout, always retained and loved the faith, and, if they sinned, were ready to do penance, — the next best thing to not sinning; and they really did go abroad, were active, ready, and able to encounter danger and to endure fatigue. They lived and acted in the open world, out of doors, among real objects. But the moderns stay for the most part in-doors, repose on soft couches, and dream. Their adventures all pass in their sentimental reveries; their heroic deeds, and knightly conduct, are visions.

Mr. Lowell has not only modernized the external character of the old legend, but he has entirely changed its internal character. The moral of the old legend was the merit of chastity, in thought, word, and deed; and chastity, not merely in relation to one passion, but in relation to all the passions, — chastity of the entire body and soul. Mr. Lowell dispenses with this as with the devotion, as foreign to the ideas and habits of the moderns, and more likely to offend than to interest. He makes the moral turn, not on the motives from which, but on the feelings with which, one acts. Thus he sings, —

“As Sir Launfal made morn through the darksome gate,
He was ware of a leper, crouched by the same,
Who begged with his hand and moaned as he sate;
And a loathing over Sir Launfal came,

The sunshine went out of his soul with a thrill,
 The flesh 'neath his armour did shrink and crawl,
 And midway its leap his heart stood still
 Like a frozen waterfall ;
 For this man, so foul and bent of stature,
 Rased harshly against his dainty nature,
 And seemed the one blot on the summer morn, —
 So he tossed him a piece of gold in scorn.

“ The leper raised not the gold from the dust :
 ‘ Better to me the poor man’s crust,
 Better the blessing of the poor,
 Though I turn me empty from his door ;
 That is no true alms which the hand can hold ;
 He gives nothing but worthless gold
 Who gives from a sense of duty ;
 But he who gives a slender mite,
 And gives to that which is out of sight,
 That thread of the all-sustaining Beauty
 Which runs through all and doth all unite, —
 The hand cannot clasp the whole of his alms,
 The heart outstretches its eager palms,
 For a god goes with it and makes it store
 To the soul that was starving in darkness before.’ ”
 — pp. 12, 13.

This giving of alms from a sense of duty will not do. The vision continues.

“ ‘ For Christ’s sweet sake, I beg an alms ’ ; —
 The happy camels may reach the spring,
 But Sir Launfal sees nought save the grewsome thing,
 The leper, lank as the rain-blanchèd bone,
 That cowered beside him, a thing as lone
 And white as the ice-isles of Northern seas
 In the desolate horror of his disease.

“ And Sir Launfal said, — ‘ I behold in thee
 An image of Him who died on the tree ;
 Thou also hast had thy crown of thorns, —
 Thou also hast had the world’s buffets and scorns, —
 And to thy life were not denied
 The wounds in the hands and feet and side :
 Mild Mary’s Son, acknowledge me ;
 Behold, through him, I give to thee ! ’ ”

“ Then the soul of the leper stood up in his eyes
 And looked at Sir Launfal, and straightway he

Remembered in what a haughtier guise

He had flung an alms to leprosie,
When he caged his young life up in gilded mail
And set forth in search of the Holy Grail.

The heart within him was ashes and dust ;

He parted in twain his single crust,

He broke the ice on the streamlet's brink,

And gave the leper to eat and drink ;

'T was a mouldy crust of coarse brown bread,

'T was water out of a wooden bowl, —

Yet with fine wheaten bread was the leper fed,

And 't was red wine he drank with his thirsty soul.

“ As Sir Launfal mused with a downcast face,
A light shone round about the place ;
The leper no longer crouched at his side,
But stood before him glorified,
Shining and tall and fair and straight
As the pillar that stood by the Beautiful Gate, —
Himself the Gate whereby men can
Enter the temple of God in Man.

“ His words were shed softer than leaves from the pine,
And they fell on Sir Launfal as snows on the brine,
Which mingle their softness and quiet in one
With the shaggy unrest they float down upon ;
And the voice that was calmer than silence said,
' Lo, it is I, be not afraid !
In many climes, without avail,
Thou has spent thy life for the Holy Grail ;
Behold, it is here, — this cup which thou
Didst fill at the streamlet for me but now ;
' This crust is my body broken for thee,
' This water His blood that died on the tree ;
' The Holy Supper is kept, indeed,
In whatso we share with another's need, —
Not that which we give, but what we share, —
For the gift without the giver is bare ;
Who bestows himself with his alms feeds three, —
Himself, his hungering neighbour, and me.' ”

“ Sir Launfal awoke, as from a swoond : —
' The Grail in my castle here is found !
Hang my idle armour up on the wall,
Let it be the spider's banquet-hall ;
He must be fenced with stronger mail
Who would seek and find the Holy Grail.' ”

Here is the moral : no matter what we give, if we give from a sense of duty, we merit nothing ; we are truly charitable and meritorious in our alms only when we give with them our feelings, or rather when we give them without motive, from the simple impulse of love. Mr. Lowell is either a bad psychologist or a bad moralist. Love, as distinguished from the sense of duty, is an affection of the sensible instead of the rational nature. He who acts from a sense of duty acts from the highest and noblest love of which man is capable ; he who acts only from what we may term sensible love acts from his lower nature, — that which he possesses in common with many animal tribes. For our own convenience and pleasure in acting, it is always desirable that our emotions should harmonize with our sense of duty ; but for the meritoriousness of our actions, it is not at all necessary. He who performs a duty which is repugnant to his nature, and which demands great self-denial and self-command, is far more meritorious than he who performs an act, in itself considered, of equal worth, to which he feels no repugnance. To throw an alms in scorn to a beggar is, indeed, not meritorious, because there is no virtuous intention, and because scorn of a brother man, however low, or however loathsome his appearance, is always wrong. But it is clear, from the author's comment, that the "scorn" he charges upon Sir Launfal, was simply giving from a sense of duty, and therefore no scorn at all.

"He gives nothing but worthless gold
Who gives from a sense of duty."

In fact, the author shows through his whole poem, that he has never made his philosophy, and is ignorant of the first principles of ethical science. This detracts from his merit as a poet no less than from his merit as a moralist. The poet aims, and should aim, at the expression of the beautiful ; but the beautiful is the form of the true, and cannot be found where the true is wanting. We are not so unreasonable as to ask of the poet a system of metaphysics or a code of ethics ; we do not ask the artist to leave his own proper department, and to enter that of science ; we understand the distinct sphere of art, and highly appreciate it, — more highly, perhaps, than we get credit for ; but we do contend that no man can be a true poet, or artist, who has in his mind a false speculative system. His mind must be informed with ideal truth, or he can never apprehend or express true beauty of form ; and all ideal truth pertains to the department of speculative science. The poet must know as well as feel, and know principles, the eternal verities of things, in their

normal order and relations, or his expression will be broken, confused, the ebullition of lawless passion, the extravagances of a wild and inconstant fancy, or the incoherent ravings of folly and madness.

Here is a point on which, in these times, there are many erroneous and mischievous opinions afloat. Every body knows that the great poets, the great artists, have never flourished, save in epochs and countries marked by severe discipline, and ennobled by serious and solid studies. The flourishing period of true art is always immediately preceded or accompanied by a flourishing period of philosophy, of moral science, and of religious truth ; and just in proportion as men lose sight of the great and eternal truths of religion, of the discoveries and teachings of a sound philosophy, — that is, of the ideal truth in the supernatural order and in the natural, — their artistic productions become mean and contemptible. It is not that art must dogmatize, speculate, or indulge in didactic teaching, but that the truths of religion and philosophy must be received into and form the mind of the artist. In ages that are serious, earnest, enlightened, when men do not scorn the ideal truth and fritter away their powers on merely external and sensible objects, these truths are generally recognized, form the basis of all moral and intellectual culture, and are taken in with ordinary speech or language, in which they are embodied, — so to speak, incarnated. The man endowed with artistic genius — that is, one who has received from nature the gift, when they are presented to his mind, of apprehending and distinguishing these truths under the form of the beautiful — is furnished with the requisite conditions of art, and can give birth to expressions which all men shall admire ; for then he has present to his mind and soul ideal truth, which is always universal and eternal.

But in other epochs, when religion and philosophy, which supply the artist with his materials, are lost sight of or obscured, — when the truths of revelation and speculative science no longer preside over education, and form the basis of moral and intellectual culture, — when the mind and the heart are turned to the external, and become intent only on sensible and material objects, — there can be no genuine art ; for the ideal truth is no longer distinctly apprehended, and, when no longer so apprehended, it can no more be expressed under the form of the beautiful than under the form of science itself. Hence it is, — though, for the last two hundred years, there has been no lack of aspirants to artistic creation, — there has been no art. The Divine

idea, supernatural truth, was obscured by the Reformers, and has been pretty much lost sight of by their descendants ; and there has appeared no philosopher, and there has been no philosophy, since the middle of the seventeenth century. The ideal truth, which was embodied by our Creator in language, has remained undistinguished ; serious studies, unless in some of the physical sciences, have been despised ; the mind has been turned outward to sensible objects, and the heart and soul have been wasted on the material, the ephemeral, and the frivolous. Art has therefore languished, and its cultivators have been able to copy only imperfectly the old masters. If we except, and we are hardly willing to except, Alfieri, there has been no poet since Milton. Goethe and Schiller had poetical genius of a high order, but the former was ruined by sensualism and pantheism, — both equally opposed to ideal truth, — and the latter by his lack of religious faith, and his Kantian philosophy, which even in the practical reason obscures and enfeebles the truth which the poet must seize and express. Byron had the subjective power of a great poet, but had present to his mind, as the material of art, far less of ideal truth than either Goethe or Schiller. France has never excelled in art, for her genius is not philosophical, does not aspire to the higher order of truth, is turned to objects of sense, to the outward world, and seldom rises above secondary ideas. The first American poet is probably not yet born.

Mr. Lowell has a lively fancy, a quick eye for material beauty, or, as we say, the beauties of nature, and considerable facility of expression. He can see and express the beauty of a daisy, of the bee collecting honey, of cows feeding in the pasture, of the cock clapping his wings and crowing, and even something of the life of a spring morning, the sultriness of a summer noon, and of the golden hues of an autumnal sunset ; but beyond or above he does not appear able to go. When he aspires, he falls ; and when he seeks to express the beauty of moral truth, he only proves that he has never clearly and distinctly beheld it. His glory is, that he believes in moral truth, — that he believes that there is the Divine and eternal idea back of the ever-changing appearances which flit past his vision ; but his misfortune is, that he has never beheld it,—that he has, at best, caught only a partial and transient glimpse of it, as one catches a partial glimpse of the objects around him, in the night, when a sudden flash of lightning for an instant furrows the darkness which envelops them. With solid training under the direction of religion and sound philosophy, which should have given elevation to his soul,

clearness to his view, firmness to his will, and sanctity to his aims, he would have been a poet. He has no complaint to bring against nature. He has, if we may so speak, genius enough potentially, and artistic genius ; but he has neither been subjected to the discipline, nor has he submitted himself to the serious and patient labor of thought, necessary to reduce the potentiality of his nature to act. Alas ! we must say this, not alone of Mr. Lowell, but of nearly all our contemporaries, in this superficial and frivolous age.

We have touched cursorily on several points in these brief remarks, which we regret that we have neither the time nor the space at present to develop. We love art, and, of the various species of art, we love poetry the best. But we have too high an appreciation of its character and office, to receive with favor the light and frivolous productions of our modern race of poetasters and versifiers, however beautiful their print and paper, or rich and tasteful their binding. Puerile conceits, flimsy sentiments, false philosophy, bad morality, even delicate and truthful descriptions of merely material objects, though expressed in flowing numbers and harmonious verse, we cannot honor with the name of poetry. We have no wish to treat harshly our young aspirants to poetic fame, to wound their feelings, or to damp their courage ; but, for the honor of our age, and the interests of modern civilization, we feel that it is necessary to raise our voice, feeble though it is, against the miserable trash which, under the name of literature, is inundating Europe and America, and threatening the extinction of what little virtue and manliness may yet remain. Would that there were amongst us a strong masculine voice, that could make itself heard amid the din and chatter of the age, and, with mingled kindness and severity, recall our youth to the antique depth of thought, greatness of soul, and energy of will, and impress upon their yet ductile minds the solemn truth that they must aim higher, submit to longer and more rigid discipline, and devote themselves for years to those solid studies which task all their faculties, and call forth all the potentialities of their souls, before venturing to appear before the public, either to instruct or to delight it. No one who would deserve well of his countrymen, leave his mark on his age, or live in the memory of his race, should entertain for a moment that silly doctrine now prevalent, that the great and enduring in art must be a spontaneous production, and that a work is worthless in proportion to the labor of intellect and will that its creation has cost. Poetry is not the instinctive and unpremeditated

utterance of the spontaneous emotions and conceits of the poet.
It might do to say,

Ich singe wie der Vogel singt
Der in dem Zweigen wohnt,

if man were a blackbird ; but it will not do, unless we are careful to understand it in Goethe's sense, now since man is man, and must find his glory in the cultivation and exercise, under the will and by the aid of his Maker, of his proper humanity.

We do not ask the poet to encroach upon the province of the theologian, or of the philosopher. We do not ask him to make his poem a sermon, a didactic lecture, nor do we wish him to be careful to tack a formal moral on to its end, as is done in *Æsop's Fables* ; but we do ask that he feed his mind and his soul with the highest order of religious and speculative truth, and that he discipline himself to express this truth under the form of the beautiful. We would have him eminently religious, because eminently true, and eminently moral, because eminently religious ; we would have him serious, earnest, great, sublime, by virtue of the universal and eternal verities of things with which he holds intercourse ; but we have no disposition to restrict his sphere, to trammel the freedom of his mind, or to forge shackles for his genius. Nay, what we desire for him is freedom, elevation, greatness, manliness, a clear and lofty intelligence, and a robust virtue, which are absolutely impossible in the nature of things without a severe and thorough discipline, and the possession of the highest order of truth, both natural and supernatural.

Our readers will understand from these remarks why it is we have been so severe on the light literature of the day, and why we have treated with so much harshness the young brood of religious novels with which we were threatened. We condemn not art in any of its forms ; we condemn not poetry ; we oppose not even works of fiction ; we object not to the cultivation of man's whole nature, to the employment of any of his faculties, or to pressing into the service of religion even sentiment and imagination : on the contrary, we approve and call for them all ; only let the mind that writes be fed, and the heart that admires be filled, with the truths of religion and philosophy. The man who has been rightly nurtured, whose faculties have been rightly disciplined, and whose mind has been enlightened, will strengthened, and soul elevated by profound study of ideal truth, and possession of the eternal verities of things, may appeal to

all nature and express himself in what forms he pleases. His expressions will be true and beautiful, his influence will be moral, will favor a robust civilization, and manly virtue, which in the saint will rise to heroic sanctity and command the veneration of all good men.

ART. IX. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. — *The History of England from the Accession of James II.* By THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY. Boston: Phillips, Sampson, & Co. 1849. Volumes I. and II. 12mo. pp. 525 and 520.

THIS is a rival edition of Macaulay's History to the Messrs. Harpers', and, though intended to be sold at a moderate price, is neatly printed on good paper, and presents, upon the whole, a respectable and even an inviting appearance. The reason assigned for issuing it was to give the American public the work in the orthography of the English edition, which the Harpers departed from in favor of the orthography of Noah Webster, our great American lexicographer. This, perhaps, was a sufficient reason for a breach of that courtesy which our publishing houses are accustomed to observe one towards another in regard to the republication of English books; but it can hardly apply in the present case, for this edition, if we have been rightly informed, departs as widely from the orthography of the English copy as the Harpers'. We have no partiality for the New York publishers, but a sense of justice compels us to say that they had as good a right to adopt Webster's orthography as the Boston publishers have to adopt Worcester's, although we follow and prefer the latter.

The Harpers, if they have not been wrongly accused, have been in the habit of taking liberties with English publications, which they can hardly justify, unless on the plea that they were born British subjects; and we are not at all displeased to see a rival house depriving them of a portion of the profits they usually reap from their disregard of the rights and dignity of authorship. We do not understand the right of American publishers to fix the orthography of the English language. We are ourselves stanch Americans, boasting an American ancestry of as long standing as any of our New England friends, and we have been brought up with a hearty hatred of England which might satisfy even our Irish friends; but in all that concerns the orthography, orthoepy, and good use of the English language, the supreme authority is in England, not in this country, and we are bound to receive the law from England instead of giving it to her. Our language is not American, but English, and we use it properly only in so far as we follow the true English usage. In regard to it, we are, and must be, as long as England remains a civilized and cultivated nation, merely provincials, and must take our fashion from the metropolis.

As to the History itself, we have now little to say. We received the two volumes at too late an hour to be able to do more than glance at a few chapters. We have read enough, however, to perceive that it is Macaulay's, a fair transcript of his mind, and may be taken as good au-

thority for judging its author, if not for judging any thing else. We hope to be able to review the work, as far as it has proceeded, in our next number. In the mean time, we can recommend it as a work of more than ordinary historical merit, learned, eloquent, and attractive, but to be read with great care and discrimination. The author has his prejudices, and is not incapable of constructing a well-turned period at the expense of truth. He tells some plain truths with regard to the Church of England, but he strikes us as being far from just to the Puritans, who, in our judgment, with all their faults, long faces, sour looks, drawling tones, psalm-singing, and cant, are, under a human point of view, always to be preferred to the swearing, toast-drinking, and licentious Cavaliers. We know that our English and American Catholic friends inherit no little of the old Cavalier contempt of the English and American Puritans; but we are not ashamed to acknowledge our Puritan descent, and the Puritans of New England need only the Catholic faith to be the noblest people on the globe. Add the Catholic faith and virtues to their unwearied industry and ceaseless activity of mind and body, to their indomitable energy, firmness and constancy of will, gravity and force of character, and you have a model people. The real elements of that character which has made England the first of modern nations, in the temporal order, are to be found in their greatest strength and activity in the Puritans and their descendants. We have, of course, no sympathy with their Puritanism, but we have sympathy with their human virtues, and would exalt them by Catholicizing instead of destroying them.

2.—*History of Maryland; from its first Settlement, in 1634, to the Year 1848.* By JAMES McSHERRY. Baltimore: Murphy. 1849. 8vo. pp. 405.

THIS is a well-printed volume, and is, for its typography and getting up, creditable to the Baltimore press. Its author is a Catholic gentleman residing in Maryland, a native, we believe, of Pennsylvania, and a graduate of Mount St. Mary's College. He displays in this work very respectable ability and industry, and we have no reason to doubt, that, in so far as he professes to relate facts, he may be relied on. With many of his opinions, and the general tone and spirit of his work, we have not been able to sympathize. Before reading a book, we often ask, Who wrote it? but in making up our judgment of it, we ask simply, What is it? We do not, because we conduct a Catholic Review, feel bound to condemn every book written by one who is not a Catholic, or to commend every book written by one who is a Catholic. We can name books written by Protestants that contain more Catholic principle than some written by Catholics. A man may have the Catholic faith, may keep the precepts of the Church, and yet, in all that concerns the application of principles to the various departments of practical life, have the views and feelings of the heterodox. Leibnitz, a professed Lutheran, was far more Catholic in principle, and in the general tendencies of his philosophy, than Des Cartes, a professed Catholic. We must tell Mr. McSherry, that, while we thank him for his book, and recognize in it a valuable contribution to the local historical literature of our country, we do not find that it has any special claims upon us as Catholics. Those of our readers who have perused it will understand at once why we cannot praise it with any great warmth. The

author commends views with regard to religious liberty, which we believe lead to indifferentism; and he shows a local feeling with which we have no sympathy, and which leads him, we will not say to overrate the virtues of Maryland, but to underrate every other section, especially our own section, of the Union. No Cavalier ever more heartily hated a Roundhead than he appears to hate a New-Englander. This is simply amusing to us as New-Englanders, but it is painful to us as Catholics. The author, moreover, shows a strange want of manliness in regard to his religion, and singular ingratitude to his own Alma Mater. When speaking of the Colleges in Maryland, he ignores all the Catholic Colleges in that State, on which its literary glory depends, and mentions only one or two feeble institutions under Protestant control. This was not by accident, for he must have heard of Georgetown College, at Georgetown, St. Mary's College, Baltimore, and have known that there was Mount St. Mary's College, near Emmitsburg, where he himself was educated, and to which the Catholic religion in this country owes some of the brightest ornaments of its hierarchy, both of the first and of the second order. We do not wish an historian to be a dogmatist or a controversialist; there is a time and a place for all things; but we cannot pardon the historian of a State founded in the main by Catholics, who studiously ignores the literary institutions which Catholics have established, and which they conduct.

As Americans, we love and honor Maryland as one of the old "Thirteen" that did her duty, and did it nobly, in the time that "tried men's souls"; and as Catholics, we love and honor her as the first and only one of the Anglo-American colonies that planted the Cross in this Western World, and brought here the Church of God, into which we trust, at no distant day, the great body of our population will be gathered. We regret that she has not found an historian more worthy of her real greatness, and one who more clearly sees and more deeply feels what it is that constitutes his peculiar and her unfading glory. Yet we would not speak harshly of the volume before us. If it might have been better, it assuredly might have been far worse, and that, in these days, is high praise.

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- 3.—*The Plan of the American Union, and the Structure of its Government, Explained and Defended.* By JAMES A. WILLIAMS. Baltimore: Sherwood & Co. 1848. 12mo. pp. 168.

THIS is a work which one must study before passing a judgment on it. We have not found time, since receiving it, to devote the attention to it which the magnitude and importance of its subject demand. As far, however, as we have examined it, although we cannot say much of its method or originality, it seems to us to take a judicious view of the general features of the American Constitution, and to be worthy of the attention of those who wish to understand the structure of the American Government. We hope soon to return to it and to its subject, and to treat them at some length.